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Summary
Critical systems thinking, dialogue and quality management
in the National Health Service
by Michael P. Walsh
This thesis considers quality in the National Health Service (NHS), the theories
of dialogue, critical systems thinking, and quality - and how these domains can be
related together to produce a new concept of quality called critical quality.
A quality gap is identified between what the NHS produces and what the public
requires of it. It is argued that this gap is unfair because of the generally unequal
access of stakeholders to decisions about quality in the NHS. It is suggested that
only through dialogue can the gap be reduced in size in a non-oppressive way.
Principles of dialogue are derived from Habermas's (1991a,b) theory of
communicative action and applied to interest group relationships using Grant's
(1989) insider/outsider model. It is argued that critical systems thinking can be
enhanced by embedding interventions within processes of dialogue, and that the
analysis of insider / outsider relationships in situations can guide the use of
critical systems thinking in creating dialogues.
Three modes of quality management are identified (strategic, normative and
critical). It is argued that the requirements and needs of the public cannot be met
by an NHS that is dominated by strategic and normative quality. Instead critical
quality, defined as the specification of services by mediation through dialogue
between stakeholders, is advocated as a fairer mode of quality management for
the NHS.
An NHS quality dialogue (the Trent Quality Initiative) is evaluated. Dialogue is
found to have occurred both within and between meetings. Two modes of peer
group participation are identified (main dialogue vs meta-dialogue) and two
general approaches to the implementation of critical quality in the NHS
(incremental vs radical). Finally critical quality in public welfare services is
discussed and a research agenda outlined for dialogue, quality and critical systems
thinking.
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chapter 1
The aims and structure of the thesis
In this thesis I address the problem that there is a gap between the quality of what
the National Health Service (NHS) provides and what individuals and collective
members of the public want from it. My main aim is to provide guidelines for
the creation and conduct of dialogue on quality issues in the NHS, between it's
users, purchasers and providers, and show how this may reduce the quality gap
systemically, systematically and above all fairly. These guidelines are based on
developments in critical systems thinking and are intended to create the
conditions for the achievement of what I shall term critical quality. To do this I
will derive the principles of dialogue from Habermas's (1991a, 1991b) theory of
communication action, analyse the potentials for dialogue between individuals
and collective actors in a variety of situations, discuss how the communicative
element of critical systems thinking may be enhanced, analyse various modes of
quality management, and finally evaluate a practical research project on quality
dialogue in the National Health Service (Gregory, Romm and Walsh, 1994).
Consequently the thesis widens the scope for the practical application of critical
systems thinking to issues in the public and private sectors of health and social
care. In the following sections I will describe the aims and content of the
succeeding chapters but first I will giye an overview of methodological aspects of
the thesis.
Throughout the thesis, so that the main argument remains as direct as possible,
strands of complimentary discussion are explained in notes and appendices. All
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quotes include the original emphasis unless otherwise stated. Because the works
of Jurgan Habermas are often published in English years after they were first
published in German I have included in appendix 'A' a chronology of all his texts
cited in the thesis. In this way I hope to avoid confusing readers when I cite
references with conflicting dates.
1.1 The aims and content of chapter 2
My aim in chapter 2 is to identify the gap in quality between public requirements
and National Health Service (NHS) provision, explain it in terms of social,
political and cultural diversity, and explain why this gap is u nfa ir. I will suggest
that the NHS should be managed in a way that will tend to reduce the size of this
gap in a fair way.
I will define the concept of a 'quality gap' in terms of a hypothetical map, on
which can be drawn boundaries around the 'requirements' that the NHS might
be called upon to fulfil, and the requirements that the NHS arguably attempts to
fulfil. By requirements I mean all the possible types and specifications of service
that the NHS might be conceivably called upon to provide by members of the
public, experts, academics, politicians and so on.
I will support the notion of a quality gap by showing that there are many
alternative socially, politically and culturally influenced views about the nature
and means of delivery of NHS services. Fundamental political differences are
briefly touched upon which have massively influenced the structures and
function of the NHS. I will argue that changes to the NHS in the 1980s have n o t
led to full commercial privatisation, despite the Conservative Government's
2
commitment to markets and executive autonomy, because of the influence of
powerful public norms that impose limits upon the way the NHS can be
managed. I will also argue that there are many kinds of health care services,
practitioners and practices within and outside the NHS. I aim to show briefly
that this political and cultural diversity often reflects fundamentally differing
theories about the nature of health, illness, healing and medicine, and of
practices based on these theories. I will argue that sometimes these differences
emerge as inconsistencies of provision and practice of care in the NHS. However
I will also argue that the NHS quality gap is not characterised merely by
differences arising out of diversity and inconsistency but by fundamental
inequalities which I define as unfair differences.. I will argue that the NHS
quality gap is partly constituted by certain unfair differences resulting from
undemocratic management processes. I will propose that more equally accessible
(or egalitarian) processes of management are required to reduce the size of the
NHS quality gap in a non-oppressive way and that the exemplary process for this
is dialogue between NHS users, purchasers and providers. The rest of the thesis
develops the the theoretical and practical basis of dialogue and relates it to critical
systems thinking, the management of quality and the pursuit of critical quality.
In chapter 3 therefore I develop the theoretical ground of dialogue.
1.2 The aims and content of chapter 3
My task in chapter 3 is to set out why and how dialogue can underpin an
egalitarian mode of NHS management which will tend to reduce the size of the
NHS quality gap. To do this I will define dialogue as a special conditional
process and identify the conditions for it to take place and the nature of the
principles for action that these imply.
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I will develop the theoretical ground of dialogue initially by explaining how
Habermas's theory of communicative action (Habermas, 1991a, 1991b) developed
from his earlier work on knowledge and human interests (Habermas, 1972). The
theory of communicative action supersedes his earlier work by focussing on the
critique of social action rather than the critique of knowledge. Habermas
identifies five kinds of social action of which the fifth kind he terms
communicative action. He argues that communicative action uniquely offers
validity claims through all other forms of social action may be evaluated
through debate. I will argue that this form of critique is inherently more
accessible to the public. In particular I will identify what I view as the most
practical, challenging and potentially useful elements of his theory - two
fundamental conditions that can permit a minimally competent individual to
engage in dialogue with other individuals and groups, and coordinate their
actions on the basis of understandings. These are the ability to deny the validity
claims made by another individual or group during acts of communication, and
the commitment to respond to such challenges by redeeming any claims made. I
will argue that these two conditions imply principles for the design and conduct
of dialogue processes that can be expressed in terms of who may participate in a
dialogue and how they may participate. Habermas's elucidation of the kinds of
validity claims made during acts of communication forms a crucial step in
defining how individuals may participate in dialogue and therefore I will discuss
them in detail.
One of the most important concepts in the theory of communicative action is
that of understanding. This concept has been subject to much criticism and
debate and I therefore attempt to clarify a practical meaning for the nature of
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understanding. I will argue that the only necessary understanding for
participants to achieve in a process of dialogue, in order that participants may
coordinate their actions in a mutually non-oppressive manner, is agreement
over the status of the validity claims being made during the course of dialogue.
i.e. over what claims have been made, challenged, successfully redeemed, and
failed. I reject the notion that any further consensus (for example over 'truth')
necessarily will emerge from dialogue but I accept that there is a possibility of
consensus on other matters.
I will also argue that dialogue can work only with special arrangements because
there is a constant threat to dialogue from strategically acting individuals or
groups which I will illustrate by comparing rational choice and communicative
action in terms of the prisoner's dilemma. I will also assess the postmodern
viewpoint of dialogue typified by Baumann (1992). Nevertheless I will argue that
the repudiation of social engineering by postmodernists is, in practice,
tantamount to rejecting dialogue itself as a form of social organisation and will
frustrate the (ironically universal) goal of postmodernists, like Baumann, which
is to spread moral subjectivity. I conclude therefore that postmodernists must
also consider how to make special arrangements for dialogue to occur between
themselves and others who have different viewpoints - such as myself.
Finally I will suggest that the NHS quality gap is, as it stands, irremediably unfair
unless special arrangements are made for widespread dialogues on the quality of
NHS services. Therefore the conditions and principles of dialogue need to be
developed further and operationalised in a practical way. The next chapter
contributes to this operationalisation by explaining how the social action
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potentials of groups and individuals may be analysed structurally with a view to
making strategic preparations for dialogues.
1.3 The aims and content of chapter 4
The operationalisation of dialogue demands some consideration of the situations
that individuals and groups find themselves in. So in chapter 41 will show how
a model of interest group relationships proposed by Grant (1978, 1989) can be
modified in order that social action potentials and obstacles to dialogue between
groups can be analysed.
Grant's model was limited to the analysis of forms of strategic action expressed in
terms of insider and outsider relations with central Government. I will broaden
Grant's model so that relations between any group may be analysed in terms of
all kinds of social action. This requires that many of Grant's assumptions are
carefully revised, in particular, the assertion that equitable access to the political
decision making process would lead to inefficiency and political paralysis. In
contrast I will argue that unequal access to decision making mechanisms is a
principle cause of the unfairness of the NHS quality gap with the waste of
resources such an unfair gap implies. Instead I will argue that public access to
decision making through dialogue processes is a technical problem to which
practical solutions can be found. Moreover I will argue that research into this
problem is essential if creativity, diversity and opportunity are to be preserved
and enhanced in the management of the NHS rather than diminished. Finally
in this chapter I will carry out a brief insider / outsider analysis of the NHS both
to illustrate the use of the enriched model and to gain some insights into the
difficulties that need to be addressed if dialogues are to be created in the NHS.
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The identification of conditions and principles for dialogue, and the analysis of
social action potentials between groups, are not in themselves sufficient to bring
about an NHS quality dialogue, nor equips participants in such a dialogue with
the agenda, knowledge and tools to begin one. In the next chapter I will consider
how critical systems thinking may contribute to filling this deficit by providing a
critical methodological framework for systemic interventions aimed at creating
dialogue.
1.4 The aims and content of chapter 5
In this chapter I intend to show how critical systems thinking (CST) can provide a
rigorous framework for participants in an NHS quality dialogue to undertake
creative thinking, choose from diverse options for coordinated social action, and
manage the implementation of these options. I will do this in two ways. Firstly
by discussing how critical systems thinking may harness diversity in the
management and systems sciences, and secondly by assessing the communicative
status of critical systems thinking.
Critical systems thinking remains a relatively new attempt to make critical and
theoretically consistent use, in systemic interventions, of the abundant diversity
of organisational perspectives. So I will begin chapter 5 by contrasting and
comparing various theories of diversity of organisational perspectives that have
impinged on critical systems thinking. In brief I review the paradigm theory of
Burrell and Morgan (1979), Reed's (1985) pluralistic theory, Gregory's (1992)
discordant pluralism (which comes from within the CST movement) and critical
systems thinking's main pluralistic theory which is termed complementarism.
There are now two variants of the latter, one that I term Flood's and Jackson's
7
(1991) complementarism (based mainly on Habermasian theory) and Flood's and
Romm's (1995) post-critical complementarism (which introduces aspects of
postmodernism). I will review each of these theories in terms of their
implications for the process of dialogue and choice of action.
The discipline of CST has always been committed more or less explicitly to
conditions of ideal speech and communicative competence as part and parcel of
its status as the application of critical social theory to problem solving. Indeed in
this thesis I am attempting to enhance the communicative aspect of CST and
bring the discipline more fully into what Habermas terms the communicative
paradigm. However a recent development in CST, the oblique use of methods
(Flood, 1995), has implications for dialogue that I will assess. Finally therefore I
will discuss the relation between CST and dialogue and outline the elements of a
dialogue framework for interventions drawing on the insider/outsider model
developed in chapter 4.
1.5 The aims and content of chapter 6
My aim in chapter 6 is to show how limited and constraining are the existing
notions of quality in manufacturing and service industries, and how the theory
of dialogue can be used to criticise constructively the management of quality. I
will do this by examining mainstream quality management approaches including
the so-called 'Guru' methods, Total Quality Management and quality methods in
the NHS. Three hidden meanings of quality are identified - strategic, normative
and critical - and the implications and variations of these are explored. Their
impact on the NHS quality gap is assessed.
8
1.6 The aims and content of chapter 7
In the seventh chapter I intend to show how dialogue processes can be
operationalised and evaluated. Therefore I will begin by discussing the practical
deign and application of guidelines in a pilot study of dialogue on quality in the
NHS in Sheffield (the 'Trent Quality Initiative' - Gregory, Romm and Walsh,
1994). I will evaluate the practical project in terms of the social action framework
developed in chapter 3:
• Aspects of strategic success or failure of the dialogue: were the
preconditions for dialogue satisfied? Chiefly: did dialogue occur during
the Trent Quality Initiative?
'Issues of acceptability: to what extent were issues of acceptability raised in
the dialogue and how were they dealt with?
• Issues of sincerity and genuineness: in what ways was sincerity
challenged or claimed?
'Extent of communicatively coordinated actions: were any actions
coordinated through dialogue?
I will use the framework to show how a meta-dialogue can be identified that
participants were not generally aware of. I will argue that providing feedback
about meta-dialogue will improve the efficiency of dialogue processes. I will also
argue that meta-dialogue might also form an alternative mode of participation in
dialogue. I will then assess two approaches to the implementation of critical
quality that I term incremental and radical.
Finally in chapter 8 I will assess to what extent the original objectivers of research
have been met, what contributions to knowledge have been made, and what
9
further research is suggested by the thesis on the development of critical quality
in public services, the relationship between quality and risk, and the future
development and application of critical systems thinking.
Now I have outlined the structure of the thesis I will clarify some of the
methodological issues underlying it.
1.7 Methodological aspects of the thesis
A large proportion of the thesis is given over to discussing the question about
how a fair hearing can be given to alternative public viewpoints given the
potentially adverse influence of social and political conditions. My answer is to
propose the process of dialogue. In making this proposal I have had to give
thought to the method of analysis that I have employed at various stages of the
research on which my thesis is based. Fortunately the analyses of Flood and
Gregory (1989) and Flood (1990) provide a basic framework which has been used
by Jackson (1991a) and Gregory (1992) with which to assess the methodological
hinterland to this thesis as I will now explain.
The key difficulty faced by a researcher in giving an account of how an issue or
idea came into being is summed up by Dr Madsen Pine (1988, p3): 'The most
difficult explanations to find are the ones no one is looking for' or, in other
words, how do you know the explanation you h a v e found is the right one and
not some other explanation which you have no knowledge of yet? Flood and
Gregory (1989) and Flood (1990), referring to systems science provide four answers
to this. They argue that there are four approaches to explaining the emergence of
a theory or method. The first approach is to describe and explain the
development of the theory, or even more broadly an idea or situation, as a linear
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chronological pathway. Logic is seen as sequential and therefore systematic
inquiry leads like natural science, with the occasional serendipitous hop, to the
accumulation of knowledge which grows ever more complete. This view is
exemplified by Popper's (1979, ch.7) (biblical?) metaphor of a tree of knowledge
that can both grow steadily and evolve Darwinistically. This kind of theory is
implicit in the work of Jackson (1991a) and Reed (1992a) who both explain how
theories and methods have evolved from the deficiencies of previous theory and
methods.
Pine qualifies this linear sequential view:
In our world truth is often silenced by force. Galileo is made to
recant; heretical books are consigned to the flames, sometimes
accompanied by their hapless authors. The more velvet-gloved
force of modern times gives academic preference to those who
toe the line, and denies it to others. Opinionated academics in
positions of power advance supporters and sycophants and try to
deny a hearing to those who would challenge the work on
which a lifetime's career has been built.
Pine (1988, p6).
At once Pine (1988) has identified a key problem that some, perhaps all, ideas
may be distorted by forces operating on them. This is a powerful theory that is
discussed in chapter 3 drawing on the work of Habermas (1972, 1990, 1991a,
1991b). Nevertheless some ideas, true of false, 'win through' if the linear
sequential approach is to be believed. Surely, it might be argued in a parody of
Darwinistic natural selection, truthful ideas survive and false ones disappear?
Pine (1988, p6) casts doubt:
It is true that some ideas did win through: these are the ones we
know about. It is quite possible that other, true ideas did not:
these are the ones we do not know about. We cannot say how
many scholars failed to gain the position needed to develop and
advance their ideas, or how many discontinued promising lines
of research in order to be eligible for some temporal rewards.
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We do know of some ruined by poverty or driven to suicide.
We know of many cases in which powerful men were able to
swing influence behind inferior ideas by successfully squeezing
out better ones. The argument that the truth wins through
eventually corrupts the Whig fallacy of history by assuming that
the function of the past was to lead up to the present.
Pine (1988, p6).
Truth is therefore not the inherent quality that an idea, theory, situation or event
needs in order to survive, reproduce and prosper. An account of the emergence
of the National Health Service (NHS), Habermasian theory, or critical systems
thinking for that matter, then, cannot simply be a chronological table of events,
inventions and innovations for that may overlook significant aspects of
development. Therefore I will not give a simple history of the NHS. Instead I
will suggest that the NHS can be seen as a rational political achievement and also
the view that it is a product of social upheaval. I will do this to show that the
current situation of the NHS may exist for reasons other than those commonly
given.
Flood and Gregory (1989) review a second theory: structuralism. This theory
states that there is some structural logic operating beneath the surface appearance
(Flood, 1990, Jackson, 1991, Giddens, 1993) that may explain why some ideas
succeed and others do not even come into being. Flood and Gregory (1989, p58)
only identify two structural analyses of the 'systems paradigm': Cornock (1978)
and Van Gich and Stolliday (1980). In the field of organisation studies Reed (1985,
1992a, 1992b) utilises Giddens (1984) structuration theory, which explains
structures as the reflexive creations of the actions they produce, to explain
organisations as central elements of modernisation but not to explain the
emergence of management and systems sciences. The notion can be developed
by considering the relations between individuals and groups in social action
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terms. This I will do in chapter 4 by modifying Grant's (1989) insider / outsider
model. Insider / outsider groups can be seen as structural sources of social
actions, with potentials to act in particular ways with respect to other groups.
This can lead to the domination of theory and practice in academic communities
(Walsh and Gregory, 1994). There are other explanations to consider and one of
these proposed by Flood and Gregory and deriving from Kuhn (1970) is that of
'world viewism'.
A 'world view' is characterised, as Pine (1988, p7) puts it, by a 'community of
interest' that forms and supports an idea perhaps under hostile conditions. They
constitute a kind of intellectual pressure group and struggle over the years until
the inconsistencies and inadequacies of the old paradigm become too great a
burden. Then Kuhn (1970) argues that extraordinary science or, for Pine (1988,
p8), 'trail-blazing' politics, for a short time dominate until the new revolutionary
paradigm is in place having sucked all that was worthwhile out of the old (Flood,
1990). Yet Pine (1988) observes that Kuhn's model deals with the people who
have the ideas and not the ideas themselves. The scientific revolution is in
people's heads and therefore for Popper (1979) Kuhn's theory is inadequate as an
explanation of the progression of scientific knowledge. As Flood puts it, world
viewism is an interpretivistic theory of the 'progress' of positivistic knowledge
(1990, P115). Pine (1988, p9) argues that world viewism is an adequate theory of
fashionable science, and of fashionable politics, but it does not explain how
scientific theories become popularly acceptable or in other words how the new
paradigm wins the grand 'battle for ideas' (Pine 1988, p13). Moreover she
disputes the presupposition inherent in world viewism that 'events will follow
in the wake' of the 'victory' of ideas' (1988, pl7), a notion she feels is exemplified
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by Keynes famous remark that: '(m)admen in authority, who hear voices in the
air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back'
(Pine, 1988, p18). Pine argues against this. In her opinion it is 'by no means
necessarily so that people in authority are the unwitting puppets of former
scribblers' and that it is the weakest assumption to suppose a link between 'the
intellectual victories and the practical ones' (Pine 1988, pI8).
Pine does not entirely accept either the linear-sequential or world view theories
of emergence and therefore she proposes a 'public choice theory' of a 'political
market' to explain the predominance of ideas. Pine's (1988, p71) approach (which
is in the tradition of Adams Smith (1910) requires an analysis of 'public choices' -
strategic, selfish, utility maximising action - at various moments of history. Her
public choice theory is explicitly based on the principle from economics that
'people act to maximise their advantage' (Pine, 1988, p71). In Dunleavy's (1991)
terms it is a political economy approach. Although Pine is concerned with local
or government policy her proposal has wider currency: a Pirean 'political market'
analysis of the emergence of an idea would focus on acts of selfishness amongst
the powerful. This would explain the dominance of some ideas rather than
others because of political market forces in which truthfulness offers no special
advantage.
However, the Habermasian theory I will develop in chapter 3 and 4 shows that
strategic action is just one of several kinds of social action. Where in Pine's
analysis one only looks for micropolitical processes of selfishness, there are
certain other forms of action (normative, dramaturgical, communicative) and
structured circumstances (insider/outsider groups) that have also to be accounted
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for. Pine (1988, p129) acknowledges certain factors like those of 'tradition' and
'entrenched interest groups', which hint at an awareness of the potential for
normatively regulated action, but she chooses to focus solely and simplistically
upon strategic action and the selfish 'market of politics'. Consequently the Pine
model can only explain one aspect of the emergence of ideas. In contrast, the
enriched insider/outsider model offers more detail of political structures and
forms of action that can enhance or supplant linear-sequential and world view
explanations. However there is one other approach to the emergence of theories,
ideas and situations that Flood and Gregory (1989) and Flood (1990) refer to:
Foucauldian genealogy.
Genealogy is an approach that effectively treats all ideas, issues, and situations as
stories. Consequently knowledge of an event, a situation, an issue, or an idea is
carried by language in a 'discursive formation' (Flood, 1990, p115). The
domination and ascendancy of any particular idea is therefore due to the
supreme inner micro-power of a discursive formation exerted over the inferior
power of lesser formations. Knowledge and power are inextricably linked and so
a dominating knowledge is congruent with dominating power. Discursive
formations crisscross in 'living' networks of domination and subjugation. Truth
is no longer an external virtue by which an idea can be judged but is simply a
label given to some discursive formations. This label is 'not a timeless and
essential secret, but the secret that they have no essence' (Foucault, 1984, p78)
because that which is called 'true' dominates by exerting superior power rather
than by superior reason. It is possible though to go back and 'read' discursive
formations, especially but not solely in documents, and to see the points at which
they begin to dominate or were subjugated, and to see the evidence of correcting
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and rewriting as formations succumbed or triumphed (Foucault 1971 pp 145-172).
Through this a genealogical tree can be written that charts the flux and wane of
discourses in generating what is in being today. If this approach had been
adopted this thesis would look quite different. Interestingly it remains unapplied
to the domain of systems science. As Flood and Gregory (1989), Flood (1990),
Jackson (1991) and (Gregory, 1992) each point out at a different chronological
point, no one has yet attempted the massive task of exploring all the writings that
branch backwards from the moment of ascendancy enjoyed by critical systems
thinking. Flood (1990) attempts a systematic integration of Foucauldian and
Habermasian methodology to produce a new meta-paradigmatic perspective that
he calls 'liberating systems theory' which is a development of the critical systems
thinking paradigm. As such Flood attempts to explain the emergence of systems
thinking by drawing upon the four approaches to emergence as theoretical
elements of a meta-approach legitimated by his complementarist perspective in
which he seeks to liberate and critique knowledges. For example, Flood (1990,
p120-130) undertakes an ideological liberating discourse of resistance to the
subjugation of General Systems Theory but not, despite his overall Foucauldian
theme, a genealogy of critical systems thinking.
However, as Gregory (1992) points out, it is not clear that this approach offers a
better account than any of other three. Rather it would offer a different
explanation of the emergence of theory and practice. Moreover the
poststructural / postmodern theory that has grown rapidly in recent years
threatens to privilege language over other important elements of social life as
Hughes (1992) points out.
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Each of these approaches can offer only a partial approach to the discussion of
ideas. I will be using the insider / outsider model (developed in chapter 4) at
various moments in chapters 5, 6 and 7 to give accounts that apply elements of
linear-sequentialism in the description of evolving situations, structuralism in
the description of the pattern and regularity of relations between and within
insider / outsider groups and world viewism as one or other group is seen to
dominate.
Another methodological aspect of the thesis is that it is inevitably heavily
influenced by the work of Jurgan Habermas. His theory follows what Popper
(1979) terms the 'traditional western' philosophical split between mind and body.
Arising out of this dualism is the phenomenology in which the human ability to
act (centred in the ego) is separated from the physical apparatus with which
actions are carried out - the body. This is problematical and has led to all manner
of debates such as that between 'foundationalist' (belief in universal truths) /
anti-foundationalist (nothing is universal) schools of philosophy reviewed 1y
Flood (1990). In chapter 3 I discuss Habermas's theory in some depth but I am not
attempting a comprehensive philosophical critique of Habermas or his critics -
those are listed in the references!
The thesis to some extent tests Habermas's theory of communicative action
(1991a, 1991b) heuristically and empirically which are processes he regards as
characteristic of what he terms 'reconstructive science' (White, 1988, p130). This
has been challenged as not being science at all (Alford, 1985) which is a fair
comment if the term science is reserved for the belief that through 'scientific
method' (such as that evinced by Popper) truth accumulates in hops, skips and
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jumps either through a growing tree of knowledge (Popper, 1979, pp 256-285) or
through 'scientific revolutions' (Kuhn, 1970). The key to Habermasian theory is
what he terms the lifeworld. The lifeworid is a sociocultural 'cognitive reference
system' (1991b, pI36) which consists of symbolic structures 'reproduced by way of
the continuation of valid knowledge' - a taken-for-granted background to
everyday life which is continually revised and refreshed during social
interaction. Central to this process of cultural reproduction is 'communicative
action which serves to transmit and renew cultural knowledge' (Habermas,
1991b, p137). Given this view, theory and observation can never be value
neutral, and objectivity is intersubjective. In other words a key assumption of
this thesis is that all theory has been constructed from a background full of social
influence and interaction that also influences observation - such a view is
increasingly common in organisational sociology / behaviour (e.g. Reed and
Hughes, 1992; Tsoukas, 1994) and in debates about important social variables such
as quality (Flood, 1993) and risk (Pidgeon, Hood, Jones, Turner and Gibson, 1992).
Therefore no inquiry can ever be regarded as anything other than a partial view
and all conclusions are tentative or contestable not simply as to whether the
'experiment' has been conducted appropriately, but also as to whether the
concepts represent something other than what is given.
While this means Popper's tree is somewhat wilted, and Kuhnian revolutions
are not they appear to be (see chapter 5), there is still a task of logical discussion
and empirical observation to be undertaken. Accordingly the heuristic test of the
theory of communicative action is in the degree of coherence and logical
applicability of Habermas's theory when, following critical discussion and
suitable qualification, it is used to illuminate other fields of inquiry. In this thesis
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this is done by discussing the background to, and development of the theory of
communicative action in chapter 3. Then in chapter 4 I apply the theory of
communicative action to enrich Grant's (1989) model of pressure group
relationships. The enriched model has been applied elsewhere to model a
variety of human situations including that of terrorism in Northern Ireland and
the problem of paradigm incommensurability in the systems sciences (Walsh and
Gregory, 1994). Habermas's theory is also applied to the analysis of the
communicative status of critical systems thinking (chapter 5) and it used later to
differentiate various modes of quality management (chapter 6). Secondly
Habermas's theory has been empirically tested to some extent during the Trent
Quality Initiative (Gregory, Romm and Walsh, 1994). I review this practical
project in chapter 7. The empirical categories are derived from the theory of
communicative action and are outlined in chapter 7 (paragraph 7.1).
Finally the practical project discussed in chapter 7 employed the premises of
action research (Gill, 1975; Jackson, 1991), by involving researchers and
participants in a learning exercise, in which the participants were making
decisions about the agendas of subsequent research meetings. The goal of the
project was to create a dialogue between NHS users, purchasers and providers in
which the participants would be able to 'generate increased understanding as well
as enriched conceptions of possibilities for action' (Gregory, Romm and Walsh,
1994, p14). I will be enlarging upon the role of dialogue in the project and of the
project findings for the process of dialogue in chapter 7. The thesis opens then i n
chapter 2, with a discussion about the NHS quality gap.
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Chapter 2
Diversity, inequality and the National Health Service
The following policy question is central to this thesis: how should the National
Health Service (NHS) be managed? In this chapter I will argue that there is often
an unfair gap in quality between what the National Health Service (NHS)
provides and what is often required by the British public both individually and
collectively. I will further argue that the the NHS should be managed in a way
that will close the quality gap systematically and systemically. This, I will suggest,
cannot be achieved fairly in a narrow, expert, monological way but only through
a widespread series of public dialogues.
I will approach this task by highlighting the diversity of the politics of the NHS,
of beliefs about the nature of health, illness, disease and healing and some of the
inconsistencies of professional practice in the NHS. The implications of such
diversity and inconsistency of health care in the United Kingdom can begin to be
revealed by an hypothetical mapping of perceived requirements and identifying
ethical and technical boundaries in service provision. The difference between
what is provided and what is required I will term the NHS quality gap. I will
argue that this throws into relief aspects of inequality that need to be addressed in
NHS quality management if there is to be a fair provision of services to the
public.
I will begin however with an appreciation of some of the background and vital
statistics of the NHS as it currently stands.
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2.1 The National Health Service in the 1990s
The NHS is not an easily described institution. Simply in terms of size it is
unique: it has been called the largest European employer since the disbandment
of the Warsaw Pact (Ellis and Whittington, 1994). In one form or another it
pervades virtually every part of the United Kingdom providing all residents,
visitors and travellers with access at least to emergency medical care through
accident and emergency departments. General Practitioners (GPs) offer primary
care services to registered patients, (and visitors who register as temporary
patients), and there are few communities that do not have a GP surgery located
within a few miles. The NHS provides hospital and community health care
although local social services now have the main responsibility for providing
continuing care in the community for those individuals with permanent
disabilities and infirmities.
Although NHS users have always borne so me of the costs of using services (for
example patients are not compensated by the NHS for lost work or leisure time)
the NHS remains largely free at the point of delivery. The most common charge
(which is by no means insignificant) is for prescribed medicine obtained from
pharmacies. The NHS is the second largest public expense after Defence spending
with a budget of some £32 billion per annum1 (Robertson, 1994, para 20/2) of
which more than half goes on salaries2 for its more than 800,000 employees3
(Department of Health, 1992d, and see Robertson, 1994, para 19/6). NHS
hospitals, clinics and surgeries offer and create local employment. Consequently
the NHS not only redistributes wealth from richer people to poorer people Iy
making services accessible at lower costs it also a major redistributor of wealth
around British communities.
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The structure of the NHS has altered several times since it was formed in 1948.
The current structure us given in Figure 1. From 1989 the NHS has been
increasingly based upon the separation of purchasers, providers and users of
NHS services (Department of Health, 1989b) and this change is now virtually
complete. The NHS reforms were intended to create an internal market for
health services. In this market NHS purchasers (the Health Authorities and
'fund holding' GPs), NHS providers (meaning NHS Trust hospitals, community,
ambulance and other NHS trusts and non-NHS providers) and NHS users (or
'patients') act strategically with respect to one another.
Secretary of State
for Health
Non fund holding	 Fund holding General
General Practitioners	 Practitioners
Private sector
providers
Figure 1: The structure of the National Health Service from April 1995, based on
The Health Services Year Book, 1994, p.xii
The meaning of strategic action I will explore in great detail in chapter 3 but in
practice it means that NHS purchasers are supposed to buy comprehensive
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health services for their local communities and individual patients and to do this
they must 'shop around' to find the best 'deals' from health service providers
(whether NHS Trusts or private sector providers). Providers are supposed to
compete with each other for purchaser revenue by offering better or cheaper or
innovatory health services. NHS users are supposed to be able to choose between
treatment options purchased on their behalf by their GPs. Providers can 'win'
revenue or 'lose' revenue to competitors. Although NHS Trusts are not
permitted to make profits or losses they can invest surplus revenues in
developing services and improve pay and conditions. If they lose revenues they
may conceivably cease to exist although emergency management to prevent this
is likely to be installed by the Department of Health. No NHS Trust has yet
ceased 'trading' although some, like the Bradford Royal Hospitals Trust do seem
to have been in difficulties (Harvey-Jones, 1992).
There are signs of changes to the original market structure envisaged in 1989
which enabled NHS purchasing authorities to buy services from any source.
These include the emergence of purchaser conglomerates comprising numbers of
GP fundholders and Health Authorities that have made agreements to
coordinate their spending (Harrison, 1994; Robertson, 1994). Further changes are
forecast in the distribution and activity of NHS units since they can now operate
with greater autonomy.
Now that a flavour of the NHS in terms of its gross structure, size and
disposition has been given I shall discuss an aspect of diversity that is implicated
in the creation of the NHS and in it's potential demise - the diversity of political
views about the NHS.
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2.2 The diverse politics of the NHS
The history of the NHS is marked by fluctuating political tensions that are still
present and influencing the corporate whole of the NHS. In order to try and
reveal some of these tensions I will discuss the political background to the
creation and continuation of the NHS. However it is necessary to provide two
cautions. Firstly I am using the term politics in this context to refer to
fundamental decisions about the NHS that are sometimes termed ma cro-
political. These are usually regarded as national in scale (in that they directly
affect people within specific parts of the United Kingdom), and dominate the
policy analysis literature (for example see Stacy, 1991; Hill, 1991). Policy analysis is
a contentious area because there is no consensus explanation as to how policy is
made, implemented or evaluated (for many debates see Hill, 1991). I do not
intend to undertake a policy analysis. Instead I will concentrate on illustrating
the diversity of political viewpoints and how political decision making may be
constrained by subtle but powerful public expectations (or norms). I will argue
that these influences need to be recognised and accounted for in any programme
of NHS quality management. Secondly in contrast to the macro level policy
decisions, myriad local micro-political decisions are made by individuals but are
often assumed to be summative, with macro-political outcomes - this is a typical
assumption in economics4. I will deal with micro-politics mainly in chapter 3 in
the more specific and more powerful social action terms of Habermasian
sociology. However I will discuss some of the influences on local individual
decisions in section 2.3 under the diversity of health-illness and healing beliefs.
Political views about the NHS vary from consensus about it's general role as a
provider of social welfare to political extremes of the 'new right' and the
Democratic Left: the NHS is accused by the new right of being a potentially
infinite drain on resources requiring immediate reform - a 'monopolistic
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monster' as Marsiand and Segalman (1989) put it. Or it is seen as a marvellous
example of socialism redistributing the national wealth, 'from those according to
means, to those according to needs' as the Democratic Left would express it. Or
again the NHS is seen by the World Health Organisation (WHO) as a vital health
and welfare support system satisfying fundamental human rights. The intensity
of such views and the tensions they produce are discernible in the debate over
what has been termed the welfare state as I will now explain.
2.2.1 The NHS and the postwar welfare consensus
The NHS is inseparably linked with the welfare state. Johnson (1987, chapter 1)
defines the 'welfare state' as a post war shorthand for economic and social policy
changes that were supposed to 'transform British society'. These politically
socialist changes were concerned with expanding social services, maintaining full
employment and nationalising industry. Each change required the state to
intervene and plan for the nation as a whole. The NHS may be regarded as both
an expanded social service and as a nationalised industry.
According to Johnson (1987) this kind of change has been an international
phenomenon with all democratic-capitalist economies developing social
programmes to a greater or lesser extent since the late 19th century. Whilst it
does not explain the development of the post war welfare state, arguably one of
it's fundamental characteristics (in Britain and abroad), is the broad political
consensus of support for welfare amongst both Governments and oppositions.
Johnson remarks that 'the growth of state intervention [...] occurred which ever
party was in power; parties of the centre, right and left seemed to be in
agreement' (1987, p155). In the United Kingdom the NHS remains a startling
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sign that there has been a British political consensus on welfare. A consensus
what is more about the NHS in particular that has seemingly remained intact in
the face of ever increasing political conflict since the 1970s - something Klein has
called a 'paradox' (Klein, 1989, p203). He argues that although the NHS 'has
become more politically controversial than ever before' nevertheless 'all parties
(have) embraced the NHS' (1989, p203). However he adds that this continuing
consensus remains 'more apparent than real since it contains disagreement about
what the 'principles' of the NHS actually entail' (1989, p203). In other words the
diversity of political viewpoints in Great Britain remained even though there
seemed to be a consensus over health care. He argues that consensus was
possibly more related to the intolerance of 'muddle, inefficiency and
incompetence' than to social injustice and that it concerned a common policy
end but not the means (1989, p7).
Nevertheless the longevity of the NHS health care consensus has been sustained
against an international climate of political fragmentation and increasing
dissensus. Mishra (1990) argues that the consensus over welfare in general all
over the western world has declined as material conditions became more difficult
especially from the late 1970s onwards. Therefore he entitles chapter 1 'the end of
post-war consensus around the mixed economy and the welfare state'. According
to Mishra 'welfare-capitalism' in the West was riven with difficulties during the
1970s not least amongst which was 'stagflation' (Mishra, 1990, p12) which means
the condition of rising deficit between Government spending and income, rising
unemployment, increasing inflation and economic stagnation. Western
economies were perceived by some to be out of control and in crisis. This led to
dissatisfaction and misery in workplaces and in communities, and to the
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radicalism of the new right in advocating 'purer' capitalism, while the left had
no electorally viable radical ways to go (Mishra, 1990, p14; Glennerster and
Midley, 1991, p22).
Mishra argues that in the West generally no new economic and social political
'orthodoxy' has yet emerged in place of the declining consensus. In Great Britain
in 1979 Margaret Thatcher came to power after the 'winter of discontent' at the
height of disillusionment with the old political settlements but not at the head of
a new radical and complete consensus. Less than half of the electorate at any
General Election from 1979 onwards have ever voted for the Conservative party
and its radical anti-corporatist policies. Therefore Conservative political
dominance since 1979 may be defined partly as a consequence of dissent in the
opposing ranks and the mathematical trick of the British first-past-the-post
electoral process. So it is safe to say that whereas there had been a welfare
consensus there was and there remains a diversity of macro-political views about
the future of welfare and of the NHS.
Johnson (1987, p30), referring to Britain, is anyway less certain about the role of
'consensus' arguing that there have always been 'criticisms in plenty from all
quarters' about the welfare state and (literally) puts a question mark against the
notion of the 'end' of consensus. Yet she too detects that 'a change in emphasis
has undoubtably occurred' (1987, p54) from what used to be a welfare state to
welfare pluralism in which there is ambivalence toward the continuation of state
provision of any kind, and a greater reliance on individual resources, and self-
help.
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In order to illustrate some of the tensions of the politics of the NHS, and of the
complexity of policy analysis, I now want to briefly review two explanations as to
how the NHS came into being. The first is the traditional view that the NHS
came into being as a rationally forged consensus of political action. The other
view is that the NHS exists not because of rational planning but because of the
effects of powerful nation-girdling norms crystallised through war effort in the
20th century.
2.2.2 The NHS: consensus forged
The National Health Service came into being through the National Health
Service Act (1946) of the post-war landslide Labour Government and began
working in 1948. The key functional commitment of the NHS, spelled out
during the war, was that
(t)he availability of necessary medical services shall not depend
on whether people can afford to pay for them, or any other factor
irrelevant to real need [...] money should not be allowed to stand
in the way of providing advice, early diagnosis and speedy
treatment.
Command 6502 (1944).
Allsop (1984, p11) calls the Act 'a major political achievement' for Aneurin
Bevan. If Churchill was the political dynamo for the war effort then Bevan was
the political dynamo for what might be termed the 'health effort'. In the way
that Churchill's role was to oppose 'Nazism and it's odious apparatus'
(Churchill, 1940) Bevan's role was to oppose the 'Giant of Sickness' that he
identified in the famous 'Beveridge Report' on social insurance (Command 6404)
in 1942 (Allsop, 1984, p11).
28
Bevan was a contemporary of Beveridge who, with the economist Keynes, leant
what Johnson (1987, p3) calls 'intellectual credibility' to the welfare state.
However
Even more significant, perhaps, was that neither Keynes nor
Beveridge saw increased state intervention as being inimical to
capitalism and the market economy. Indeed, they would be
more efficient
Johnson (1987, p155).
So here is an indication of the argument that had been won, on which the future
development of welfarism and the NHS would depend, for even conservatives
expressed their 'reluctant acceptance' of the welfare state and a National Health
Service (Johnson, 1987,pl55):
We accept the principle, and we accept the consequences that
flow from it. We understand, for example, that once we are
committed, to the principle of a 100 per cent service, we require
an enormous expansion and development in the health services
as a whole.
Mr Richard Law (conservative), debate with Mr Bevan on
the NHS, Hansard, 30th April 1946 (Bevan, 1946).
However, there was hostility amongst many politicians and doctors toward the
perceived interference of the state in the 'sacred' domain of medicine, because it
seemed 'reminiscent of state fascism' of the kind recently subjugated during the
war (Alisop, 1984, p12). Nevertheless there was widespread acceptance of the
collectivist principle: 'The Second World War had changed the whole mood of
influential sections of the population to state intervention' (Ailsop, 1984, p13).
This mood change eventually led to Bevan's political victory in obtaining, as
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Ailsop notes, the 'eventual agreement of the majority of doctors to join the
service' (1984, p11). The post-war welfare consensus may therefore be regarded as
a politically skilful achievement of tact and intellect. However seeing the
inception of the NHS as an achievement of socialist politics, although the
argument in Command 6502 is clear, may risk overlooking the role of the war in
forging another kind of political consensus - a norm based unity.
2.2.3 NHS welfare, social upheaval and war
It would be very hard not to see the enactment of the socialist principle of the
NHS - collective responsibility for comprehensive, equally accessible, health
services for all - as not unrelated to the great national war effort based on
strategically and nationally planned rationing (of work, goods, services, dangers
etc). War has often spurred concern for the citizens health:
In the Manchester district 11,000 men offered themselves for war
service between the outbreak of hostilities in October 1899 and
July 1900. Of this number 8000 were found to be physically unfit
to carry a rifle and stand the fatigues of discipline. Of the 3000
who were accepted only 1200 attained the moderate standard of
muscular power and chest measurement required by the
military authorities. In other words, two out of every three men
willing to bear arms in the Manchester district are virtual
invalids.
White (1901), p100-103
The Boer War, the Great War and the Second World War are each seen by Alisop
to have some part in leading to the establishment of the NHS. However it may
be that the creation of the NHS has nothing to do with wartime strategy (for
obtaining fit soldiers) or high socialist principles but everything to do with the
public experience of war and social upheaval: World War Two mobilised British
30
people in new ways and to new extremes creating public entitlements to
collective striving for a common goal - to defeat the unambiguously identified
enemies: Germany, Japan and sickness. The NHS is therefore possibly part of the
war debt of the nation to the vast majority of its people who, united through war
effort rather than socialistic ideals, feel individually entitled to a guarantee of
social security of which the NHS is part.
How can this nation-girdling norm be shown to exist? There are no absolute
proofs but there are right wing factions who advocate the abolition of the NHS
and yet despite the unprecedented term of Conservative government somehow
cannot achieve it. This is expressed very clearly by Marsland and Segalman (1989)
who argue that the NHS should be abolished. In its place they advocate a Swiss
style private health care system with a 'safety net' incorporating strict forms of
economic and social rehabilitation for those whose circumstances merit it. In
their view the NHS is simply another enormous example of the kind of free
welfare that creates the problems it is intended to solve. According to them the
NHS creates social dependency and it is economically crippling for both
subscriber and dependent. There is no ambiguity about their attitude to the NHS!
What is more the whole thrust of the Conservative government under Thatcher
and Major generally is that socialism is finished (Hunt, 1994), the 'nanny' state is
dead (Clarke, 1994), and consequently privatisation, claimed John Redwood in
1988 (who was the only Prime-ministerial candidate other than John Major in
1995) is the solution to the problems of the NHS (Redwood, 1988; Letwin and
Redwood, 1988).
If the NHS were to be privatised it would reduce the public tax burden by a
potentially substantial proportion of £3lbn, allowing a reduction of income tax Ly
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several percent; it would pull in billions in share capital into NHS trusts -
perhaps far more than for any other privatisation undertaken by the
government; it would solve the perennial problem of deciding which hospitals
to keep open in places like London (where several world famous centres of
excellence are threatened with closure because of over supply, (Kings Fund, 1992))
because the market would decide. Moreover the Conservative Bow Group (1983)
of MPs deplored the Thatcher pledge on the NHS ('safe in our hands') and were
simply being consistent with new right ideals in the 1980s. Most recently the
former Chief Executive of the NHS, Duncan Nicholl (a Thatcherite who
implemented the 1989 reforms of the NHS and is now chair of BUPA a private
health insurance company), stated that the NHS should begin to sell it's services
privately and rejects the premise that it can continue to provide services out of
general taxation. He argued that the NHS cannot provide all the services
demanded of it - there is a gap between demand and the supply of resources that
can only be made up through some patients paying fees (BBC, Breakfast News,
19th September, 1995). So it can be seen that the NHS should be a prime target for
privatisation under the current Conservative government. Consequently it
appears strange, given the right wing rhetoric of the 1980s and the resource panics
of the 90's, that the NHS has not been privatised even though it has been
reformed to the stage that it could be done - the NHS now comprises quasi-
autonomous units that could become fully independent corporations. Yet
Stephen Dorrell, the Secretary of State for Health, was put in the position
throughout the day on the 19th September 1995 of restating the long term
commitment of the government to the NHS as a service financed out of general
taxation. This is surely not because the government have lost faith in capitalism!
Rather, it may be that no government can privatise the NHS because it is
protected by a widespread view, a feeling of entitlement, that it should not be
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privatised. The government dare not waver for a moment on it's commitment
to the NHS. If this is so then it is not surprising that the NHS remains in public
ownership. What other explanation can account for the stupendous revenues
probably foregone by the Government?
I will not speculate further about why and how the NHS continues to exist even
as it is, although there are other possibilities I could explore, political-economic
arguments for example. Rather I simply wish to show that whenever supposedly
rational plans are made for the NHS, they must take into account that
implementation may be profoundly affected by extra-rational considerations. I
will enlarge upon this in chapter 3. However i now want to turn to another
aspect of diversity that influences the management of the NHS - the cultural
variation in health-illness beliefs.
2.3 The diverse meanings of health, illness, disease and healing
It may seem obvious but neither the communities served by the NHS, nor the
professions and professionals of the NHS, nor its organisational units, nor the
international environment of health care, are culturally and socially
homogeneous. Indeed it is widely acknowledged that there are enormous
variations in any variable you care to define between geographical and social
situations of the NHS whether it is community health indicators by social class
(Department of Health and Social Security, 1980), GP referral rates (Department of
Health, 1989b), anomalies of medical practice (Peckham, 1995), or health-illness
beliefs and practices (Helman, 1990).
Given that such variation exists it may appear bizarre to deal with issues like
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quality as if the population were, or more provocatively should be,
homogeneous. Yet to an extent this attitude may be no better exemplified than in
the forthcoming research and development conference organised by the NHS
management on the scientific basis of health services (Department of Health,
1995). To see why this is an inadequate basis for the management of the NHS it is
necessary to examine the diversity of views about the nature of health, illness
and healing.
To begin with despite being called the National Health Service, the meaning of
health is rarely mentioned in any NHS policy discussion except as a passing and
inadequate definition (Seedhouse, 1986). This seeming neglect of the meaning of
health in local and national NHS policy making is at odds with the diversity of
health-illness belief and practices that are observable amongst its employees and
users. Indeed Helman (1990) observes that variations of perception of the
meanings of health, illness, disease and healing occurs across and within all
communities of the UK, including the NHS professions.
The providers of health care in the United Kingdom can be divided into formal
and informal, charitable, commercial and public sectors including the NHS.
These sectors offer a wide variety of what Helman (1990) calls 'therapeutic
options'. He lists more than sixty kinds of 'healer' that a British citizen might
consult some of whom are available 'on' the NHS. The most common form of
medicine offered by the NHS is given a variety of names. Leslie (1976) refers to it
as 'western' or 'cosmopolitan' medicine. More familiarly Helman (1990) calls it
'scientific' or 'orthodox' medicine. This is the usual form of medicine 'produced'
by the NHS.
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However the NHS also officially offers homeopathy which originated in Europe
and is also a professionalised form of medicine. Although it is practised lr
'scientific' doctors in the NHS, and there are NHS hospitals that specialise in
homeopathy, it is based on principles that are clearly antithetical to scientific
medicine (Gregory and Walsh, 1993). So while the NHS is an orthodox source of
medicine sometimes it is scientific medicine and at other times not. The
provision of unorthodox alternative or complementary medicine through the
NHS is growing although this is often provided less formally (Helman, 1990;
Gregory and Walsh, 1993).
A major source of professionalised alternative medicine is the variety of ethnic
groups in Britain that preserve and transfer beliefs and practices that originate in
other parts of the world. The most prevalent and well known examples are the
Asian professionalised 'medical systems' as Leslie (1976) calls them. These
include Hindu vaids, Muslim fakims, acupuncturists, chiropractors, Chinese
herbalists and so on.
Another source of diversity of health-illness beliefs and practices are the varieties
of what Helman (1990) calls 'folk medicine'. These are not professionalised
'medical systems' in Leslie's sense although terms can become confusing since
Fitzpatrick (1986) also refers to Ayervedic medicine, which is highly
professionalised, as a 'folk' system. Folk medicine may still be the preserve of
special practitioners who are called upon for assistance, such as faith healers or
local herbalists, but this category also includes family remedies for illnesses and
they correspond more to a notion of 'lay' belief when they are compared with
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collegially developed and formally professionalised medicine.
The diversity of lay perceptions of health, illness, disease and healing have been
well documented. For example Helman (1986) gives British examples of lay
models of colds and fever that feature their own detailed notions of cause and
appropriate treatment and later (1990) gives an international anthropological
summar?. Sometimes lay anatomical beliefs involve metaphors. Helman (1990)
gives an example of beliefs in which the internal body is likened to domestic
plumbing. Other powerful metaphors feature strongly in lay 'representation' of
disease as Fox (1993, p3) observes like those identifying cancer as 'the enemy' and
AIDS as a 'plague'. Kleinman (1988) discusses how illness can be seen as a
process involving myth-making rather than as a phenomena to be objectively
scrutinised in the manner of scientific medicine.
In contrast to lay perceptions, professional scientific concepts of disease make far
stricter claims to represent an underlying reality than simple metaphors (Fox,
1993). Very often however this takes the form of simple description made
mysterious by the use of special language. For instance hepatitis simply translates
from Latin as 'inflamed liver' and, similarly, polymorphic dermatitis means 'skin
rash with irregularly shaped lumps'. In other words the diagnostic terms simply
describe objects of concern at a relatively superficial level and do not necessarily
imply a specific cause although this might not be obvious to a patient. The
special knowledge claimed by scientific doctors emphasises objectivism in
diagnosis through the anatomically and physiologically based medical model
(Fox, 1993) although this begins to break down as the diagnosis moves from 'cold
dissected' physiology to that of psychological and social pathology.
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Kleinman remarks that 'healing is an embarrassing word' to scientific medicine
because it exposes 'how little we really know about the most central function of
clinical care' (1980, p312). He was perhaps criticising the narrow cure orientation
of scientific medicine. Perhaps it is the difficulties in achieving a consistent
scientific medical objectivity of the psychological and social that underlie his
comments. Moreover his remark about 'how little we really know' makes it
clear that he takes a scientific medical perspective without committing himself to
a judgment about the genuineness of 'healing' in other medical systems6.
Perhaps it is not surprising then that lay representations and professional
representations of illness, disease, health and healing do not tally. One of the
quantified signs of this, as Fox (1993, p3) points out, is the famous research by
Hannay (1980) in which he identifies a 'clinical iceberg' of unreported and
untreated medical problems in the community while a mass of 'trivial' problems
are reported to GPs.
Cultural variation might provide one explanation as to why there is a diversity
of medical systems in the UK. Culturally speaking the perceived efficaciousness
of medicine is not dependent upon uniform scientific evaluation but upon the
satisfaction of cultural criteria determined by such elements of social life as
norms, values, myths and rituals. Arguably this may help explain some of the
variations in scientific medicine a n d the burgeoning of alternative medicine in
the NHS as NHS professionals respond to a public with diverse demands
(Helman, 1990).
On the other hand Fitzpatrick (1986) argues that the 'traditional health care
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systems', in contrast to scientific medicine, frequently deal more with the healing
of distress and anxiety of the patient and family than with curing the disease' (p
12). The diversity of therapeutic options in the UK, and even in the NHS, is
therefore perhaps due not only to the presence of local sub-cultures but also to
the satisfaction of more widespread public requirements that scientific medicine
does not and perhaps cannot address. The simple diversity of health-illness
perceptions, beliefs and practice is one source of complexity for NHS decision
makers. Another is the inconsistency of these perceptions, beliefs and practices
even amongst those who make special claims to rigour - scientific doctors.
2.4 The inconsistency of NHS health care
According to Leslie (1976) one of the characteristics of medicine in Asia is the
eclectic nature of practice. Folk, professional and scientific medicine may be
practised together. However this has also always been a feature of the NHS in
which scientific doctors offer homeopathy and an increasing number of so-called
alternative and complementary therapies (Helman, 1990).
Acupuncture, osteopathy and chiropractor are not uncommon - and increasingly
popular - sidelines amongst GPs. However this seems to raise the possibility of
theoretical and practical inconsistency. In the first place the knowledge
differences between medical systems like those of scientific medicine,
acupuncture, Chinese herbalism and homeopathy prevent a meaningful
conceptualisation of one in terms of the other. For instance the power of an
homeopathic medicine increases with dilution while a scientific medicine
increases in power if it is increasingly concentrated. The logic of homeopathy is
contradicted by science and vice versa.
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From the scientific medical perspective doctors may seek scientific justifications
for the use, or perceived consequences of the use, of alternative medicines. So
naturally the therapeutic processes and benefits of acupuncture has been
conceptualised in terms of endorphins and has been tried recently in the control
of acute diseases like AIDS (Fogg, 1994). Chinese herbal remedies are being
investigated to discover the therapeutic component that is efficacious against
dermatitis (Stuttaford, 1990), and the placebo effect is a well known phenomenon
that might be a last refuge for theoretical consistency in homeopathic practice
(Gregory and Walsh, 1993).
It seems that a degree of eclecticism in the NHS may be made acceptable to the
scientific medical establishment by this 'scientizing' of alternative therapies.
However while it may seem to be 'unscientific', and legally and professionally
hazardous, for NHS doctors to practice a form of medicine without scientific
evaluation the practice of scientific medicine is itself inconsistent both nationally
and internationally. So called 'anomalies' of scientific medical practice are a
target for elimination by an NHS research and development strategy (Peckharn,
1995).
There is broad acknowledgement of the international inconsistency aic cvc*:
within the practice of scientific medicine. Helman (1990) points out tl 	 cr:se
foia' in France, 'Krisekollaps' in Germany and 'chilblains' in Britair
accepted scientific diagnoses - but only in the host country. In other c:n:'
diagnostic concepts they do not exist: the language of scientific mech: 	 s n
wholly international.
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More often the scientific diagnosis is similar but the treatment differs. Maynard
(1992) criticises unnecessary operations in the NHS and cites the case of 'glue ear',
a childhood ear condition, which when diagnosed is frequently operated on in
the UK but hardly ever in North America. So what might explain this? is it that
the diagnosis in the UK and in North America uses the same terms but the
whole concept of the course of the disease, the right treatment and the prognosis
is different? Or is it that the 'culture clubs' of British and American medicine
have differing valuations of the weight of scientific evidence? Or is it that the
patients differ, or the competence of the surgical teams differ, so that it is
genuinely better not to have grommets inserted in 'glue' ears in the US?
International inconsistencies in scientific medicine are more than matched by
national inconsistencies in the UK. The 1989 NHS reforms were partly
predicated on the elimination of inconsistency in practice that resulted in 'wide
variations' in drug prescribing by GPs and 'twentyfold' variations in referrals to
hospital across the UK (Department of Health, 1989b). The Government clearly
implies that these inconsistencies are illegitimate. 'Correctable anomalies' are a
target for elimination by the NHS (Peckham, 1995). Surgical practice in the NHS
is also known to vary and it is not clear if this is due to 'welcome diversity or
disturbing differences' (Jennet, 1988). The variation in medical and surgical
practice is arguably one of the driving forces behind the non-statutory
development of medical audit in the UK over the last twenty years since the
reflection it stimulates is supposed to bring quality improvements (Shaw, 1986).
Part of this voluntary tradition of review, reflection and audit led to the NCEPOD
series of reports which focus on pen-operative mortality and are the most
comprehensive analysis of outcomes of scientific medicine in the UK (Campling,
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Devlin, Hoile and Lunn 1993). The whole point about the data is that it is reflects
variations in practice and therefore systematic investigation is supposed to
provide insight into ideal practices. NCEPOD is one of the only examples of a
large scale systematic attempt to measure treatment outcomes of scientific
medicine in the UK and make inferences about the preceding surgical care. What
the report does not do is inquire into subcultural factors that may have
influenced the treatment. In other words it is assumed, with the considerable
authority of all the concerned Royal Colleges, that the problem of variable
outcome for matched surgical cases is simply due to technical variations and
variations in surgical competence.
While these may be crucial there may be other underlying differences of
appreciation of a situation that may broadly be construed as cultural. It might be
possible to reveal these to some extent by challenging the normative content of
surgical decisions for example by asking surgeons to specify why an outcome was
acceptable or unacceptable. This either has not occurred to the concerned Royal
Colleges and other participants in NCEPOD or cultural variation is regarded as
unimportant or an illegitimate source of variation in surgical practice.
Sometimes inconsistency in medical practice can lead to hidden conflicts. Walsh
(1991) observes that the use of eusol as a wound dressing is scientifically
contentious. Some doctors will not prescribe it yet it is prescribed by some
dermatologists, surgeons and consultants in Sheffield hospitals. Again perhaps
this is a dispute over the 'weight' of evidence and therefore the lay person must
be guided by the expert. However the prescribed use of eusol in Sheffield is, in at
least some cases, quietly sabotaged by nurses who have the responsibility for
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implementing the prescribed care but instead use other substances. The use of
eusol is based on the expert judgment of experienced dermatologists and
surgeons that it is efficacious rather than upon scientifically controlled trials.
Trials in rabbits ears wound models (Leaper, 1986) find against the efficaciousness
of eusol. Nurses who use scientifically 'proven' alternatives such hydrocolloidal
or enzymal dressings instead of eusol are therefore at least as well grounded, if
not more so, than the doctors whose prescribed care is sabotaged. If an
hypothetical patient had the option how can a choice be made between experts
whose views are inconsistent with each other but who both make claims to
scientifically grounded practice (and knowledge that the lay person does not
have)? Or between experts from differing medical systems? Logically, choice
between expert views requires that these views need to be tested or otherwise the
'expertise' is irrelevant to the choice. Yet how can lay people do this without
becoming as 'expert' as the experts? Of course one possible resolution to the eusol
and like issues in the NHS could be achieved through a determination about
whose view is legitimate rather than rational. Arguably this occurred when
Wessex Region circulated a letter around the NHS in 1989 with the legal advice
that nurses may not have a professional right to withhold prescribed treatment.
This letter specifically concerned the use of eusol (Wessex, 1991). Another
possibility is raised by Giddens (1991) who suggests that it is possible for lay people
to regain some of the knowledge that has been monopolised by experts, yet this is
hardly feasible for all occasions that an expert is required. Another possibility is
developed in the course of this thesis: dialogue can provide the conditions for the
assessment of competing expert claims, even to the minimally competent, at least
to so m e extent. I will begin a discussion about that possibility in chapter 3 but for
now I want to consider yet another source of diversity and inconsistency in the
NHS - professional subcultures and professional rivalry.
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2.4.1 Professional diversity in the NHS
In the last example it became clear that doctors are only one subset of all the
clinical professions within the NHS which may have the greatest variety of
professionals in any single organisation in Europe or even on earth. Helman
(1990) observes that these diverse professions have their own jargon, notions of
health, disease, course of illness and healing. 1-le therefore provides a convenient
explanation for variations and inconsistencies in the medicine of the NHS: they
are due to cultural differences of knowledge and perception transmitted through
professional and occupational subcultures.
Nevertheless all these professions are nevertheless closely linked with that of
scientific medicine given the dominance of the medics in the NHS
establishment. However professional diversity creates new twists of complexity
for NHS management by forming loci for battles for supremacy (or at least
superiority) between professional groupings whose perceptions of good care
differ.
So while inconsistency of 'scientific' treatments might stem from differences of
'scientific' perception it may also be due to the dominance of professional
strategy. This has traditionally been a theme in the modernist 'doctor bashing'
sociology of health and healing (as Fox, 1993, p70 puts it) where the medical
establishment is seen to be acting in an oppressive and self-interested way.
Professional tensions can be seen in Professor Mitchell's attack on the nursing
process (introduced in 1984 as a systematic approach to nursing care) because he
saw this to be in 'time and manner calculated to offend my profession' (Mitchell,
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1984). Yet the nursing process was also seen to be a path toward more rational
nursing practice and away from the use of myth and fable (Rowden, 1984).
Inconsistency of practices is also influenced by the law and this is revealed in
management policy. The problem that excellent care is often constrained by legal
imperatives may be widespread but is often only noticeable in more contentious
areas of health and social care. Professionals may deny choice to their patients
where this conflicts with issues of professional perception of safety or
professional liability. There is undoubtably a hazard for the clinician that they
may be retrospectively blamed for some disaster unless they have demonstrated
reasonable insight into the consequences of a some aspect of care (Alaszewski,
1994).
This is especially so in obstetrics where home confinements, birthing pools and
delivery positions are all matters of conflict particularly in terms of safety. The
midwife who responded to a survey in Trent Region by stating that the most
important issue in the NHS was 'to give the patient as much choice as is safe'
(Gregory, Romm and Walsh, 1994) was merely stating the condition for the
rendering of care with minimised professional liability. The acceptability of any
risks for patients in this view is not an issue.
Similarly Walsh (1991) found that the likelihood of an older patient having cot
sides on their bed depends upon which hospital unit they are in rather than
upon the outcome of a clinical assessment. Consequently the same person
transferred from one Sheffield hospital to another might find cot sides applied in
one place but not in another with no choice in the matter for legal reasons.
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In contrast to the mere denial of choice, legal imperatives may constrain
genuinely excellent care which is aimed at enabling individuals to choose, who
may seem unable to make preferences known. Shelton (1992) made
extraordinary arrangements to facilitate the sex education of an adult with
learning difficulties, (including being observed every sixty seconds by a colleague)
in order to minimise the risks of prosecution for assault or sexual abuse. The
legal risks to the professionals in situations like this are such that excellent care
like Shelton's may be exceptional - but no-one really knows because there has not
been any large scale widely generalisable inquiry into this.
2.4.2 Social inequality
Inequality is not the same as diversity. There may be diverse incomes in a town
for example, meaning simply that some individuals earn more and others less.
However inequality of income means that some people earn more than others
for the s a m e work and conditions. This is not merely a difference of income but
an unfair difference of income. Chadwick (1842) in his famous report
documented social inequality from London to Glasgow. For example in London
(Bethnal Green) he observed that professional life expectancy was 45 years while
servants was 16 years. Clearly this fact was related to social conditions - but so
what? The issue of course was that the social difference was not harmless. It was
perceived that poor life styles harmed health. Moreover, this was perceived to be
unfair. This was not diversity - it was inequality. Inequalities like this continue
to exist, even if the scale has lessened. The Department of Health (1980) reported
inequalities in health (the 'Black Report') claiming that social differences often
also represented health differences. Blane (1986) examines British inequalities of
wealth, income, living conditions and working conditions and links these with
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rates of death and disease by social class, the broad finding being that in general,
unskilled workers are less likely to live as long, and as healthily, as professional
workers.
However it is the perception that this in unfair that makes such observations
contentious because unfairness suggests that some correction is needed. Action is
required to overcome inequalities - this was the conclusion of the Black report
(Department of Health, 1980) which recommended various moves to eliminate
class inequality including increased spending on housing and the abolition of
child poverty. So it can be seen that the perception of unfairness implies a
perceived need to allocate resources in alternative ways, something which the
NHS is already involved in.
It should be clear by now that the production of NHS services is dominated by
political and cultural diversity. Sometimes services are inconsistent between
professionals, hospitals and areas of the country. These variations may be
ascribed to a variety of influences including technical constraints, professional
competence, cultural differences in perception and beliefs, professional
competitiveness, legal imperatives and varying client demands. I now want to
bring out some of the implications of diversity and inconsistency in the NHS and
to do this I will introduce the notion of quality and the idea of an NHS quality
gap.
2.5 The nature of the NHS quality gap
To begin to understand the implications of diversity and inconsistency in the
NHS it is helpful to introduce an elementary if uncritical definition of quality
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which is that quality means simply meeting the customer's requirements
(Oakland, 1989).
j-:: : : : : :''7//A:..Jd'.\
requlremeffls
Serviced	 :E	 requirementS
Figure 2:
	 The NHS 'quality gap". Key: A - Unknown, unserviced,
requirements. B - Requirements recognised as legitimate but
imserviced. C - Requirements not recognised as legitimate and
unserviced. D - Serviced requirements. E - Unrequired services
Within this can be sketched an inner boundary around requirements that are
serviced by the NHS (area D). Between the two lie 'unserviced' requirements
which can be termed a quality gap in NHS provision. If the NHS could satisfy all
these requirements without contradiction or dispute then the NHS would be
providing perfect quality and there would be no gap between the inner and outer
boundaries. While this has to be seen as a gross simplification of the meaning of
quality the map can illustrate important areas of dispute about quality in the
NHS. For example the map notionally represents an NHS planner's viewpoint
in which the area (A) represents unknown, unserviced requirements. Yet this
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boundary is constantly shifting and opens up all manner of hitherto fantastic
requirements. Heart transplants are regularly undertaken in provincial British
cities, such as Sheffield. Aldous Huxley's Brave New World illustrates how a
1950s fantasy has now come 'true'. Humans can be conceived and grow outside
of the womb, twins can be born years apart, human clones can be produced.
Robert White has, since 1963, been able to remove monkey and dog brains from
their bodies and keep them alive for a few days sometimes by transplanting them
into other bodies (Lausch, j975)8
Which of these new technologies will become public requirements of the NHS in
the future? (B) represents requirements known to NHS management but that are
unserviced perhaps because they are lower priority or unserviceable within the
bounds of current technology. For an example of the latter drug companies are
striving to find new medicines to cure hitherto intractable diseases, e.g. AIDS;
Area (C) represents 'requirements' that are postulated or claimed as legitimate 1y
some members of the public but are not accepted as legitimate by NHS planners -
euthanasia is a good example, general cosmetic surgery, or many kinds of
'alternative' medicine are others. (D) comprises all those requirements currently
satisfied by the NHS. Of course this area could be broken down a number of
ways, such as into formal services and informally provided NHS services. For
example colleagues of mine would often do favours for patients because my
hospital simply did not seem able to meet expressed requirements which are
often taken for granted elsewhere, like getting newspapers or arranging shopping
expeditions after work hours or trips to the pub. Another notional boundary
could be added to the map around requirements that are serviced
uncontentiously. i.e. with the complete agreement of everybody. (However,
how would any such boundary be identified?) Finally, intuitively speaking, there
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are those services provided that continue to be provided despite their
obsolescence or uselessness (E). The grommets example mentioned earlier might
fit into this category.
What it is important to realise is that all of these boundaries can be, and are,
disputed. Indeed as anyone who writes about the NHS will realise there are
continuing acrimonious adversarial debates about how and what services the
NHS should provide. Yet it is not always clear that the frequent adverse publicity
about the NHS is to do with 'quality' at all. This stems from the lack of
agreement between commentators as to what quality in the NHS actually is, or is
not, and therefore debate is wildly unconstrained and anecdotal. Turrill (1987)
exemplifies the 'bad' experience stories about the NHS with a serious personal
account about waiting for treatment. Sir John Harvey Jones visit to the Bradford
Hospitals NHS Trust on behalf of the BBC series 'Troubleshooter 2' to
'troubleshoot' an entire hospital is an anecdote about problems at the opposite
end of the organisational scale (Harvey-Jones, 1992). O'Brien (1987) blames
communication failures for complaints and sees quality assurance as a 'response'
to this problem. Even the government joins in the polemical rubbishing of NHS
quality by referring to 'twenty-fold variations' in GP referral rates, without
actually saying what the particular 'problem' with this is, but implying it would
be solved by the NHS reforms (Department of Health, 1989b). Waiting lists have
been a focus of attention because they are perceived to be related to
'performance'. The Government even 'ring-fenced' a special budget from 1989 to
reduce them which, as Holloway (1990) observes, was seen by some
commentators to reward poor performance. Probably the most emotive NHS
quality 'problems' are those concerning children such as the frequent claims
about the lack of special baby care cots and staff that have made peak hour news
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following criticisms by specialists (Bennett, 1993; Hunt, 1993; Hall, 1991; Sherman,
1991).
In this contentious and adversarial atmosphere how can quality in the NHS be
managed fairly? How can any criteria or specification for any service boundary
like those in figure 2 be determined and justified? The current approaches to
defining the boundaries of quality in the NHS tend to reflect the professional and
autonomous executive characteristics of the reformed NHS. Increasing executive
autonomy has been a feature of the 1989 NHS reforms. All NHS providers have
chief executives who have a responsibility to compete with other providers, and
to be individually responsible for what occurs in the trust. Marketing techniques
have been recommended by the Department of Health (Department of Health,
1992b; Department of Health, 1992a) to identify priority services and previously
unrecognised requirements. These techniques include quantitative surveys, and
qualitative interviews. Another way that requirements are defined and achieved
is through the use of standard setting formulae (e.g. Maxwell, 1984) and a variety
of audit techniques, including large hospital wide surveys (e.g. Health Policy
Advisory Service surveys9), within existing NHS services.
All these techniques provide operational data and strategic intelligence.
However the evaluation and exploitation of this information is very much the
preserve of narrow groups of professionals within the executive management of
NHS units. The use of marketing techniques (and for that matter public
inquiries into NHS service failures), can also be seen as ways of preserving the
strategic superiority of NHS management. By commissioning these kinds of
'research' (e.g. the Cleveland inquiry 1988) NHS executives do not merely 'find
out' useful information but may also influence and control the public by
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controlling the quality agenda. Under the current managerial arrangements of
the NHS any process of consultation in the NHS is likely to take place through
'ritualised' channels adapted to executive requirements (e.g. marketing, 'patient
representatives', health education). Furthermore inquiries may deflect the
actions of individuals and groups of the public who must decide whether to
continue campaigning if it appears that their issue of concern is being dealt with.
This channelling might help to protect the autonomy of NHS executives but it
also means NHS users and NHS management cannot give a full account of their
views to each other about quality boundaries. Consequently no matter how
increasingly effective and efficient the NHS may appear to be to it's management,
the Government, or even to parts of the general public, to those whose views are
never heard the NHS will still appear ineffective, uncaring and low quality.
Even those NHS users whose views are selectively listened to by management
may still not be satisfied with the way their views are accounted for. What is
needed is some way of broadening participation in decisions about the
boundaries of NHS quality, so that NHS users have equal access to mechanisms
for making their viewpoints known, with the confidence that their views will be
given the weight and merit they deserve. I contend that this can only occur
within a dialogue. I will argue over the next few chapters that dialogue can
underpin a mode of quality management that is more fair than that currently
dominating the NHS. So what is dialogue? and what are these modes of quality
management? To begin to answer these questions I need to discuss the meaning
and nature of social action. This I will do in the next chapter.
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1 Although gross expenditure is in fact much higher, around £4Obn. This is
set against what are termed 'appropriations' including charges for
prescriptions, the private use of NHS services, land sales, interest
charges and so worth around £8bn.
2 Just how much is debatable but the figures for English health authorities
expenditure for the year ended 31st March 1991 were total revenue
expended £l5bn of which £llbn comprised salaries and wages
(Robertson, 1994, para 20/10).
This iswhole time equivalents for England only up to April 1991.
The policy literature has abounded with micro-politics ever since Downs
(1957) proposed that voters are utility-maximisers and political parties are
vote-maximisers -characteristics referred to in economic literature as
rational. For examples of discussions of political-economic explanations
of policy based on rational choice see in addition to Downs, Hartley (1977),
Pine (1988) and Dunleavy (1991). I contend that Downs assumptions are
flawed - in chapter 3 I discuss five kinds of social action of which rational
choice is only one variety.
For more examples of accounts about lay perceptions and beliefs refer to
Currer and Stacy (1986) edited volume, Calnan (1987), and Fox (1993).
6 This uncertainty about the genuineness of the healing offered by scientific
and 'alternative' medicines illustrates the relative weakness of lay people
when confronted with so-called choices by those with presumed expertise.
How can a lay person choose between experts? My answer to this is
summarised in chapters 3 and 7 - through dialogue.
I undertake a detailed critical discussion of the meaning of quality in
chapter 6. However for the purposes of chapter 2 a simple, uncritical
definition is adequate.
The fantastic should not be taken with a pinch of salt. Is Jurrasic Park so
fanciful?
Health Policy Advisory Service, West Bar, Sheffield, SI.
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Chapter 3
Dialogue and the theory of communicative action
In this chapter I will set out the reasons why dialogue is a more fair basis for the
management of quality in the NHS. The meaning of dialogue is central to this
thesis, and the main plank in the theory of dialogue is Jurgan Habermas's
massive theory of communicative action, from which this chapter takes its title.
It is spelled out in two volumes in a total of around 1000 pages (Habermas 1991a,
1991b). It provides the basis for the discussion of the communicative element of
critical systems thinking in chapter 5 and of quality management in chapter 6. In
chapter 7 it is invoked to evaluate the Trent Quality Initiative which
implemented many of the principles of dialogue in 1994 (Gregory, Romm and
Walsh, 1994). In this chapter it also forms a sociological framework for a theory
of dialogue between individuals and groups of actors.
The theory of communicative action only has meaning within a particular
context - that of modernity - and it is in this context that the theory has its roots.
So I shall begin by discussing the nature of modernity and explain how the theory
of communicative action came about as a deliberate modern project of social
critique by Jurgan Habermas. Following this I shall discuss some of the
important theoretical elements of Habermas's theory of communicative action.
These are the presumed nature of the actor in the theory, the qualified use of
Popper's differentiation between objective, social and subjective 'worlds' and the
meaning and nature of social action, the lifeworid, and situations. I will compare
and contrast competition (based on so called 'rational choice') with collaboration
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(based on communicative action) as a basis for individual, institutional and
governmental decision making. The prisoner's dilemma provides a useful
insight into the difference between these modes of management. Finally I will
suggest that it is only through dialogue that the inequalities of the NHS quality
gap can begin to be resolved. Firstly then I shall discuss the theoretical roots of
dialogue - modernity.
The theory of modernity is a major battleground for contemporary sociology and
anthropology. It is variously regarded as 'high' (Giddens, 1991), 'late' Beck (1992),
and 'post'
 Baumann (1992). It is also contrasted with 'pre' and 'post' modernity.
Clearly pre-modernity is retrospectively defined as 'what used to be' (or in
modernistic opinion even still exists in 'primitive' parts of the world) and is
situated by reference to 'modernity'. Similarly theories of post-modernity situate
modernity in the past (or the oppressed present). Best and Keilner (1991) identify
Marx and Weber's modernity as an 'historical periodizing term which refers to
the epoch that follows the "middle ages" or feudalism' (p2). This is affirmed and
qualified by Giddens who argues that the term refers 'to the institutions and
modes of behaviour established first of all in post-feudal Europe, but which in
the twentieth century increasingly have become world-historical in their impact'
(Giddens, 1991, pl5). Modernity (or 'modern' life) in Giddens' view therefore
only came into being after the industrial revolution but is not regarded generally
as the product or sole-progenitor of the industrial revolution. Giddens regards
industrialism as 'one institutional axis' of modernity; others he identifies as
capitalism, surveillance, 'industrialised' violence, the nation-state and
organisation (Giddens, 1991, ppl5-l6).
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Theories of modernity can all be characterised by a qualified and 'enlightened'
belief in 'reason as the source of progress in knowledge and society, as well as the
privileged locus of truth and the foundation of systematic knowledge' (Best and
Kellner, 1991, p2). Ultimately there is the firm belief that it is possible to discern
what is rational and irrational about a human situation and to act accordingly.
Yet sometimes criticisms of modernity can be very pessimistic like those of
Weber (1930) on the 'iron cage' of bureaucracy or of Horkheimer and Adorno
(1972) in the so-called Frankfurt School of sociology. In these versions of the
theory the structures and processes of modern life are seen as ensnaring and
debilitating - akin to saying that no plan can overcome the unfairness of the NHS
quality gap. There is even an argument that Adorno 'anticipated certain trends of
postmodern theory' (Best and Kellner, 1991, p32). However even 'pessimistic'
modernity implies that there is another substantively better endpoint or
fulfilment of the lives of individuals and of society - it is simply unattainable for
reasons of structure or power. Optimistic modernity, on the other hand, as
represented by Habermas, Giddens and Beck in contrast rejects the certainty of
ensnarement into substandard living and is explicitly about seeking ways of
critique and emancipation from constraints.
Thus the argument about the nature of modern life is not an esoteric or trivial
question (like which end of an egg should be opened). Instead theories of
modernity are views about the structures and processes of life, what gives rise to
them, and what can be done about them - if anything. In the optimistic view a
'way through' the complexity of modern life (and of difficulties like the NHS
quality 'problem') can be found by reasoning. If there are problems in life it is
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because there has been inadequate reasoning and not necessarily that the
requisite degree of rationality is impossible to attain.
Not all modern theorists are necessarily equally concerned with what to do about
the conditions of life (or social critique). For example Giddens (1993) argues that
sociology deals with the analysis and explanation of intended and unintended
consequences of human action. These are pivotal to social critique but Giddens
does not make a 'crusade' out of them. Indeed Bryant and Jary (1989) observe that
Giddens considers sociology to be inherently critical, and therefore he does not
bother with developing a critical sociology like that of Bauman or Habermas; on
the other hand Bernstein (1989) finds Giddens 'vague' on the nature of critique
and considers that Habermas, in contrast, directly confronts the problem of how
normative judgments may be justified. Habermas surely can be regarded as
crusading no more clearly than in his confrontation of apologists for Nazism
(Holub, 1991). Perhaps it is this explicitly purposeful characteristic of Habermas
work that makes his theories more amenable to intervention in the world
through, for example, critical systems thinking. So how has Habermas arrived at
the theory of communicative action as an approach to social critique? What
happened to his previous theories? Did they fail or not work? Answering these
questions coincidentally justifies the theory of communicative action as the
lynch-pin of dialogue and all that follows in this thesis.
3.1	 Habermas's critical theory
Early in his career, during the early 1960s, Habermas set out the heart of his
modernistic thinking with concern for the 'liberal and democratic public sphere
in which individuals critically discussed their common interests and public
57
concerns' (Best and Keliner, 1991, p235). In Habermas's (1991) view the public
sphere declined as a forum for enlightened debate under the pressures of
unreflective instrumentalism. In the 1960s he explored the relationship between
knowledge and human interest (Habermas, 1970; Habermas, 1972). In the late 70s
and early 80s this led to the 'linguistic turn' in Habermas's work as many
commentators have observed e.g. (McCarthy, 1978; White, 1988; Holub, 1991; Best
and Keliner, 1991).
Habermas's linguistic turn took him to the theory of communicative action. He
produced this through the massive task of logical reconstruction and integration
of sociological theories by Durkheim, Weber, Mead and Parsons. The 'glue'
between the theories is the idea of communicative rationality and out of it
emerges critical theories about society and processes of rationalisation involving
the displacement of what might be termed 'means-end mindedness': the modern
strategic instrumentality characteristic of modern capitalistic society.
In order to help understand why Habermas believes that communicative
rationality is the key to 'finishing' the project of modernity (Holub, 1991) I shall
discuss how the theory of communicative action developed from his earlier
work on knowledge and human interest.
3.2 The move from 'knowledge and human interests' to 'communicative
action.'
In the theory of 'knowledge and human interests' Habermas (1972) deals with the
weaknesses of traditional 'instrumental' methods of human inquiry. The pith of
the theory is in the critique of the hidden underlying purposes in the way
knowledge is gained and used. It is especially focussed on positivism which
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Habermas defines broadly as the gaining and use of knowledge without
'reflection' (Habermas 1972, vii and see pp4-5). Put in simpler terms positivism
is like an arrogant scientist who believes that she or he is producing the only
valid knowledge and about which the only questions are technical ones of
refinement. This lack of reflection leaves other questions (which have no
'scientific' meaning) to the realm of philosophy (or in Popper's (1979) view
psychology) which had split away from science (Habermas, 1972, p4).
Habermas argues that modern science 'regressed behind the level of reflection
once attained by Kant' (Habermas, 1972, p63) because the illusory objectivism of
science represses other kinds of knowledge (Habermas, 1972, p88). To Habermas
modern science has tended only to support techniques enabling people to control
their environment instrumentally with ever more sophisticated tools. However
he argues that this technical interest is, on it's own, insufficient as a rationale for
contemporary human life. So he postulated that the technical interest, which is
expressed through the use of instrumental reason, is and should be,
complemented by a practical interest in making social arrangements to expedite
technical success and an emancipatory interest in achieving freedom from
domination produced by the pursuit of technical and practical interests.
By positing practical and emancipatory interests Habermas was producing a
model for the critique of knowledge that would lead, ultimately, to the
emancipation of people from conditions of repressed knowledge and repressing
instrumental reason. This does not in Habermas's view invalidate the technical
knowledge gained per se but simply overvalues and distorts one kind of
knowledge at the expense of another.
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Turning to Freud and psychoanalysis Habermas likened the repression of
knowledges to the neurotic states of people whose distorted self-perception could
be released by psychotherapeutic 'critical reflection'. So likewise reflection on
knowledge, and the repressive interest dominating it, could lead to the
emancipation of people from local social or societal repression. This work has
formed the cornerstone of critical systems thinking hitherto (Jackson, 1991) and
has led to reflective organisational thinking like 'Total Systems Intervention'
(TSI) (Flood and Jackson, 1991) and Gregory's (1992) 'New Constellation' in
which technical, practical and emancipatory interests are methodologically
balanced.
There is a problem in this because Habermas abandoned this approach in favour
of critique based on language. Perhaps the most important practical reason for
this was because the theory of knowledge and human interest does not itself
suggest the conditions for universal access to the therapeutic emancipative
process1 . Yet the theory of knowledge constitutive interests is founded upon the
need for people to arrive 'at mutual understanding' (Habermas 1972, p196) and
this is at least one of the rays in the 'sunbeam shining on communicative action
in Habermas's later theory' (Holub, 1991, p8).
The theory of communicative action was conceived by Habermas during the late
1960s and early 1970s, as a 'language-theoretic foundation of the social sciences',
and was 'the beginning of a social theory concerned to validate it's critical
standards' (Habermas, 1991, pxli). Habermas wanted to produce a theory of
'communicative rationality' that was 'resistant to cognitive-instrumental
abridgements of reason' (Habermas, 1991, pxlii). In other words to be robustly
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critical.
According to White (1988), Habermas's theory of communicative action is based
on a theory of communicative competence and ideal speech (which Habermas
had been elucidating during the 1970s, for example see Habermas, (1970, 1973). A
communicatively competent speaker has 'mastery of the rules' for 'raising and
redeeming' speech act validity claims and an ideal speech situation is one in
which competent speakers and listeners put aside all motives other than that of
reaching consensus (Habermas, 1973). However Habermas uses neither the term
communicative competence nor ideal speech as such in his theory of
communicative action (Habermas, 1991a; Habermas, 1991b). Instead Habermas
identifies fundamental conditions that potentially allow anyone who engages in
speech to enter into social critique, if only at the most basic level by competently
rejecting the validity claimed by someone else for their proposition.
Even the name of the theory suggests a quite different approach to that of
knowledge and human interests: while action may follow from reflection upon
knowledge constitutive interests, and mutual understanding be achieved in due
course, action is not the focus of the 1972 theory. In contrast among several
categories of social action one particular kind is clearly the focus in the later
theory: communicative action.
Both of Habermas's theories outlined in this section identify the possibility of
emancipation but in knowledge and human interests it is achieved through
psychoanalysis (or it's social analogue). In the theory of communicative action
emancipation begins at a more fundamental level: that of communication
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between people. Unless the conditions for communication are satisfactory any
'therapy' will be either less effective or completely ineffective. Considering
communication reveals a different set of conditions for emancipation. For
example reflecting upon who can or should communicate partly precedes and
partly constitutes reflection upon whose interest is being satisfied. This does not
dismiss the earlier (1972) work but rather reveals a constraint upon it's
usefulness.
Now that the transition from knowledge and human interests to communicative
action has been outlined I shall explain the role of the actor about whom
Habermas makes fundamental assumptions. He developed these notions in the
era of knowledge and human interests but they also underpin the theory of
communicative action.
In all his theories Habermas generally views individuals as entities living
biologically in one context but egoistically in another. The relation between an
ego and it's context is interpreted and has a meaning that is validated
intersubjectively. This is Habermas's analytical rather than normative or ethical
proposition. He is positing the idea that the unique identity of an individual is
reflexively maintained through lots of interactions with others. It is this
'reflexive life experience [...] which brings about the continuity of life history
through cumulative understanding of oneself as a stack of autobiographical
interpretations' (Habermas 1972, p156).
Interaction and understanding are crucial in both Habermas's early and later
work. Interaction and understanding are intersubjective, that is between egos,
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and this requires some form of mediation by definition:
(E)very form of interaction and mutual understanding between
individuals is mediated by an intersubjectively valid
employment of symbols that refer in the last instance to
ordinary language. Language is the ground of intersubjectivity,
and every person must already have set foot on it before he can
objectivate himself in his first expression of life, whether in
words, attitudes or actions [...] Language is the medium in which
meanings are shared, not only in the cognitive sense but in the
comprehensive sense of significance that encompasses affective
and normative modes.
Habermas (1972 , pI57).
Here we have another sign as to Habermas's later linguistic direction, guided by a
view of the nature of the human life-world, as ego and as thing in reflexive
communicative interaction. Without dialogue between people, in the sense of
interpreted reflexive interactions, there can be no ego identity. Individuality
therefore depends upon interaction.
Now that Habermas's earlier thoughts on individual egos and their relation to
each other have been reviewed it is possible to turn to his development of them
in the theory of communicative action (Habermas 1991a, 1991b).
3.3 The social action context: the three worlds model
In his later work Habermas examines the presuppositions of social action in
terms of 'the relations between actor and world' (Habermas, 1991, p76). This
required the further development of the idea of a life-relation from a primarily
cognitive relation, symbolically or linguistically mediated, into an action relation.
This again is one of the key differences between knowledge and human interests
and the theory of communicative action. The latter directly concerns actor-world
relations while the former only really considers the ego and relations with an
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unspecified world governed by cognitive interests. However in the theory of
communicative action Habermas explicitly addresses the nature of the 'world'
with which an ego (in his older terminology) can have a life relation in the form
of five kinds of social action. To do this Habermas had to consider the nature of
the context of the things and egos perceived at the 'other' end of the relationship
- the theory of communicative action could not be developed without a model or
theory of the 'world' in which action takes place. So I will now consider the
nature of the world in which, according to Habermas, egos and things exist.
Habermas (1991a) follows Jarvie (1972) in adapting Popper's (1979) 'three-world'
theory to explicate the context in which social action may occur. Habermas
makes it clear that his use of the term 'world' refers to a perceived world which is
an interpreted aspect of reality that therefore may not be perceived in the same
way by another actor. He also makes it clear that this perceived world is not the
same entity as the 'lifeworid' which I will return to shortly.
In Habermas's adaptation of Popper's theory an 'actor' (ego, subject, individual
person or other simile) can have three 'actor-world relations'. These are life-
relations to an objective world (of propositional truths), to a social world (shared
by all members of a 'collective') and to the actor's own subjective world
(Habermas, 1991a, p120).
Popper (1979) envisaged the three worlds as each containing real objects, though
he argued that only the physical world contains physical things, the other two
worlds contain 'virtual' objects2 - about which objective knowledge could be
produced. Habermas however rejects this version of the three world theory.
Instead he maintains that the three worlds are distinct entities of which 'only
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one, namely the objective world, can be understood objectively as the correlate of
the totality of true propositions' and furthermore the special character of the
three worlds is such that
taken together the worlds form a reference system that is
mutually presupposed in communication processes. With this
reference system participants lay down what there can possibly
be understanding about at all.
Habermas, (1991, p84).
In this can be seen the necessity of a model of the context of communicative
action. Through this model Habermas can contextualise his previous (1972)
criticisms about instrumentality, scientism and empiricism because:
Participants in communication who are seeking to come to an
understanding with one another do not take up a relation only
to the one objective world, as is suggested by the
precommunicative model suggested by empiricism. They by no
means refer only to things that happen or could be made to
happen in the objective world, but to things in the social and
subjective worlds as well. Speakers and hearers operate with a
system of several equally primordial worlds.
Habermas, (1991, p83).
Habermas's main purpose in utilising a three-worlds theory is to analyse the
presuppositions of several kinds of social action of which one is communicative
action. The distinctions between these forms of action will be discussed next.
3.4	 Five kinds of social action
Habermas defines action as the process of 'mastering situations' (Habermas, 1990,
p134) and distinguishes five types of social action: teleological, strategic,
normatively regulated, dramaturgical and communicative action. Each form of
social action is clearly distinguishable from the next by relating it to one of the
primordial worlds mentioned previously and as shall become clear they can be
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linked together through communication.
3.4.1 Teleological action
Habermas defines this as the action taken when an actor has decided it is the best
way of realising a desired aim or outcome. It is the epitome of instrumental
means-end mindedness but Habermas differentiates it from:
3.4.2 Strategic action
Habermas argues that strategic action can be regarded as a special case of
teleological action when the actor can anticipate or guess the decisions of at least
one other actor. The distinction is not necessarily clear since few social actions
can be implemented regardless of other actor's decision making. Habermas
argues that strategic action is often regarded as a utilitarian form of action: the
actor acts strategically in order to maximise her/his utility. He regards this then
as the form of action underpinning decision/game models in economics,
sociology and social psychology.
Teleological and strategic action both assume that the actor is able to perceive an
objective world. On the strength of this perception it is assumed that the actor is
able independently and voluntarily to form beliefs and make decisions about
what action to take.
The analytical quality of this form of action is that the actor concerned can make
beliefs and intentions known as propositions about the objective world - i.e.
claims to truth - that can be evaluated by others as true or false. Furthermore the
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actor can carry out the intended action and others may judge whether or not it
has succeeded or failed. This is a little more complicated in strategic action where
the 'others' may be the objects strategically targeted by an actor feigning success or
failure to gain an ultimate advantage.
3.4.3 Normatively regulated action
Actors who are members of a social group are, to an extent, identifiable as
members of that group because they behave in particular ways characteristic of
the group - in other words they conform to n or m s.
If a norm has relevance in a particular situation then some actions are preferred
while others are barred because members of the group are 'entitled to expect a
certain behaviour' (Habermas, 1991a, p85). That is the action may be judged to be
right or wrong. Habermas identifies this form of action as the basis of role theory
in sociology.
Judgments about normatively regulated action require a perception not only of
the objective world but also of the social world. The social world delimits
possible actions that might otherwise be wholly teleological in character.
Habermas argues that as meaning in the objective world can be clarified by
reference to the existence of 'objective' realities then, analogously, meaning in
the social world is clarified with reference to the existence of norms.
This means that while truth and efficacy can be judged by others in relation to the
objective world the rightness (or wrongness) of a normatively regulated action is
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judged by others in relation to their general normative expectations (or 'norms')
about what can, must or should be done.
According to Habermas the virtue of a norm is found in the assent that a valid
action commands because the action will have been regulated in the social
group's common interest. Habermas does not pursue how this common interest
may have come about but it implies a process of environmental selection. For
example first cousins do not marry because of the health consequences of
inbreeding. In Darwinistic (or Dawkins, 1989) terms norms survive if they have
survival value for a group that share in it3.
Habermas (1991a) distinguishes between a social norm and a cultural value. The
latter is an attitude but not an entitlement to certain actions taken by by others. It
is less specific, more general, and potentially more variable. It does not in itself
directly pose evaluative criteria and therefore cannot regulate action. A value
may become a norm but if it does it will have acquired a specific nature that
values do not have.
3.4.4 Dramaturgical action
When an actor 'presents' her/himself to an audience the
actor evokes in his public a certain image, an impression of
himself, by more or less disclosing his own subjectivity. Each
agent can monitor public access to the systems of his own
intentions, thoughts, attitudes, desires, feelings, and the like, to
which only he has privileged access. In Dramaturgical action
participants make use of this and steer their interactions
through regulating mutual access to their own subjectivities
Habermas (1991a, p86)
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If there were such a thing as a 'pure situation' then the actor is 'playing to an
audience' and purely conveying her/his own interpretation of the drama.The
actor is not acting strategically by trying to influence others by making up an
interpretation. Nor is the actor acting as a normatively regulated member of a
social group. To some extent this form of action can appear like a strategic goal-
directed action because the actor reveals something of her/his subjective world in
being 'seen by his public in a particular way' (Habermas, 1991, p90) and may do
this with some goal in mind. Habermas argues that to be theoretically rigorous
the notion of the subjective world must also have elements analogous to
'propositions' and 'norms' that can be contested by others. Therefore he posits
'sincerity' as the analytical quality of the subjective world. The public are then
put in the position of making judgments, objectified as propositions, about the
sincerity of the expression of an actors views, desires and feelings.
3.4.5 Communicative action
The final kind of action is the focus of Habermas's theory. Communicative
action occurs when two or more actors
establish interpersonal relations (whether by verbal or extra-
verbal means). The actors seek to reach an understanding about
the action situation and their plans of action in order to
coordinate their actions by way of agreement.
Habermas (1991a, p86.)
There are several points arising from this. Firstly Habermas emphasises that
communicative action is not the same as acts of communication. The latter,
speech for example, are simply physical acts in the objective world. Although an
'act of communication' is a very broad heading for a variety of symbolically
mediated interactions (including body language for example), communicative
action is dependent upon interpretation by actors who must negotiate a
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definition of a situation with other actors. This means that language necessarily
has a 'prominent place' (Habermas, 1991 a, p86) in communicative action since it
is the media by which understandings are achieved. Each of the other three
forms of action have criteria that potentially enable someone else to make a
judgment. Teleological and strategic actions have truth and efficacy criteria,
normatively regulated actions have rightness criteria, dramaturgical actions have
sincerity criteria. These criteria inevitably necessitate some form of language of
expression or else they could not be appraised. However Habermas argues that
only communicative action utilises a linguistic medium to allow speakers and
hearers to refer simultaneously to all three worlds 'in order to negotiate common
definitions of the situation' (Habermas, 1991, p95). It is this linguistic basis of
these other forms of action that opens them up to argument and the
coordination of action in general between actors.
Communicative action presumes that an individual is genuinely trying to reach
an understanding with others, rather than being strategically manipulative or
normatively regulated, and to that extent it is clearly teleological (Habermas,
1991a). This has led to the criticism from Dailmayr that Habermas's theory is
individualistic and that it turns language into an instrumental tool, while
overlooking more passive non-instrumental use of language (Dailmayr, 1984).
However White (1988) counter-argues that Dallmayr fails to recognise both the
practical and everyday teleological aspect of communication and its role as a
context in Habermas's theory. However it is helpful to clarify what Habermas
means when using the concept of 'understanding' as the telos of communicative
action.
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According to Habermas it is through acts of communication, in which
understandings between people are reached, that all other forms of action can be
coordinated. In fact for Habermas reaching understandings is the whole point of
communication and this forms an anthropological imperative. He quotes
Kanngiesser's argument that '(t)he necessity for coordinated action generates in
society a certain need for communication which must be met if it is to be possible
to coordinate actions effectively for the purpose of satisfying needs' (Kanngiesser,
1976, p278).
Habermas defines basic understanding as the knowledge of what makes a
particular speech act acceptable. This means the listener must know what action
the speech act refers to and what claims are inherent in it that would require
agreement were it to be a basis for the coordination of actions between
individuals. White (1988) does point out that Habermas also uses the phrase
'reach an understanding' to mean, in addition to the listener's knowledge of the
actions and claims being made by a speaker, that both listener and speaker do
eventually actually agree with each other.
White cautions that these two meanings of understanding are often muddled 1y
readers, so it is worth restating them in a slightly different way: to understand a
speech act individuals must know what actions are being referred to, and what
claims are inherent in it. There are then at least three possible degrees of
agreement. Either (A) both speaker and listener heartily and completely agree in
toto (in Habermas's terms they have reached a full understanding); Or (B), the
listener, though well aware of the claims being made (i.e. understands the speech
act), does not agree with them, but both speaker and listener know and agree this
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(a partial understanding). Or (C), finally, while the listener understands the
speech act, she/he does not agree with the speaker but, furthermore, either one or
both individuals are not aware of this (a fragmentary understanding).
Each of these possibilities represent degrees of understanding varying from very
clear to very tenuous and they presume that in addition to the speech act claims
being made clear that agreement or otherwise is signalled from one individual to
another, for instance through another speech act. This has given rise to some
controversy because Habermas argues that in order for listeners to fully
understand a speaker they must necessarily be able to put themselves in the
'shoes' (as it were) of the speaker; that is, correct interpretation requires that a
'performative attitude' is adopted and that a 'position' is taken (Habmermas,
1991a). This means that listeners are not neutral and could, if desired, signal
their personal agreement or otherwise with the claims being made. If they are
not in a 'position' to do this then, in Habermas's view, they have not understood
the speech act.
This seems very clear but both White (1988) and McCarthy (1984) disagree with
this element of Habermas's theory. The question is, does the listener's
knowledge of the claims being made necessarily entail agreement or
disagreement? In both White's and Thompson's view, full understanding does
not require a listener (who may be a third party interpreter) to 'take a position' as
to the acceptability of any claims being made. They argue that judgment can be
suspended while claims are nevertheless unerringly represented although
McCarthy carefully explains that this does not mean adopting a value neutral or
objective position. However this point seems less clear than Habermas's and it is
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resolvable in a practical way: action cannot be coordinated between individuals
without judgments being made - there must be at least a partial understanding
(point B above) between individuals (who beg to differ) and actions coordinated
in respect of this. Moreover interpreters can be questioned as to their
understanding of a speech act and if they cannot 'take a position' doubt may be
cast on their grasp of the situation.
There is another corollary of the above which is that it is not necessary for
individuals to have total agreement in order to coordinate their actions. Indeed,
if understandings are created out of non-understanding, then there will always be
matters not yet discussed, or understandings not fully achieved. That is action is
probably nearly always coordinated through partial understandings. Yet the
debate about 'reaching an understanding' has a static 'once and for all' feel which
risks severely abridging the dynamism inherent in social relations. There will
always be the need to establish and reestablish understandings in changing
circumstances and this may mean that full understandings are always temporary
and possibly quite rare. What would damage the ability to coordinate action is
the failure to agree about differences - this would be a serious lack of
understanding. A degree of understanding is necessary if action is to be
coordinated socially.
Participants can reach an understanding but, given that claims can be disputed,
what characteristic of an argument gives it 'force', thereby making it a basis for
reaching agreement and coordinating social action, if strategic and normative
'forces' between actors have been somehow 'neutralised'? Habermas's answer is
that rational arguments possess binding force deriving from the warranty offered
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by a speaker (Habermas, 1991a). White explains the meaning of this as the
'underlying, mutual expectation between actors that they can, if challenged,
defend the specific claims they raise, which in turn creates the 'binding force' for
the coordination of action' (White, 1988, p35). What is perhaps underemphasised
by Habermas (and White) is the expectation that the actor defending a claim will
defend it to the challenger whoever that may be (for instance whether a lawyer or
a learning disabled NHS user). While, as Habermas believes, there may be a
universal anthropological imperative for understandings to reached, this will be
constrained by strategic and normatively regulated action unless individuals are
reliably committed to the institutionalisation of communicative action - in other
words some process of dialogue. This commitment has previously been claimed
to be related in some way to ideology (Gregory and Walsh, 1993, p177) - the
communicative ideology of democratic debate in the public sphere.
The five kinds of action that have been reviewed are analysed by Habermas in
terms of actor-world relations but he also considers the relation between social
action and physical events such as the bodily movements involved in speaking.
The relation between physical human acts and communicative action affects to
what extent empirical observation can assist in reaching understandings so I will
now explore this relationship.
3.5	 Social action and physical events
Habermas argues that bodily movements are not actions in themselves but are
merely operations through which social actions are mediated. In his theory of
communicative action the most that can be said about a physical act, such as the
uttering of a word or the making of a gesture, is whether or not it is 'well-
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formed' (Habermas, 1991, p98) or in other words intelligible or coded correctly.
This situation arises because of the dualistic nature of an actor (as ego-thing) and
the purely referential nature of an actors perceived three worlds. These 'worlds'
are however only a linguistically based reference frame relating to the form and
use of knowledge about social action.
Physical acts therefore are not represented by the three-world model except as
linguistic statements. That is physical acts must be interpreted into linguistic
statements in order for them to be analysed. Consequently actors may draw upon
knowledge of physical acts for evidence in making judgments about action but
judgment ultimately depends upon there being a way of showing that the use of
a linguistic statement is based on a valid interpretation of the situation.
Although movement and physical change are signs of action, and are sometimes
defined as 'basic actions' (Danto, 1965), Habermas chooses not to define them in
this way. Instead Habermas regards them as operations that occur in the process
of an action: 'A bodily movement is an element of an action but not an action'
(Habermas, 1991a). This means also that although a physical event must take
place in order to mediate the action (for instance in forming an utterance by
saying a word), the judgment made by others about the efficacy, rightness and
sincerity of the action cannot be dependent upon an empirical analysis of the
movement. Furthermore Habermas (1991a) argues that the language of
empirical observation is not 'basic'. To carry out a 'lie-test' for example by
attaching sensors to a person's skin, requires observations that are also linguistic
propositions about what has been observed. So propositions must be made about
propositions ad infinitum, and all of which may be disputed: the familiar vicious
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circle of empirical-analytical science.
Habermas argues that communicative action is not concerned with grammatical
analysis, except in so far as an act of speech or writing is intelligible (which is a
basic requirement), or any other form of linguistic analysis such as semantics,
phonetics and other empirical/structural or scientific modes of linguistic
investigation. Instead communicative action is concerned with the pragmatic
use of language between speakers and listeners when they are unreservedly
coordinating their individual actions on the basis of 'communicatively achieved
agreement' (Habermas, 1991a, p305).
Now that the relation between physical events and social action has been
explored and found to be limited in Habermas's view to a simple operational
function of well-formedness it is possible to concentrate upon the non-physical
aspects of communicative action. The next section is a discussion of speech acts
and the validity claims associated with them. This will lead to the rigorous
definition of a meaning of dialogue that then forms the basis for the rest of the
thesis.
3.6 Communicative action and validity claims
Habermas argues that the first four forms of action may be judged according to
particular criteria that are presupposed by the three worlds of actor-perception -
objective, social and subjective. However, by what criteria can the judgment of
one actor, expressed in the course of communicative action, be evaluated by
another?
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This is calling for a new set of criteria that are related to those by which the other
forms of social actions are judged but, because of the intuitive background nature
of the logic involved (Habermas, 1982), which gives communicative action its
universalistic property. These criteria are validity claims made by speakers
during acts of communication. Habermas identifies within an utterance (referred
to linguistically as 'locution') two elements: propositional content and constative
content (a form of 'illocution' or utterance with a specific intent such as a
command). He also identifies three ways in which language is used: Speech acts
in which propositions are made make cognitive use of language. Interactive use
of language (of the constative speech component made up of commands,
promises etc) establishes a relationship between people in conversation. Lastly
expressive use of language states the intention of the speaker (Habermas, 1991a,
pp286-3O5).
Now Habermas (1990, 1991a) also argues that any utterance relates to at least on e
of the three worlds - the referential frame of social actions - and in so doing make
validity claims that exactly correspond to the use being made of the speech act. In
the first place the simple act of speaking is a claim that what is being said is
intelligible or 'well-formed' as Habermas puts it (Habermas, 1991a, p98). This is a
precondition for any attempt to reach an understanding. The other speech act
validity claims assume intelligibility as a given.
The other claims - truth, rightness and sincerity - are each related to one of the
three worlds: cognitive use claims truth of proposition (for example by reference
to objective facts). Interactive use claims rightness of interpersonal relations
according to norms (for example by reference to what is socially 'acceptable') and
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expressive use claims sincerity of the speakers intention.
Furthermore, Habermas argues that any particular speech act can make all three
validity claims simultaneously: A speaker may claim to be stating something true
about the objective world and normatively right about the social world. Finally
the speaker is claiming to be sincerely stating their subjective world belief in the
truth and rightness of their speech act (Habermas, 1991a, p278).
Actors that are listening can accept or deny, in a simple yes/no fashion, the truth,
rightness or sincerity of another actor's utterance:
In rejecting a speech act as (normatively) wrong or untrue or
insincere, he is expressing with his 'no' the fact that the
utterance has not fulfilled it's function of securing an
interpersonal relationship, or representing states of affairs, or of
manifesting experiences. It is not in agreement with our world
of legitimately ordered interpersonal relations, or with the
world of existing states of affairs, or with the speakers own world
of subjective experiences'.
Habermas, (1991a, p308.)
Speech acts and validity claims which form the mechanism of individual
communicative actions are only part of the theory which concerns how
situations are mastered. The three world theory is a tool used by Habermas to
analyse the details of social action but it seems to fragment and reduces social
action to do this. Yet social action inevitably involves a context into which it is
integrated because it never comes 'out of the blue'. Habermas refers to this
context as the lifeworid.
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3.7 Lifeworid
Habermas (1991a, 1991b) has a specific vision of the lifeworid that he links to
action, the concept of society and to the processes of rationalisation that he
believes occur in modern society. He describes the lifeworld as a cognitive
structure of 'taken for granted' and 'unproblematic' background knowledge
(1991a, p335 and 1991b, chapter VI). Without this 'unproblematic' knowledge
action would become impossible since action depends upon existing pre-
reflective assumptions and 'naively mastered skills' (1991a, p335). It is this
intuitive background that gives actors an 'everyday certainty' (Habermas, 1982,
p234) about the status of validity claims.
Habermas also links the lifeworld, the necessary a-priori knowledge for the
occurrence of any action, with concepts of society:
The concept of society has to be linked to a concept of the
lifeworld that is complementary to the concept of
communicative action. Communicative action provides the
medium for the reproduction of the lifeworids.
Habermas (1991a, p33)7.
'Society' is identified as a structural component of the lifeworld, along with
'Culture' and 'Person' (Habermas, 1991b, pl42). The lifeworld is reproduced
through processes that are linked to these structural elements - culturally
reproductive, socially integrative and socialising - and mediated through
communicative action. In particular the 'coordination of actions via
intersubjectively recognised validity claims', a socially integrative process of
which dialogue as defined previously is an example, reproduces the society
element of the lifeworld (Habermas, 1991b, p144).
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There is an ambiguity here in Habermas's concept of the lifeworid that is worth
clarifying. It is that while the lifeworid is described initially as simply (or merely)
a cognitive structure of 'background knowledge', implying a local egocentric
structure, Habermas eventually enriches the lifeworld into an highly
differentiated and independent entity: a 'transcendental site' (Habermas, 1991b,
p126) with all encompassing structural components from persons to whole
societies. This goes beyond the narrow implications of local egocentrism. Indeed
Habermas situates the processes of rationalisation of society 'more in implicitly
known structures of the lifeworid' (Habermas, 1991a, p336) and therefore the
lifeworid is not merely 'background knowledge' in individual minds but a locus
for the action of reaching mutual understanding. In a way the lifeworid assumes
a 'virtual reality' not unlike Popper's (1979) 'World 3'.
3.7.1 Actor-world relations, lifeworid segments and siti.iations
The focus of the lifeworld is the 'actor' with the three 'actor-world relations'
discussed previously. Communicative relations, the linguistic media of
interaction between people, are 'embedded' in these three worlds
simultaneously. Previously the three formal world-concept was used to analyse
social action. Now the three worlds are being used to denote the reference
system, the 'interpretive framework', within which actors who are talking to one
another 'work out their common situation definitions' (Habermas, 1991a, p120).
Here Habermas has drawn implicitly upon his earlier work about the ego's life
relation which 'firmly establishes' the significance of other things and egos
(Habermas, 1972, p15l). Only now Habermas clearly defines a 'situation' about
which actors try to reach understandings that was left implicit in his earlier (1972)
work. According to Habermas a situation is a shared context in which actions
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may be defined and take place. It has spatial, temporal and normative
dimensions. The normative dimension is a collective's shared and tacitly
accepted framework of norms (Habermas, 1991b).
Situations are continually redefined by their actors as they 'negotiate' new or
affirm old understandings with actors. The constant flux of definition and
redefinition relies upon assumptions of 'commonality' between actors as to the
content of their three worlds. Nor can these situations be sharply defined: they
are a perceptual horizon moving with each change of theme - limited 'segments',
of the portions of the lifeworid relevant to the situation (Habermas, 1991b, p122).
Put another way the three dimensions of a situation are not absolute. They alter
every time there is a new agreement, or disagreement, between the group of
actors.
The greater the 'distance' along each dimension of the situation, the wider a
situation is defined, the more uncertainty there is about the relevance, or the
quality, of the background information called upon. So Habermas regards the
immediate situation in which we are placed as a world 'that is within my actual
reach' (Habermas, 1991b, p123). Raising our gaze more toward the horizon calls
for a wider redefinition of our situation and reveals 'a world within my potential
reach' (Habermas, 1991b, p123). Habermas has openly used Husserl's 'image of
the horizon that shifts according to one's position and that can expand and
shrink as one moves through the rough countryside' (Habermas, 1991b, p123 and
Kuhn, 1940, p106). In this way situations are defined in the 'eye of the beholder',
are never static, and they can be purposefully redefined by 'stepping over the
boundary'.
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A simple example of a situation will help to clarify its meaning: some neighbours
on an housing estate have a common perception about how far it is to the shops -
a shared viewpoint about the spatial dimension of their situation. This common
definition could alter simply if some physically fitter people move into the
neighbourhood. There may be a redefinition resulting in a common perception
of a single new situation: everyone agrees it is now a walk instead of a bus-ride,
or there may be a conflict between actors who perceive two situations with
slightly differing dimensions.
In each case, the appropriate background knowledge is enclosed within an
horizon of relevance to the situation and includes perceptions common to each
actor such as subjective estimations of distance, objective information - the
number of the bus service - and norms about an acceptable distance to walk.
The horizon of relevance may be altered abruptly, and deliberately, if a new closer
shopping development is proposed and then contested on planning grounds.
Suddenly local people may have to accommodate vague or unfamiliar new
relevancies within the old situation such as the council's planning department
and local political parties. The world within potential reach acquires new
significance.
3.7.2 Situations and action
In the above example the immediate situation, a lifeworid segment of local
significance, had always been a focus for some action, such as getting a bus or
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taking a walk, or talking to someone. Some actions have been a part of the
redefinition of the situation which will itself lead actors to take some new forms
of action. From this it can be seen that a situation is a locus both in defining and
being reflexively defined by action (a very similar notion to Giddens' (1984)
theory of structuration.
To an actor this locus is the 'centre of their lifeworid' as Habermas (1991b, p126)
puts it. But as soon as a redefinition takes place, and new relevancies of taken-
for-granted possibly unconscious knowledge are called upon, this newly relevant
knowledge becomes contestable. Habermas finds that this analysis, based on
action oriented to reaching understandings and on strategic action, is inadequate
however because societies are also reproduced and integrated by other
mechanisms that are not reliant upon social action. In this way Habermas
introduces the notion of system into his theory.
3.7.3 System and lifeworid
Habermas defines situations (or 'lifeworid segments') in terms of three
dimensions - spatial, temporal and normative. In this context actions have
spatial, temporal and normative consequences, but often these are the
coordinated but nevertheless unintended outcomes of individual and collective
actions. Habermas argues that
goal-directed actions are coordinated not only through processes
of reaching understanding, but also through functional
interconnections that are not intended by them and are usually
not even perceived within the horizon of everyday practice. In
capitalist societies the market is the most important example of a
norm-free regulation of cooperative contexts. The market is one
of those systemic mechanisms that stabilise non-intended
interconnections of action by way of fundamentally
intermeshing action consequences, whereas the mechanism of
mutual understanding harmonises the action orientations of
participants.
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Habermas (1991b, p150)
It is this 'functional interconnection', a mechanism for involvement and
influence mediated through countless transactions (whether of market or some
other kind) that leads Habermas to propose a system element to the theory of
communicative action and a systemic definition of society: 'societies are
systemically stabilised complexes of action of socially integrated groups' (1991b,
p152). This definition is explicitly developed from Parson's systems theory of
society which is based upon structural differentiation and functional integration.
According to Habermas the relationship between social action and society is
systemic and steered by 'blind' mechanisms of which markets are the chief
example. The very blindness of these mechanisms and the unreflective nature of
instrumental thinking limit and constrain the rationalisation of society to which
the only response is a public renaissance of communicative action. In its own
small way this thesis attempts to contribute to that renaissance. However in
order to illustrate and bring out some of the implications of the theory I will now
contrast rational choice (a synonym for the strategic action that central to the
economic theory of markets) with communicative action and the respective
broad modes of management they support - competition versus collaboration.
3.8	 Rational choice
The view that people are wholly selfish individuals who will always do that
which they believe to be in their own best interests, in other words maximise
utility, is a standard assumption made by economists. It is usually called 'rational
choice' (White, 1988) and this view has been severely criticised because of the
number of assumptions necessary to make economic theories empirically
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verifiable. These assumptions are often disguised as ceteris paribus ('other things
being equal') clauses (Rosenberg, 1988).
For instance if offered a choice between half a biscuit and whole biscuit most
people would, other things being equal, choose the whole biscuit. That would be
a rational choice. It would be irrational to choose the half biscuit unless other
things were not equal such as the recipes of the biscuits, or the health of the
subjects chosen for the experiment. Similarly other experimental situations can
be contrived in which the rational choice appears intuitively obvious. It is on the
basis of induction from this simple situation that economic theory arrives at
rational choice which Habermas (1991a) identifies as a form of strategic social
action - only one of five kinds of social action.
Yet the theory of rational choice breaks down immediately at ceteris paribus. In
day to day life very few things can be demonstrably equal. Only under the
strictest laboratory control can a majority of variables be accounted for and
individuals do not usually live in laboratories.
Very often deep seated problems in the theory of rational choices result in
anomalies like the caring externality (Mooney, 1993) which means that
individuals seem to obtain utility out of providing care for nothing. Indeed the
way Mooney uses the term seems to imply that care is something given without
payment. Such anomalies are serious because they are are regarded as one of the
reasons health care markets are, in Mooney's economic terms, inefficient.
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The problem of individuals providing price-free services is just one reason why
it is not surprising to discover internationally that all health care markets are
peculiar under whatever political system. Other reasons are the dominance of
experts as gatekeepers for public access to services, the reliance on insurance to
finance health care, the lack of information and so on (Mooney, 1993). Moreover
rational choice is not considered politically reliable as a basis for the market
allocation of health services. As it was shown in chapter 2 the NHS has survived
the era of privatisation (more or less) intact when capitalist logic would suggest
that it be sold off, and given over to blind steering mechanisms, with an
immense short term tax payoff.
According to economists rational choice should lead to bargaining over price,
quality and delivery of goods and services. It is this theory that underpins the
NHS reforms of 1989 in which the so called 'internal market' was created
(Department of Health, 1989a). Yet rational bargains can only be struck if there is
adequate information. If information is less than perfect then inefficiencies will
appear. Since bargains require the least concessions for the greatest gains, in
other words maximum profit, this will involve concealing information about
strengths and weaknesses and making maximum use of certainty and
uncertainty to weaken the resolve of the other party. Put simply economic truth
is the first casualty of economic war which is central to economic 'competition
red in tooth and claw' (Maynard, 1992).
Selfish bargaining means that concern for others may be seen to be a weakness to
be exploited in pursuit of maximum gains. The concealment of information and
promotion of uncertainty further limits the information available about
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alternative actions. These are constraints that necessarily offer fewer potential
resolutions to a situation than rational argumentation through which all forms
of social action may be coordinated and to which I now turn.
It is possible to conceive of a quantitative difference between rational choice and
communicative action in the number of options for individual action that are
available to those involved. This can be explored through the famous prisoner's
dilemma.
3.9 The prisoners dilemma
The original model concerned two prisoners who are accused of committing a
joint crime (Rosenberg, 1988). They are isolated from one another but
independently offered enormous incentives by the gaoler to 'sell out' their crony
- or be sold out. If the prisoners cooperate with each other by refusing to blame
the other then they know they will soon be released to benefit equally from their
crime - a moderate reward. If the prisoners both defect and lay the blame on the
other then they will each receive short jail sentences and must wait longer to
benefit - a moderate penalty. If however one defects while the other cooperates
the latter will be fully blamed and be given a life sentence - a massive penalty -
while the former will go free to enjoy all the ill-gotten gains - a massive reward.
In Habermasian terms the prisoners are faced with deciding a course of
teleological action by guessing what the other prisoner is going to do.
Analytically the teleological action involves two elements: deciding which
teleological goal the other prisoner will pursue knowing he is faced with the
same situation and payoffs. Then deciding what action to take - cooperate or
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defect?
It is usually assumed that individuals are risk averse (Wharton, 1992) meaning
in economic terms that they strive to maximise their expected utility while
avoiding losses. Or, to put it another way, it is 'bottom line' preference to live
with a small loss and the possibility of a big gain than with a small gain and the
possibility of losing everything.
Most observers would probably agree in the light of this that the individual
rational choice in the dilemma is to defect since this automatically avoids a
massive penalty and offers either an individually moderate penalty or a
potentially massive reward. Cooperation yields either a moderate reward or the
loss of everything. Consequently it is assumed that both prisoners will inevitably
defect and the payoff will be a moderate penalty to each. It is also assumed that
this is what the gaoler wants.
The notion of the prisoners dilemma as a one off once and for all situation is
used to explore the theory of rational choice. However it is recognised that this is
only one version of the dilemma. An alternative is the prisoners dilemma in a
repeated situation (Rosenberg, 1988). The payoffs differ slightly - it takes
repetitions to build up the rewards and the penalties. The prisoners are told what
action the other took and they can change their action from occasion to occasion.
Thus they can act strategically rather than merely teleologically.
In this situation the prisoners have the option of cooperating without incurring
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massive short term penalties. Cooperation is a viable 'something for nothing'
short term strategy. If one prisoner cooperates and the other responds by
similarly cooperating then they can achieve a cooperate-cooperate outcome with
a moderate reward rather than the alternative inevitable moderate penalty. It
would be considered pathological if one prisoner continued to cooperate while
the other defected because this would build up a massive penalty.
This notion of repeated prisoners dilemmas has been explored extensively in the
management literature particularly in the field of games theory (e.g. see Ward,
1989). In these discussions the rewards and penalties are no longer usually
allocated by a sole human authority. More often the method of payoff is implicit
in the discussion and it is often down to an economic 'invisible hand' type
mechanism. This replacement of a discrete and manipulative human authority
with a natural mechanism has been used byDawkins (1989) to model cooperation
between species in the natural world. However Dawkins is able to remove all
human cognition from his model: he models cooperation and competition
amongst birds and crocodiles (amongst other organisms) - some of the least
'intelligent' and most 'instinctive' forms of life known.
Dawkins argues that randomly arising instances of cooperation between
individuals of differing species that might otherwise eat or avoid each other,
coincidentally increases their individual prospects for survival and the
transmission of cooperative genes. Therefore certain species of birds can be seen
earning a living by cleaning crocodiles teeth. Both crocodiles and the birds
cooperate. Crocodiles get improved dental protection, which is crucial to their
lifestyle while the birds get a free lunch without any fear of predation from other
animals. At any time a croc can defect and eat the bird - but the crocodiles that do
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this will on the whole not prosper in great numbers - they will fail to pass on
their less collaborative and more competitive genes. Similarly birds may not
clean crocodile teeth but they too will tend not to prosper because they miss the
free safe food supply. Repeated cooperation between individuals of species when
established in this situation produces a longer term social payoff, through a
'blind' natural world steering mechanism, because the partner's overall
competitiveness is enhanced. Cooperate-cooperate is a better long term social
strategy than defect-defect. Cooperate-defect is inherently unstable. If all birds
were eaten by crocodiles there would be no birds left to pass on 'suicide' genes.
This natural world analogy is extended by Dawkins back into the social world on
the issue of the North Sea fishing and competitive fish markets. Since fish stocks
have become depleted fishing has become regulated. If all fishermen cooperate
and continually land small quotas there will continue to be fish available for the
foreseeable future providing a modest long term reward for fishing. If some
fishermen defect and land large catches then they can make a large amount of
money - those who do not break their quotas are losing big potential rewards and
may be regarded as less viable long term businesses. Yet if all fishermen did this
very soon there would be no fish at all. The long term reward for repeated defect-
defect is the end of the fishing industry yet this is the only viable resolution of
the dilemma, unless there is some totally reliable means of social regulation - in
other words policing of the cooperate-cooperate strategy.
Similar situations can be constructed out of more common experiences - any
situation in fact where there are identifiable alternatives of competition or
cooperation with the familiar pattern of payoffs.
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So in Habermasian terms what is the characteristic in a prisoners' dilemma that
enables a cooperate-cooperate social strategy to succeed? It is the sincerity of the
claim made by another individual or group that is the crucial factor in deciding
whether or not one could cooperate. If sincerity in other parties cannot be
established then the prisoners' dilemma leads inevitably to the short term
rational choice of defect. This becomes a double defect in fact - the least desirable
collective solution to a social problem.
3.10 Competition versus cooperation
If communicative action can be established between stakeholders in a prisoners
dilemma then sincerity can be checked and options for cooperative action will
become available that are otherwise not viable. On the one hand because
without evidence of sincerity there are risks and uncertainties in cooperation
and, on the other hand, because some options will simply remain unexplored or
even unknowable because of the way information is strategically exploited.
Collaboration, in repeated prisoners dilemmas, is the key to longer term stability
and prosperity, although this does not mean that stakeholders will choose to
cooperate because a big payoff for defect will always threaten cooperation.
The prisoners' dilemma is only one way of exploring rational choice and only
one scenario although it is an important model. The model is nevertheless very
narrow. It is not the general case of human choices but a special case in which
defect at low risk for an extra special reward is possible at any time. Very often in
social situations the payoffs are not nearly so clear cut and the repetition of a
situation is cognitively dependent rather than reproductively dependent as in
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Dawkins natural world examples. Instead of the 'blind watchmaker' (Dawkins
1989) acting over aeons in the natural world there is the social world analogue of
Adam Smith's 'invisible hand' (Smith 1910) or Habermas's steering mechanism
acting over hours, days, months and years. The model has served to show
however that economic and political competition may lead to undesirable social
outcomes.
A key assumption of the prisoners dilemma though is the mutual exclusivity of
competition and cooperation - but even competitive social, economic and
political markets require a degree of collaboration. Midgley (1992) comments that
his ideal of collaboration in research and change might seem at odds with the
antagonistic, even competitive, necessity of independent viewpoint formulation.
This is resolved in Midgely's model by the presence of a common forum in
which an understanding may be achieved between otherwise potentially
anarchically competitive viewpoints. In other words there are presumed
commitments to communicative action and a forum for it to occur.
This simply emphasises that competition and collaboration are not at opposite
ends of a continuum as may be supposed. The logical opposite of collaboration is
anarchy which as Flood (1993) observes is what all the actors in a situation are
trying to avoid. Competition is a special case of collaboration. Therefore
competition is regulated in economic markets (see Maynard's (1992) comments
on competition). Indeed there is such a thing as unfair competition and
exploitation recognised in law in the Western world. Black markets are abhorred
by socialists and capitalists alike - drug pushers for example operate in a black
market.
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3.11 The conditions for dialogue
Although Habermas argues for communicative action, as a critical basis for
coordinating action, he does not clearly state the arrangements that would have
to be made to operationalise his theory. Any such methodological steps are
implied within the body of his theory. One way of beginning to understand the
practical implications of the theory of communicative action is to consider it
within a special process of dialogue. This term is frequently used to indicate that
two or more actors are communicating with each other with the serious
intention of increasing mutual understanding.
According to the Oxford English Dictionary (Sykes, 1976) the term can simply
refer to a conversation between people, or to a piece of written or dramatic work
in the form of conversation, or to an exchange of proposals between parties.
However the term is used in many more walks of life and this is reflected in the
general literature. For instance, it is used to refer to an educational approach to
children with learning difficulties (Englert, Tarrant, Manage, Oxer 1994). Jackson
(1991a) uses the term in a loose ill-defined sense when referring to the need for
communication between advocates of differing positions in systems science. So
does Reed (1992a) on the sociology of organisations. Other authors use the term
in a more purely sociological context: Bubner (1982) uses the term in his critique
of Habermas while Baumann (1992) develops a postmodern meaning for the
term. The term dialogue generally implies notions of a presumed diversity of
viewpoints, an ethical attitude that dialogue is right and necessary, and that there
are suitable structures and processes for social action to occur in the light of
dialogue. My concern is with certain normative and structural conditions of the
process which determine w h en , how and between whom communicative action
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should occur. I shall bring out aspects of these conditions of Habermas's theory
by contrasting Bauman's postmodern view of dialogue with Habermas's views
but I do not intend to launch into a large scale modern-postmodern debate.
Rather I simply wish to show that for dialogue to have a role in society in general
suitable arrangements have to be made to expedite it and that this can be
accessibly understood as a democratic and egalitarian process aimed at defining
and pursuing fair goals. I shall begin with the postmodern view of dialogue
represented by Bauman.
Baumann (1992) argues that dialogue is the special conditional process of
communication between individuals when those with differing viewpoints are
not merely tolerated by others out of 'generosity' but are accepted and respected
for their differing viewpoints which are deemed to be equally relevant and valid
(ppxxi-xxii). This means that there is no claimable universally appropriate
viewpoint - this is one of the defining features of Bauman's postmodern
perspective. He would argue that there is no way of evaluating social action in
the way proposed by Habermas which suggests that there is an ultimate and
universally agreeable ethic for action (Habermas 1991b). Bauman rejects this
presumed ultimate objectivity.
This sounds like an invitation into ethical relativism - all views are equally valid
and good for the believer to act on - but Bauman carefully qualifies this in what
seems to be a typically negative postmodern way: if all actions are pronounced
equally valid (no matter how barbaric) then this simply reasserts selfish,
individual 'superiority' by permitting immoral things to happen (pxxiii). Instead
Bauman advocates individual responsibility for moral choice but without the
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prop of some universal guidance however this is supposed to be obtained.
Bauman's viewpoint therefore effectively seems to rule out a Habermasian form
of communicative action as an element of a dialogue process.
Indeed Bauman rejects the idea that sociology can define the conditions for a
dialogue process. He follows Bakhtin (1986) in claiming that modern sociology
(like that of Habermas) is tnonological: By this he means that it treats its subjects
as objects, not as conscious partners in dialogue (Baumann 1992, p78). Moreover
it is un-democractic, meaning that it supports the 'accomplishments of the
powers that be' as 'objectively given and non-negotiable 'facts of reality"
(Baumann 1992, p78). Modern sociology, Bauman argues, accepts 'without
questioning the right of the managers of social processes to determine the
distinction between proper and improper' (Baumann 1992, p78). Instead Bauman
argues that dialogue is the way in which subjective authority can be produced:
Purposes can no longer be substantiated monologically; having
become perforce subjects of dialogue, they must now refer to
principles wide enough to command authority of the sort that
belongs solely to ethical values.
Baumann (1992, p202)
However Bauman's views on modern sociology seem to be both too pessimistic
and too sweeping. Habermas would completely reject the idea that modern
sociology always unquestioningly supports arrogant objectivity in managing
social processes. Habermas pursues quite the opposite path to that criticised 1y
Bauman. He opposes the instrumentalism that is implicit in rnonologic - as I
have discussed earlier. He produced the theory of communicative action in
opposition to such instrumentality. Habermas rejects the strategy of monologic
and advocates a dialogic involving actors in reaching understandings where they
have some confidence as to what is agreed and disagreed upon and what is
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undecided.
So while Habermas's theory of communicative action is built on a notion of
universal ethics this is achieved through debate between subjects in the public
sphere. Such debate is conducted because there is a diversity of viewpoints with
no a-priori knowledge of which is 'the' best. Moreover conclusions are always
tentative. In practical terms perhaps the most fundamental aspect of the theory
of communicative action is the option of an individual to say 'no' (or 'not yes') to
a validity claim: - I do not understand your words, or I do not think you are being
sincere, or I do not think that your view is moral or finally I do not believe that
the 'facts' you have provided support your point of view. This is in the
expectation that there will be a genuine attempt to respond.
The universal 'rational' society is not homogeneous or homogenised by some
arrogant powerful authority or code as is implied and decried by Bauman. That is
the antithesis of what Habermas would agree is a rational society in which
individuals must be able to challenge and receive answer on any such proposed
code at any time. In the theory of communicative action Habermas does not
specify a universal moral code or formula by which to make judgments about
what is proper. What he does do is argue that social action is decided very often
without communicative action between those whom it involves and that this
fact should be changed. In other words there should not be a universal code but
an accessible process in which moral argumentation can occur. McCarthy puts it
this way:
The aim of the latter is to reconstruct the moral point of view as
the perspective from which competing claims can be fairly and
impartially adjudicated. Like Kant, Habermas understands this
sort of practical reasoning as universal in import: it is geared to
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what everyone could radically will to be a norm binding on
everyone alike. His 'discourse ethics', however, replaces Kant's
categorical imperatives with a procedure of moral
argumentation: normative justification is tied to reasoned
agreement among those subject to the norm in question.
Thomas McCarthy (1990, pviii)
In general then the absence of challenges to validity claims or responses to them
are potential distortions not only of argument but also of justice. If an actor does
not have the option to say 'no' to a validity claim then they cannot coordinate
their actions with others on the basis of genuine understanding. With unequal
access to the forum at best they are faced with making solo decisions to act, in
spite or ignorance of what other people think, either as selfish or unwilling
competitors - a recipe for loneliness. Or they can conform mindlessly or
unwillingly to dominant norms or they can be driven by other people's strategies
and be forced into a corner. None of these options will tend to eliminate
unfairness in the NHS quality gap. Habermas (1991b) identifies such
communicative failure as a 'pathology' of society.
However Habermas argues that individuals do attempt to reach genuine
understandings with others. Indeed life cannot be lived without communicative
action and in the absence of understandings - Habermas argues that it is the way
that the lifeworld and society are reproduced. It is simply that it does not always
occur when and in the way it should because of distorting factors and it is veiled
by complex human society.
Perhaps the most important methodological principle of the theory of
communicative action is the option to say 'no' to some claim to validity being
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made. It is this option that defines the democratic conditions for dialogue. To
argue against the idea that everyone is entitled to exercise the option means
arguing for the undemocratic and inegalitarian monologic deprecated by
Bauman, or for ethical relativism. Habermas at least provides an indication of
the mechanism to satisfy Bauman's postmodern call for the 'authority' of ethical
propositions to be tested: it is through the democratic responsibility of someone
making a proposition to redeem the validity claims inherent in it when
challenged. In other words can you substantiate your view if someone says 'no'
to the claims you are making? Of course the problems are who genuinely has this
democratic option? How can it be operationalised? Would anyone bother
responding?
The optimistic answer to the latter question, based on the view that individuals
instinctively need to coordinate actions, is yes but without special arrangements
most people may never have the opportunity to exercise the option to say 'no'
because of the general emphasis on strategic action. This is the democratic hot
potato which Bauman avoids by rather sweepingly condemning 'social
engineering' (1992, pxxiv) in favour of a new class of 'moral subjects':
All in all, in the postmodern context agents are constantly faced
with moral issues and obliged to choose between equally well
founded (or equally unfounded) ethical precepts. The choice
always means the assumption of responsibility, and for this
reason bears the character of a moral act. Under the postmodern
condition the actor is perforce not just an actor and decision-
maker, but a moral subject. The performance of life functions
demands also that the agent be a morally competent subject.
Baumann (1992, p203)
But unless there is a collective democratic solution to the problem of inequalities
how can individuals learn to be morally competent? How can they learn to live
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out their moral subjectivity? How do they get the life-chance? Or is postmodern
ethics always to be lived out by the privileged few in the interstices of whatever
political system is thrown up by society?5
 If so then the majority of people who
will ever live risk becoming powerless victims, bereft of the means of critique,
rather than empowered moral subjects. Bauman cannot avoid making some
collective arrangements for dialogue or else he simply favours some strong and
fortunate people (who may have had access to his book).
Therefore it is a mistake automatically to regard the institution of dialogue as
simply more social engineering because structure counts a premise that is
missing it seems from postmodern critiques such as that offered by Taket and
White (1994). The theory of communicative action does suggest that a suitable
democratic arrangement can be conceived of in which individuals may equably
exercise their option to challenge the claims being made by others. Habermas
implies that a democratic structure is a prerequisite for justice to be done because
it is necessary to establish, in his words, 'a procedure based on presuppositions
and designed to guarantee the impartiality of judging' (Habermas 1990, p122).
To make such a procedure work ideally requires that there be equal access to the
process for all citizens. A good enough process is one in which equality of access
is striven for as a basic commitment of participation. The commitment to
equality of access is the acid test of dialogue and without it there remain only
markets or norms or moral subjectivity as modes of management. As I have
attempted to argue in this chapter none of these are likely to reduce the
unfairness inherent in the quality gap of the NHS because they do not address
fundamental social inequalities. Perhaps a better way of explaining the acrimony
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over the NHS quality gap is because there is a lack of dialogue. Without dialogue
there can be no overall just resolution to quality matters. On the other hand if
dialogue were to occur between NHS users, purchasers and providers issues of
inequality and inconsistency could be resolved in ways that are not amenable to
the blind or part-regulated steering of market forces. What is needed then are
some arrangements to be made for dialogue on quality between NHS purchasers,
providers and users. Through this the concept of quality can be made intelligible,
goals can be ratified as right and genuine by the public, and understandings can be
reached about the situation in common.
Although the theory of communicative action points the way toward a
continuing dialogical process of resolution of the NHS quality gap how this can
be pragmatised is yet to be dealt with. To assist in this task the Habermasian
definition of a situation can be taken further by considering and characterising
the circumstances in which individual and group actors (or 'stakeholders')
employ the various categories of social action. In the next chapter therefore I will
suggest how social action relationships between identified stakeholders can be
modelled.
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1 White (1988) explains that Habermas's knowledge and human interest has
attracted much criticism, especially the accusation that his theory is
philosophically foundationalist, meaning that it claims a universal basis
for morality or knowledge. This includes the notion, for example, that all
morally just acts 'partake of a common nature, which will be found in
whatever is just and in nothing else' (Russell, 1912). White argues that
Habermas has dealt with these criticisms by undertaking his linguistic
turn. Instead of identifying full blown Kantian universal conditions for all
possible knowledge, Habermas hypothesiess that conditions of validity of
expression can be identified through the reconstruction of what is
intuitively in-built into speech. As well as being a logical task in which
contradictions can be screened out it is also an empirical task (Habermas,
1991). Habermas rejects the idea that formulating hypothetical universals
for empirical testing is the same as being foundationlist (Habermas, 1990,
ch.1). Instead philosophy can merely 'stand-in' and be 'interpreter' for a
while, whilst hypothetical reconstructions are tested out in empirical
research projects. Philosophy did not produce science and technology, law
and morality and aesthetics. These came into being 'without the aid of
philosphy' (Habermas, 1990, ch.1, and see; Habermas, 1991). Of course this
has led to accusations that there is no difference between Habermasian
'reconstructive science' hypotheses and those of the positivistic science he
criticises (for example see Alford (1985). It seems to me that one of the key
characteristics of positivistic science is the lack of reflection on the grounds
for verification or falsification of theory. Strangely enough Habermas's
theory of communicative action addresses the conditions under which
such grounds can be challenged. To that extent there is clear water between
the hypotheses contained within the theory of communicative action and
those of positivistic science. In the second volume of the theory of
communicative action Habermas (1991) enlarges on the reconstructive
sciences to which the interested reader can refer.
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Virtual objects in Popper's three worlds theory are not physical but
nevertheless exist independently of individual egos. Mind I body duality,
which Popper argues has dominated Western philosophy, exemplifies two
worlds. The body personifies the real physical world. The mind is a world
of 'mental states' and contains 'subjective or personal experiences' (Popper,
1979, p155). However Popper argues that a third world can be discerned - a
world of 'ideas in the objective sense' which contains theories, their logical
relations, arguments and problem situations, (p154) Together these form a
theory which 'transcends the dualistic schema' (Popper, 1979, p154).
Responding to criticisms Popper dropped the terms first, second and third
world replacing them with world 1, world 2 and world 3.
It is ironic that Habermas who opposes scientism is sucked into implying a
process of 'natural selection' of norms because this idea is very similar to
the 'meme' posited by Dawkins (1989). Dawkins is an archetypical scientist
who argues that ideas reproduce in a way contingent upon their
environment. He suggests that God is one such idea propagated by the
human fear of eternal hellfire and damnation.
Rational choice has a big and influential lobby. Classical works include
Downs (1957) and Olsen (1971). Pine (1988) and Dunleavy (1991) are more
contemporary examples of the rational choice view. Mooney (1993) could
not have written his book without making rational choice assumptions.
None of these authors deal adequately with non-strategic forms of social
action.
Let me be personal for a moment - I worry about my children: I want
them to have the option to say 'no' to some outrageous policy made by a
third party (like sending my daughter to a special school), and crucially, to
be entitled to the justification (which currently they are not). Of course if
no-one else shares this democratic viewpoint then there is nothing that
can be done other than to resist and struggle for a brief lifetime. However I
do not k n o w that this is the case. So I shall argue for dialogue as a mode of
local, national and international management. Enough people call for
dialogue - so why not be optimistic?
102
chapter 4
Pressure group politics
In the previous chapter it was argued that social action occurs in a context defined
as a situation - a segment of the lifeworid - and that there is a constant flux of
definition and redefinition of the situation as participants negotiate a common
understanding of it. What has not been described yet is how the theory of
communicative action can be applied in a constructive way to 'real' situations
and so the task in this chapter is show how situations can be analysed in terms of
social action.
The political theory of interest groups provides a useful starting point for this
discussion. In particular Grant (1989) provides a ready made model of interest
group relationships with the British government that can be modified and
enriched. In fact Grant's model can be developed to assist in understanding
political relations in a variety of situations involving groups of people in a way
that is far more generalised than his original proposal with the help of the
theoretical discussion of social action undertaken in chapter four 1 . This chapter
outlines Grant's original version of his interest group model taking in the
theoretical issues as he presents them. The model is then enriched and applied
to three scenarios both to explain them but reciprocally to illuminate the model.
4.1	 Insiders and outsiders
Grant's (1989) insider/outsider classification of interest group strategies is a
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simple but flexible model of the relationships that may exist between pressure
groups and Government. He focusses on Government-pressure group relations
because he regarded this as the general case of political processes in any
democratic society. Grant distinguishes this from other situations where a
specific organisation is being challenged by an internal' pressure group as, for
example, occurred in the Anglican Church over many years on the issue of the
ordination of women.
The first point to note is that in Grant's model there must be an authority (the
Government) capable of making important decisions that can be influenced by
'pressure'. Grant does not clearly say what the 'pressure' is but leaves this to be
implied by the tactics employed. For example, Grant mentions acts of violence,
the entertainment of members of Parliament, letter writing, personal persuasion
and use of the media as ways of exerting pressure on the Government. He also
agues that pressure is at least one part of a bargaining process (Grant, 1989 p18).
Grant argues that pressure groups are defined by the existence of a clear cut
membership and group objectives and often their employment of paid staff. He
differentiates organised pressure groups from unorganised 'interests' by arguing
that pressure groups may promote 'amorphous' interests which are often
economically or socially defined (e.g.: Sheffield Pensioners Action Group or
'SPAG' ostensibly represents working class retired people in Sheffield). Grant
typifies groups whose main objective is to apply pressure as 'primary' groups.
However exerting political pressure may be secondary objective since many
'secondary' groups exist mainly to supply a service to their members as in the
Royal Automobile Club. 'Sectional' groups represent a sector of the community
(e.g.: SPAG or Age Concern) while 'cause' groups represent a particular ideal or
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principle (e.g.: Friends of the Earth).
However, the most useful and important element of Grant's model for the
theory and practice of dialogue is that of pressure group strategy. Pressure groups
can be regarded as 'insiders' or 'outsiders' with respect to the Government. In
fact Grant identifies a whole range of inside or outside strategies: Insider,
thresholder, outsider and these are subdivided: prisoner, potential insider, low
profile insider, high profile insider, outsider by necessity and ideological
outsiders.
Grant defines prisoner insider groups as those that are virtual extensions of
government departments in helping to form and implement Government policy
as at times, arguably, has the Confederation of British Industry (CBI). The other
insider groups may adopt very public (high profile) or hidden (low profile) roles
in helping to formulate and implement Government policy. Thresholder groups
were identified by May and Nugent (1987) as groups that might at times be insider
or outsider. Potential insider groups seek closer relationships with Government.
Outsider groups by necessity are simply less politically able than potential insider
groups. At the other extreme to prisoner insider groups are ideological outsider
pressure groups whose members see no lawful means of achieving their goals
and act accordingly - paramilitary terrorist groups, among others, fall into this
category. Between these extremes of Grant's classification are degrees of
insider/outsider strategy.
Group strategies might alter over time moving them closer to or further away
from the Government. It is possible that some pressure groups might have
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'insider' and 'outsider' factions. Government too might alter its position with
respect to the interest groups - especially if there is a change of government.
4.2 The pressure group context - political pluralism, democracy and efficiency
Pressure group activity does not occur in a vacuum. Grant defines a context in
which pressure groups operate their strategies with respect to government. This
context Grant defines as one of political pluralism 2
 which he contrasts with that
of political corporatism.3
 What Grant does not discuss is how pressure groups
relate to each other, something I redress later in this chapter.
According to Grant pluralism is, broadly speaking, a context where there are
many pressure groups with competing interests in a 'balanced' situation, of
distinct 'issue areas', where 'power in society is fragmented and dispersed'
(Grant, 1989, p25). The pressure groups are themselves distinct and diverse with
differing styles, tactics and strategies.
Grant also argues that in theory pluralism should mean that pressure groups can
easily form and disappear although he admits that this does not occur in practice.
For one thing some pressure groups acquire assets that enable them to continue
in the long term while other potential groups are too poor to come into being.
What Grant argues is a balanced situation can also be construed as an unfair and
illegitimate situation. However while Grant agrees that there is a potential
distortion of democracy by the reinforcing of the political status quo by pressure
groups - particularly business interests - he emphasises that pluralism does not
mean that there is equality of access to, or influence over, the political process.
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He argues without giving precise reasons that if this occurred it would 'paralyse'
the political system. Perhaps Grant believes that for everyone to have access to
the political process would 'tie it up' with an endless trivial agenda.
So what is it in Grant's view that makes the competitive dominance of some
pressure groups under political pluralism both legitimate and rational? On the
one hand Grant takes refuge in the power of democracy explaining away the
special position of business as 'a value choice of society, expressed through the
outcome of elections, in favour of a capitalist, free enterprise society' (Grant, 1989
p22). On the other hand Grant argues that Governments need the advice,
support and cooperation of interest groups (among them businesses) in forming
and implementing policy. Groups therefore tend to dominate if they have
something especially valuable to contribute in the national interest and they
improve democracy by 'contributing to the quality of the decision making
process. Those that have axes to grind may something to say that is relevant to
the issue under consideration' (Grant, 1989, p21). Consequently pressure groups
allow democracy to register the intensity of opinion and the quality of argument
rather than simply the number of votes cast.
These views certainly need some qualifying. It is not clear for example that the
pluralistic conditions of balance described by Grant actually do or could exist
although he advocates them. Furthermore the characterisation of society as an
entity capable of making 'value choices' demands clarification. In what way has
'society' (reified by Grant) made an ethical choice on behalf of its members that
they should accept? Grant seems to be trying to legitimate what a substantial
number of individuals find unacceptable - the inequalities in society and a lack of
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dialogue. Yet if dialogue is lacking then there is no way those who do not like
the status quo 'value-choice' to register their disapproval - the messages will be
garbled and distorted. Only those with sufficient power can 'break through'.
Society cannot make a democratic 'value choice' in the fashion presumed 1y
Grant unless he defines democracy as a 'pecking order' dominated by strategic and
normatively regulated action. Nevertheless Grant makes what at first seems to
be a good point: equal access would lead to political paralysis. Surely there would
be no point in desiring equitable access to a process that ceased to exist because of
decisiveness or sheer complexity?
However Grant does not substantiate this problem. He does not demonstrate
that equity necessarily equals paralysis. It would be more productive to ask h o w
can a political process be arranged that is demonstrably efficient and equitable?
Indeed this thesis is based upon the premise that it is vital for the welfare of all
members of society to produce equitable democratic decision making, without
political paralysis, by design - a practical dialogue. The management of quality in
the NHS is, in that regard, simply an exemplar and calls upon critical systems
thinking in chapter 5 and the theory of quality in chapter 6 to support this.
Grant neither supports his 'political paralysis' claim nor does he spell out what
he means by 'intensity of opinion'. Possibly he means that if a pressure group
comes into being its members must be prepared to make substantial sacrifices to
get their views across. Those with existing resources and opportunities have a
massive advantage but in Habermasian terms does this make their view more
intelligible? or acceptable? or sincere? or supportable with other information or
experience? All the more reason in fact for there to be an equitable process of
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critique so that the excessive zeal, resources and opportunities of a minority do
not prevail simply because of that excess.
Grant acknowledges this. Intensity of viewpoint, however it is registered, is in
itself an inadequate legitimator of a viewpoint. Arguments must also be of high
quality. Yet if there is one thing to distort and reduce the quality of argument
according to the Habermasian validity claims discussed previously it is inequity
of access to the political process - arguments cannot be weighed if they are not
heard. Madsen Pine (1988) of the 'right wing' Adam Smith Institute similarly
observes that it is not quality arguments that prevail under conditions of political
inequity. In general, she argues, it is the most powerful socioeconomic interest
expressed through a sociopolitical market - what Dunleavy (1991) calls a 'political
economy' - dominated by selfishness. Unfortunately Dunleavy, Pine and the rest
of the school of 'public choice theory' deal only with strategic social action. They
do not consider the role of other forms of social action especially communicative
action in influencing decision making.
It is now necessary to go back over the insider-outsider model to enrich it from
the perspective of the paradigm of communicative action thereby overcoming its
shortcomings and produce a tool for the analysis of political scenarios.
4.3	 Enriching Grant's insider - outsider model
Grant's model was intended to portray strategies between government and
pressure groups. The key explicit assumptions in the original model are those of
'balance' in the political context that is nevertheless dominated by the
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government, diversity of political groupings, a democratic freedoi.
association, freedom for groups to come into being or disappear voluntarily and
of a rationalising and legitimising societal value choice that some powerful
minorities (especially business) should dominate public policy. There are also
some important implicit assumptions that actors are selfish utility maximisers
and that the dominant form of social action in a democracy is (and should be)
strategic. It is also assumed that actors can only take on positions of
insider/outsider with respect to government and not with each other.
These assumptions will now be reexamined and it will be argued that they are
inadequate even in terms of the original purpose of Grant's model.
4.4	 Actors
Although he excludes inter-organisational relationships from his model Grant
argues that he is attempting to model the democratic process generally. It is
therefore in keeping with his intention to widen the locus of concern of the
model from government and pressure groups to any set of actors (or groups of
actors) even if this is within a particular organisation.
4.5	 Situations
The change in the identity of those whom the model is concerned with makes it
more complex not least in terms of the situations being modelled. Grant did not
clearly define a political situation but rather implied two boundaries. One
boundary is that of pluralistic democracy (in Great Britain) while the other is that
of an ideological socio-legal boundary. A pressure group that lies beyond this
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boundary (for example the IRA) either in beliefs or actions is beyond what is
normatively acceptable.
These boundary definitions can be enriched by defining the political situation of
diverse actors as a Habermasian lifeworld segment. When this is done the
ideological socio-legal boundary simply becomes a fault line, perhaps one of
many normative discontinuities, between areas of normatively regulated action.
Likewise the pluralistic democracy boundary also becomes a discontinuity
between areas of normatively regulated action.
4.6	 Social action
At no point in the model did Grant go on to clarify the nature of the relations
between pressure groups and government. Rather the model vaguely portrays
what Grant calls 'strategies'. The list of tactics that are employed by pressure
groups in practice do largely imply relations of strategic action between pressure
groups and government although it is possible to see that dining with a minister,
for example, is also a forum in which the other forms of Habermasian social
action can occur.
While Grant's model did not extend to a discussion of the other forms of social
action nor did Habermas's theory extend to a pragmatic attempt to illustrate the
types of possible relations between actors. Clearly Grant's model can be enriched
by defining the several forms of action involved in a political relation while his
terminology can help to operationalise Habermas's social action concepts.
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Grant 's insider - outsider strategies can be seen as potentials for social action of
particular kinds between actors. These potential differences for social action are
summarised in table 1, for two actors A and B, where A is regarded as an insider
or outsider with respect to B. The discussion following elaborates on the
summary.
a___________________________________________________________________
	
B's	 relation	 to A
	
Insi der	 Out sider
High/Low Prisoner By necessity Ideological
________________ Profile
Social action:
Strategic	 Low	 Low	 High	 High
Normative	 Medium	 High	 Medium	 Low
Dramaturgical 	 Present	 Present	 Present	 Present
	
Communicative High	 Low	 Low	 Low
Table 1: potentials for social action between actor A and actor B
4.7 High/low profile insider
Where individual or group actors are low or high profile insiders with respect to
another actor then strategic action is limited to a decision as to whether to
continue with the relationship or not. This is important because the purposeful
creation of dialogues between diverse actors requires, initially, a strategic
commitment. Sometimes this might be a covert relationship or it could be an
highly public relationship.
When dialogue is established in some forum thus cementing the insider
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relationship then communicative action will begin to dominate. Subsequently
other forms of social action will become much less significant in mastering the
situation.
If dialogue is not established properly then the relationship will be fragile.
Commitments will be difficult to test, sincerity may be doubted, and norms may
not be challenged.
4.8	 Prisoner insider
This is a special case of insider relation where one actor is a 'prisoner' of the
other. Normatively regulated action dominates the relationship and the
dominant norms are those of the imprisoning actor.
Strategic action between the actors is limited to the creation of the special
conditions of complete compliance and may consist of extreme rewards or
punishments offered or threatened by the imprisoning actor. Communicative
action is very restricted - there is no basis for a prisoner to challenge what the
powerful imprisoner has to say. Dramaturgical action is limited to expressions of
compliance and acceptance. Expressions of rebelliousness would meet with
increased strategic activity leading to a guarded sincerity.
4.9	 Outsider by necessity
Where an actor is an outsider by necessity with respect to another dominant actor
then diverse strategic actions become significant in political relations.
Communicative action is limited to reaching understandings as to whether it is
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strategically useful to enter into a mutual insider relationship. Normatively
regulated and dramaturgical action may also occur and the former may still
predominate in the guise, for example at a societal level, of civil law or human
rights conventions. Dramaturgical action may also become significant as actors
attempt to impress and convince one another with the importance of their
strategic positions but of course sincerity may be doubted4.
4.10 Ideological outsider
The main difference between this and the previous relationship is that there is a
diminished level of normatively regulated action between the actors. Even so it
is not a total absence of normatively regulated action since the actors may share
norms that are unassociated with their political positions.
Nevertheless in some key way there will be a normative discontinuity that may
be perceived by insiders, and outsiders, as an ideological boundary. In health
services for example it was traditionally expected that health service staff would
not go on strike in industrial disputes because of the risk and discomfort to
patients. This norm has been embodied in some professional codes like that of
the Royal College of Nursing which until mid 1995 forbade members from taking
strike action. Remarkably this norm has been overturned to some extent during
1995 as the Royal nursing and midwifery colleges have become disenchanted
with the way the NHS is being managed. However the expectation of the public
and the government may remain intact. There may still be an ideological
boundary.
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In general clinical professionals are exempt from the obligation of strike action
when called for by their unions. However there have been several occasions
now when health service staff h a v e gone on strike in contravention of the
appropriate norms. One of the most famous of these was the strike called at
Normansfield Hospital (1976) when nurses took strategic action in protest over
the actions of the main consultant. The nurses moved into a new domain of
normatively regulated action not shared with the other actors in the situation.
This is reflected in the report which condemned the strike even though it rightly
brought to an end a scandalous regime. The inquiry found that various groups of
employees had stopped talking to and cooperating with one another hence
communicative action was grossly limited.
4.11 Insider - thresholder
The potential difference between two actors in this case is variable perhaps
because of a wavering commitment to an insider relationship on the part of one
of the actors or it may be a strategy.
4.12 Modifying Grant's assumptions
Grant's model has been modified in three broad ways: firstly the focus has been
widened from pressure group relations with government to political relations
between actors generally. Secondly the political context has been clarified as a
situation defined as a segment of the lifeworld relevant to the situation. Thirdly
the relations between actors have been widened from mainly strategic forms of
social action to include dramaturgical, normatively regulated and
communicative forms of social action.
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These three modifications introduce new assumptions from the theory of
communicative action into Grant's model and call for a clarification of the
existing ones.
4.13 The meaning of 'balance' in the political context
Grant (1989) argues that pressure groups in Great Britain exist in a 'balanced'
pluralistic situation that avoids a paralysing equality of access to Government.
Those with 'axes to grind' can take strategic action. The implicit assumption is
that the more important the issue the more likely are pressure groups to form
and strive for a resolution of the matter. These assumptions are weak as I have
explained above. There are barriers to the formation of some groups while
others have resource and organisational advantages that mean any 'balance'
unfairly favour powerful interests. I argued that this is a question of design so
that there is equality of access to the political process. Therefore facilitating
dialogue processes will allow situations to be mastered by balancing all
Habermasian forms of social action and not just the strategic. It should be noted
that it is possible to see an imbalance in actor situations from the Habermasian
perspective even where there is a strategic balance produced through blind
steering for example. These imbalances may manifest themselves as pathological
conditions of society and are discussed at length by Habermas (1991b).
4.14 The diversity of political groupings
Grant's model is analytically concerned with political diversity as is the enriched
model. Diversity is regarded by Grant as beneficial to the 'pluralistic balance' of
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the nation's democracy as it reflects the aspirations and unique needs and wants
of the many groups in society. Political diversity in the enriched model is
regarded as a reflection of the naturally occurring situations of actors who
necessarily differ in their temporal, spatial and normative dimensions of their
lifeworids. Without these differences there would be no basis for distinguishing
one actor from the next. The diversity of unique actor perspectives is resolved, in
particular situations, through communicative action and steering mechanisms.
4.15 Democratic freedom of association and freedom for groups to appear or
disappear
A pluralistic balance cannot be maintained, argues Grant, without freedom of
association as a fundamental democratic principle. If this principle is violated
then pressure groups could not form and democracy would wane. Hence Grant
explicitly links the quality of democracy with strategic action but overlooks
communicative action.
In contrast the enriched model assumes that communicative action is the only
inherently democratic form of action. So the democratic status of Grant's
pluralistic balance is dependent upon the degree to which actions can be
coordinated through processes of dialogue rather than the ability of some groups
to come into existence for strategic purposes. The freedom of association is
therefore important in facilitating communicative action as well as strategic
action.
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4.16 Pluralistic balance: society's value choice
This assumption about the democratic legitimation of the role of powerful
minorities in the British policy process is perhaps Grant's least realistic (or the
most optimistic). It is that society has rationally chosen the way things are and
that this is acceptable to all. However to impute that society has 'made' any
rational choice only has meaning if the choice is manifested in the form of
competently networked understandings between all actors about how their
actions should be coordinated. Yet in chapter 2 and chapter 4 I have argued that
there is a general lack of the dialogue processes required to achieve this.
Consequently there has been a failure of rationalisation in society so it seems
absurd to argue that 'society' has 'made' a value choice.
It would be more accurate to say that the pluralistic balance and minority
domination of public policy is more due to steering mechanisms and strategic
actions of a powerful few with the means rather than a nation wide
understanding systemically manifested as society's value choice. This also
underlies the unequal access to decision making which, in the case of the NHS,
leads to the unfairness of the quality gap.
4.17 Political relations between actors
Grant does not model the relationships between interest groups. This limitation
is necessarily dropped in the course of widening the locus of concern to actors i n
political situations generally. The key assumption of the enriched model now is
that it is possible to identify which actors have which social action potentials in
each situation. It is important to remember that the insider/outsider positions
are not fixed values but differences from which arise the potential for social
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actions. This leads to several possibilities that require careful description.
4.18 An insider community
In figure 3 actors A,B an C have been labelled an 'insider community. From the
labels it is possible to determine what varieties of social action may be expected to
occur betw	 -
Insider
community
00
LED®
Figure 3: Insider actors A,B,C, Outsider actor D
In figure 3 actor D is identified as an outsider with respect to the insider
community. Now if D strikes up a low profile insider relation with one of the
actors in the insider community, for example with A (figure 4), then the situation
has subtly -	 -
Insider
community0
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Figure 4: Insider actors A,B,C, Outsider actor D, Low profile A-D
Firstly D is no longer a complete outsider. D has perhaps become a 'low profile
thresholder' with respect to the community. Secondly this may or may not be a
stable relationship since there may be a need for strategic actions within the
insider community to obscure the existence of the relation.
Indeed the understandings that are reached with U will have some impact within
the community. It may be that D is admitted to the community or alternatively
that D comes in while B goes out. Or again strategic action by B and D may lead to
them forming their own insider community from which A and C are excluded.
At each stage where strategic actions in the insider community are concealed
through systematic distortion of communications there is some likelihood of
detection. This would lead immediately to a reduction in the level of trust
between the actors who would be more likely to challenge the sincerity of
statements and actions. If U is an ideological outsider with respect to the
community then the above scenario could lead to more extreme strategic actions.
4.19 Defining the insiders and outsiders
In the above situation A, B and C were identified as an insider community and
the designation of D as an outsider represented no difficulty. However what
happens when the situation is not as intuitively clear? For example in figure 5
there is a political situation that has been labelled 'X' and in this particular
situation A and B can be labelled as outsiders with respect to one another. In
figure 5 another actor C has been introduced who is an insider with respect to B.
A and C are related through the mediation of B but what is their potential
difference? In the absence of some mechanism for reaching understandings there
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is little option but to regard A and C has mutual outsiders. Any relation between
them is likely to be tenuous unless one or the other begins some strategic actions
to create a more direct relation. However the A-C outsider potential difference
will be influenced by any
they share.
Figure 5: Insider actors B, C, Outsiders A, B & C
Several questions arise from the above: Can the actors be said to be in the same
situation? In one sense the answer is 'yes' because the potential differences
between the actors actually help to define the situation which is constituted from
relevant elements of the lifeworld (as explained in chapter 4). Does this mean
then that A,B and C are all concerned with the same issue? Not necessarily.
There is no reason to suppose that all the social actions between the three actors
will be related to issues in common. In fact the political situation may arise as
actors come together to try and find out what they have got in common and
perhaps to negotiate a common situation. Is it possible then that actors can
simultaneously have one social action potential on one issue and another
possibly contradictory social action potential on another? This possibility cannot
be excluded so long as the issues in question remain separated in the minds of
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each of the actors.
In certain circumstances it may be possible to separate out more than one
situation involving the same group of actors in differing sets of social action
potentials (figure 6). However the maintenance of the potential differences may
result in conflicts. These could be logical contradictions at a personal level (in an
ego's subjective world) arising from understandings reached with other members
of a group (in an ego's social world). Or again they could be normative
contradictions within a group that create seemingly social perverse action
potentials between individuals according to the temporarily dominant issue of
concern. Such contradictions in situations may create social instability which
Situation X0 0 Situation Y
Figure 6 Situation X, Insiders, A,B,C; Outsider, D
Situation Y, Insiders, B,C,D; Outsider, A
might lead to the increased use of strategic action. Dialogue is called for in this
circumstance.
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Now that a basic pattern of potential differences in political situations has been
mapped out it is useful to go on to consider the NHS quality gap. For this
exercise I will draw on research carried out in Sheffield in 1993/94.
4.20 Insiders and outsiders in the NHS
From figure 1 It is possible to identify a community of well networked insiders in
the NHS, that comprises most of the NHS executive and advisory agencies,
around the Department of Health (figure 7). Other insider communities exist
around NHS Trusts. However these communities are not thoroughly integrated.
In figure 7 for instance the RCN is shown as a thresholder. There is a socio-legal
boundary of legitimacy and it is conceivable that some professional factions
might cross it and, in ethical terms, become ideological outsiders. This has
occurred previously with strikes by nursing staff at a time when strike action is
not usually considered acceptable (e.g. Normansfield Hospital, 1976). GP fund-
Authorities
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I?igure 7 Insiders and outsiders in the NHS
Key: DOH: Department of Health
NHSME: National Health Service
Management Executive
BMA: British Medical Association
RCN: Royal College of Nursing
CHC: Community Health Council
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holders and health authorities have been forming purchaser conglomerates
(Robertson, 1994) and these therefore clearly have degrees of insider status with
each other which is shown as overlapping areas in figure 7.
There are a large number of other groups that lie outside of NHS policy
communities. Some ideological outsiders are well known cause groups lobbying
for particular rights such as the voluntary euthanasia society (EXIT). However it
is worth noting that groups like EXIT often do not operate as ideological outsiders
even if some members break the law. In contrast to this the IRA is a clear
ideological outsider - it is a criminal offence simply to be a member.
Figure 8 A view of insiders and outsiders of the NHS in Sheffield
Key: CSHUT: Central Sheffield University Hospitals Trust
NGH: Northern General Hospitals Trust
CHC: Community Health Council
SHA: Sheffield Health Authority
F&CS: Family and Community Services
RSIB: Royal Sheffield Institution for Blind people
VIPs: Visually Impaired People's Group
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In figure 8 a simple schema of elements of the NHS in Sheffield is shown based
on my discussions with a large number of individuals during the Trent Quality
Initiative (Gregory, Romm and Walsh, 1994). In the figure the two 'provider'
NHS trusts are shown as outsiders by necessity with respect to one another (they
do not overlap or touch at any point in the figure), reflecting their competitive
status in the reformed NHS. The Community Health Council (CHC) is acting as
a thresholder with respect to both trusts and offers s a m e linkage between them.
Similarly the 'purchasers', Sheffield Health Authority (SHA) and Family and
Community Services (F&CS), are outsiders by necessity. There is a joint planning
committee which is attended by executives from both F&CS and SHA which
therefore offers a thresholding relation between the two purchasers. Two NHS
user groups are also shown in figure 8: the Royal Sheffield Institution for Blind
people (RSIB) and the Visually Impaired People's Group (or VIP's as they call
themselves). These are outsiders by necessity in terms of NHS decision making.
However the RSIB does have long standing excellent relations with the
ophthalmic services within the adjacent NHS trust. The RSIB are also contacted
by F&CS whenever they register a new client with visual impairment. In
contrast the VIPs like to remain as outsiders. To some extent the members that I
have spoken with regard themselves as ideologically distinct from the RSIB
membership. The thresholding link between the VIPs and the RSIB that I have
depicted in the figure is very tenuous indeed but I have indicated it on the
strength that the VIPs hold a meeting every month on RSIB premises. This
indicates some link though precisely what is unclear. In the current situation
insider status is associated with increased strategic power yet even the NHS user
groups mentioned, though superficially seeming to have a lot in common
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because of their visual impairment are not regarded as the same by their
members. To create a new forum in which quality can be discussed equably is no
easy undertaking. It would require finding some point of strategic interest to
create what is likely to be a thresholder group from the various stakeholders.
This analysis of the NHS in Sheffield is clearly embryonic however it does focus
attention on the issue that in order to begin a dialogue between NHS purchasers,
providers and users that there is a need to create an insider forum from
representatives drawn from all the groups mentioned. Those who are making
commitments to dialogue will be able to act as low profile insiders with respect to
other stakeholders. The insider forum can then begin to consider how to
facilitate the process of dialogue by reflecting on the specific actions arising from
the potentials of the situation.
In this chapter I have argued that relationships between groups and individuals
can be modelled in terms of Habermasian social action through a modification of
Grant's (1989) insider-outsider model. With this model I have provided a view
of the social action potentials of some NHS user, purchaser and provider groups
in Sheffield. I will be returning to this scenario in chapter 7 when evaluating the
Trent Quality Initiative. However the creation of an insider forum needs more
than the principles of dialogue in order to get started. In the next chapter I will
discuss a methodological framework that can provide the tools for the job -
critical systems thinking.
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Whitely and Winyard (1987) developed a multi-dimensional approach to
the political theory of interest groups but Grant's (1989) insider/outsider
classification of interest group strategies is simpler and more clearly
indicative of the potentials for social action that may exist between groups,
Government, and public services.
Grant acknowledges that pluralism is an 'elastic' term but that it has a
particular place in the political theory of pressure groups. He particularly
distinguishes analytical usages of the term pluralism (e.g.: how does it
exist?) and normative usages (e.g.: should it exist?) arguing that this
distinction is often obscured in political literature (1989, p24). However
there are a multitude of other usages of the term.
The macro-political use of the term is commonly indicative of an
alternative national political system. It is also used to indicate multiple
'lifestyle choices' (Giddens, 1991, p83). Pluralism is used to refer to the
variety of health- illness beliefs of the British public (Gregory and Walsh,
1993, p173). Morgan (1986) refers to political pluralism as one possible
analytical 'image of organisation'. Gregory (1992) discusses issues of
pluralism in the social and management sciences in great detail and, like
Grant in political theory, finds that the term has great elasticity with
theoretically, methodologically and politically defined pluralisms within
just one strand of management science. Pluralism in management and
systems science is returned to in chapter 6.
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The special form of insider group relationship called corporatism has been
a particular concern of the Conservative Government. A corporatist
agreement between Government and a pressure group obliges mutual
cooperation. Grant (1989) cannot find an overall consensus as to what
corporatism actually is but he observes that it is ideologically cemented by a
belief in 'social partnership'.
The most important aspect of corporatism for our purposes is that the
Thatcher Government blamed corporatism by name for British economic
ills. Grant (1989) argues that this was a 'surprise' to analysts because
attempts to create corporatism had failed. Probably the last attempt at
corporatism in UK politics was the 1974 to 1979 Labour Government's
social contract between Government and unions that ended in the so-
called 'winter of discontent' where dissensus prevailed over corporatist
consensus.
It is even possible that if the corporate partners had found a way of
handling dissensus that the Labour Party in 1979 would have remained in
Government. It is perhaps the way disagreements are handled that enables
corporatist relations, like marriages, to survive. This also sets a condition
for a successful dialogue: dialogue must hold dissensus to be as important
as consensus. otherwise simplistic utilitarian bargaining would take over.
Arguably this occurred during the Winter of Discontent of 1979 and
continued afterwards as a policy with the Thatcher Government which
confronted and coerced the Trades Unions.
Grant (1989) leaves no doubt that the Conservative Party have rejected any
form of corporatism or corporatist like management. Recent evidence of
this can be seen in the reforms of the National Health Service (Department
of Health 1989a) where elected council representatives have been removed
from Health Authority boards.
The significance of this rejection is in its potentially negative influence on
any form of quality dialogue in the NHS as will be outlined later.
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British Rail stations always announce train delays with an apology: 'we are
sorry for any inconvenience this may have caused'. Is this apology a
sincere statement? Is it a dramaturgically truthful action? For who, in fact,
is the actor claiming to be sorry?
The apology is more understandable as a strategic action, initiated by
management, that (it is hoped) will be interpreted as a truthful
dramaturgical action by those people waiting for trains (and not just those
whose trains are late).
In this situation the passenger is subject to strategic actions that clearly
places her/him in an outsider position with respect to British Rail. If the
validity claim to sincerity of the apology had to redeemed it would require
some statement of support by a BR employee, often an executive. The
strategic purpose of the action is to help retain the custom of passengers in
the longer term who might other wise favour alternative travel
arrangements. The difficulty in this action is that although it is
immediately effective, everyone can hear it, the redemption of the validity
claim is not immediate nor is the identity of the actor clear. The value of
the action is therefore much reduced. A competitor that is able to redeem
the validity claims of dramaturgical action immediately and with clarity as
to who is apologising would be offering a more personal service of much
greater value. In this latter case strategic action will have been
subordinated to dramaturgical action that is unquestionably of great
importance. Any hint of strategic content immediately brings into question
the sincerity of the speaker and the sincerity of dramaturgical action.
The thesis is focussed on the management of quality in the NHS through
dialogue which is concerned with the healthy reproduction of society and
should be seen in that context but society per se is tangential to the thesis.
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Chapter 5
Critical systems thinking
In the last two chapters I have begun to develop an approach to the analysis of
situations, focussing on the social action potentials of individuals and groups.
The analysis of the NHS in Sheffield provides one view as to the social action
potentials of the groups that between them will define the local boundaries of
quality. In this chapter I will discuss critical systems thinking (CST) and how this
framework can contribute to the fair renegotiation of the boundaries of quality in
the NHS. Justifying the appropriateness of CST as a framework for the
management of quality in the NHS, rather than the many other often apparently
conflicting alternative theories and methods in the organisational literature, is a
another theme of this chapter. This theme and that of CST itself is explored in
two ways. On the one hand theories about the nature of the diversity in
management and systems sciences (often referred to as pluralism) are discussed.
This is done by comparing and contrasting the pluralism which is central to
critical systems thinking with other examples of pluralistic frameworks.
Through this an appreciation is gained of the theoretical basis of critical systems
thinking.
Another significant conclusion is that CST can increase its emancipative
potential, and may be undertaken in more widely varied situations, by the
analysis of the social action potentials of those situations with a view to starting
dialogues. However other recent developments in CST, particularly the oblique
use of systems methods proposed by Flood and Romm (1995b),have implications
for dialogue which I will explore.
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Finally the development of dialogue theory in chapter 3 is formalised as a set of
guidelines for the dialogue element of critical systems thinking. Consequently
the scope and potential for critical systems thinking in situational analysis and
intervention is increased. I will begin the exploration of CST therefore by
comparing theories about the nature of the theoretical and practical diversity of
the management and systems sciences.
5.1 Theories of diversity in systems and management sciences
It is generally acknowledged that the social sciences, including what Jackson
(1991) calls management and systems science, are characterised by a diversity of
viewpoints (for example see Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Morgan, 1986; Jackson,
1987; Flood, 1989; Midgley, 1989; Jackson, 1991; Reed, 1992; Willmott, 1993). This
diversity is expressed in the form of differences of philosophy, principles and
methods of research into, and the management of, organisations. For example
Reed (1992) lists five different frameworks for sociological inquiry into
organisations. Flood and Jackson (1991a) discuss a variety of systems
methodologies. Morgan (1986) provides an overview of theoretical and practical
diversity in management and systems sciences through several 'metaphors' of
organisation.
What is not agreed upon between advocates of different positions is the meaning
of this diversity. For example, there are those who suggest that social scientific
diversity represents fundamentally differing kinds of knowledge, and notions of
social goal, being utilised within disciplines (e.g. Burrell and Morgan, 1979), with
more than one 'orthodoxy'. Others argue that differences in the social sciences
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are being overplayed perhaps mischievously (Reed, 1992) and claim that while
there are many perspectives they may be explicably related. While others like
Flood and Jackson (1991a) argue that the diversity is an expression of a
fundamental unity on another level.
Very often in the social sciences the term pluralism is used to signify a theory of
diversity (with analytical and descriptive implications) unlike the purely
descriptive terms 'diversity' or 'multiplicity' (as Aldrich 1992, p37 uses) 1 . For
example Midgley (1989) defines one view of pluralism as the theory that
'paradigms might be commensurate on a theoretical level, while the
methodologies associated with these remain incommensurate when applied in
practice' (p220). Another view like that of Reed (1985) is that there is more than
one 'orthodoxy' and a dominance of many rather than one social scientific
paradigm but that these are nevertheless explicably related.
In general theories of diversity can be differentiated in terms of their
assumptions about the notions of paradigms and paradigm incommensurability.
So, firstly, what is meant by the terms paradigms and paradigm
incommensurability?
The original concept of scientific progress and 'paradigm incommensurability'
was proposed by Kuhn (1970) who referred almost entirely to natural science.
This term has been broadened by, amongst others, Burrell and Morgan (1979),
Pine (1988)2 and (Gregory 1992) to include the so-called social sciences although
this is one of the only things in common between any of these authors. The
most important Kuhnian premise is that theories win by revolution as the old
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paradigm of knowledge fails under a burden of inconsistencies that a
replacement paradigm addresses (Kuhn 1970).
Crucially the paradigms differ to the extent that they are 'incommensurable'
without any possibility of communication of theory between them. This issue of
incompatibility (as Bernstein (1983) refers to it) means on the face of it that no
inductive or deductive logical operation can ever lead from one paradigm to
another, for even if the scientists involved are using the same vocabulary, they
perceive a different situation (Kuhn 1970, p200). However Kuhn also argues that
this incompatibility does not stop the scientists involved from talking to one
another. Put another way how else would scientists they realise that they differ if
their personal interrelations are dominated by strategic and normatively
regulated action?
There are a number of implications in Kuhn's reasoning. He cannot avoid
assuming that there is a universal criterion operating against which the success
or effectiveness and coherence of the revolutionary paradigm is measured or, in
Popper's (1979) and Pine's (1988) words, which make it 'fashionable'. Neither can
Kuhn avoid a political situation in the choices confronting actors who must
speculate as to which paradigm to support and develop. Kuhn (1970) addresses
this to some extent because he denies the existence of a single valid view of data
or of value-neutrality in the production of theory and even admits that some
alternative viewpoints, though seen retrospectively to be valuable, are
sometimes ignored because they do not find the right audience (Kuhn 1970, p76).
Nor is it universally accepted that Kuhn's definition of an 'incommensurable
paradigm' (1970, p200) necessarily indicates genuine incompatibility. Indeed
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(Gregory, 1992) argues that Kuhn's scientific revolutions are intra-paradigmatic.
On the other hand Kuhn does argue that 'superior' theory survives in the
academic jungle - a view contradicted by both Popper (1979), who calls for
resistance to 'fashion' in the natural sciences, and Pine (1988) in the social
sciences, who argues that 'truth is often silenced by force' (p6).
Kuhn's concern with the natural sciences did not lead him to address the
difficulty recognised by many writers in the social sciences that there is a
'pluralistic' situation (Bernstein 1991, p338; Reed 1992, p1) or a 'plethora of
approaches' (Jackson 1987, p134) or a 'proliferation of frameworks' (Hughes 1992,
p296). Like the social, cultural and political diversity of perspectives in the NHS
(discussed in chapter 2) the social sciences in general are dominated by a diversity
of viewpoints.
CST has produced several original responses to the diversity in systems sciences,
but firstly I will deal briefly with other theories about diversity in the
organisational social sciences beginning with Burrell and Morgan's famous
contribution.
5.1.2 The strongly incommensurable divergent paradigms thesis
Burrell and Morgan's (1979) framework of four incommensurable macro-
paradigms into which they subsume all the fragments of social science
perspectives (figure 9), is taken byReed (1985, 1992a) and Hughes (1992) (who uses
the term 'antipluralism') as the antithesis of the pluralistic unity of science, and
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by Donaldson (1985) as the antithesis of of scientific orthodoxy.
Burrell and Morgan propose four paradigms that they claim express wholly
incompatible logics - similar in a way to the relationship between homeopathy
and scientific medicine discussed in chapter 2. Within these macro-paradigms
the diversity or patterns of paradigmatic viewpoints may be typified.
Nevertheless the macro-paradigms are mutually exclusive with, in Burrell's and
Morgan's view, no grounds for communication in a common theory-language
between them.
The sociology of radical change
'Radical	 'Radical
humanist'	 structuralist'
'Interpretive'	 I	 'Functionalist'
The sociology of regulation
Figure 9: Burrell's and Morgan's (1979) sociological framework
Jackson and Carter (1991) argue that Burrell's and Morgan's (1979) theory has been
misunderstood and misrepresented with a consequent failure to grasp its
significance. In the first place they deny that Burrell and Morgan's (1979)
definition of paradigm is the same as Kuhn's (1970). The only element they
share according to Jackson and Carter is the theoretical position that 'what is
incommensurable are the languages used by each paradigm'. Although the
'signifiers' may be the same, Jackson and Carter explain, the 'signifieds' are
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completely different (Jackson and Carter, 1991, p117).
The signifier-language issue is perhaps clarified by the example of the conflict
implied by scientific doctors of the NHS who practise homeopathy (see chapter 2)
who must reconcile mutually exclusive logics in order to practice. Similarly
coming to an understanding of the functionalist social sciences and the
interpretive social sciences necessitates the conflict, in Burrell and Morgan's
(1979) scheme, of internally reconciling seemingly mutually exclusive
philosophical and social theory assumptions. If Burrell and Morgan are correct,
theoretically this is impossible, and therefore an irrational state sustained by
some political distortion may be the consequence.
This leaves lay people with the problem, identified by Gregory and Walsh (1993),
of choosing between experts advocating differing paradigms - for example how
can a choice be made between scientific and alternative medicine? More broadly
Giddens (1991) argues that everyone, for much of their day to day life, is a lay-
person dependent on experts for decisions at 'fateful-moments'. Although
deciding-between-experts was not the concern of Burrell and Morgan their
advocacy of paradigm incommensurability has a related corollary as clarified by
Jackson and Carter:
distinct paradigms should encourage debate and should that
debate bring about resolution of differences so much the better,
provided such resolution is not achieved through the exercise of
power.
Jackson & Carter (1991, p122)
Yet while Jackson and Carter argue that debate is necessary they do not consider
how such a debate should be organised nor how lay people can engage
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competently in debate with so-called experts. In chapter 3 I argued that the basic
condition for dialogue is the mutual respect for the denial of a validity claim.
Otherwise strategic and normatively regulated action may dominate - the very
thing opposed by both Burrell and Morgan and Jackson and Carter.
In health care this might be seen in the dominance of scientific medicine over
the paradigmatically different fields of alternative and complementary medicines
(e.g. through control of resources). This is highly visible in the NHS Research
and Development Directorate's call for papers for a special conference on the
'Scientific Basis of Health Services' in 1995 (Department of Health 1995). It is
highly unlikely that alternative medicine will be represented at the conference in
it's own terms.
Jackson and Carter (1991, p122) observe that the call for dialogue is contrary to the
contention of Reed (1985) that Burrell and Morgan's strong paradigm
incommensurability thesis necessarily puts an end to the point or prospect of any
dispute and debate between positions. Indeed the accounts of Reed (1992) and
Reed and Hughes (1992) appear to indicate a high degree of antagonism toward
the issue of paradigm incommensurability particularly emanating from what
might be termed the 'organisational analysis community' at Lancaster
Management School of which Reed is a part. Given this, any polemical attempts
to discredit Burrell and Morgan's (1979) framework without logical refutation of
the incommensurability thesis must be politically suspect. For instance, Ackroyd
(1992, p112) (also a member of the Lancaster Management School) argues that the
'uncompromising' position of Burrell and Morgan was soon 'broken down' with
a renewed emphasis on the desirability of 'dialogue between different positions'.
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From this it is clear that Ackroyd believes (like Reed) that paradigm
incommensurability terminates the possibility of, or need for, dialogue.
Moreover Ackroyd dismisses the seriousness of paradigmatic theory:
The paradigm idea, despite some lingering support for it [...] has
been lost. Instead there is a partial reinstatement of serialism i n
the presentation of the history of the field. It cannot be
emphasised too strongly, however, that several features of the
paradigmatic approach, including much of its sterile academism,
remain.
Ackroyd (1992, p112).
It is difficult to tease out what Ackroyd means by this: on the one hand he argues
that paradigm theory has gone (but where to?) while on the other he suggests it is
still here poisoning the atmosphere. He repudiates paradigmatic theory, anti-
pluralism, pluralism and 'paradigm mentality' in favour of a more 'routine'
ordering of 'diversity' because
what is indefensible about these approaches to organisation
studies is that they can make no contribution to knowledge i n
the field; they merely record what is already there.
Ackroyd (1992, p112)
Put another way, Ackroyd is saying that theories of pluralism or anti-pluralism
simply describe the field of knowledge with no more consequence, and perhaps a
lot less utility, than a library catalogue. Yet he has not rebutted the logic of
paradigm incommensurability, preferring to deal with it instead in a polemical
and political way. Ackroyd gives his own political explanation of the diversity of
paradigms:
it is implausible to think of these disagreements in terms of
conservatism versus radicalism as is sometimes implied. On
the basis of the analysis of audiences, the radicalism of some
organisational writers can be understood as an attempt to retain
a particular (undergraduate student or academic) audience for
the subject in the face of competition from those with other
(graduate student or business) audiences in mind. The best that
can be said is that the 'radicals' did not yield to rising pressures
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on academics to achieve more practical relevance in their work.
In these circumstances however, radicalism largely amounts to a
desire to preserve a place for dissenting voices, and, through
that, to maintain a secure attachment to traditional institutions.
Ackroyd (1992, p113).
So Ackroyd believes that the support for positions like that of Burrell and
Morgan, is due to normatively regulated action, arising out of the norms of
tradition, and strategic action aimed at survival. What he denies or perhaps
overlooks is the seriousness of the underlying issue which affects the
meaningfulness of choice and social action. Is soft systems methodology
reconcilable with organisational cybernetics, one as a subset of the other 3? Are
they both equally suitable means for managing quality in the NHS? How can a
choice be made between them? Similarly is the practice of homeopathy
reconcilable with chiropractor and 'scientific' medicine? Should they both be
available in the NHS? In the face of these conflicts can Ackroyd be really
confident that there is jeally no longer any urgency or crisis over the tensions
and divisions within the social sciences? Academics on organisation like to claim
relevance for their discipline to social life: that is their raison d'etre. Surely the
theory of paradigms is an important issue for all those communities who face the
consequences of theoretically or 'pragmatically' informed decision making?
If paradigm theories are logically supportable then they should not be down-
played or ignored. Potentially they offer analytical and normative properties
without which diversity itself cannot be managed except possibly in a blind
pragmatic selfish way dictated by anything but undistorted understandings. It is
this premise that underlies the efforts of Jackson (1987, 1991) and Flood (1990)
among others to produce an enlightened systems science.
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Another Lancaster Management School critic of the strong paradigm
incommensurability thesis is Reed (1985, 1992a, 1992b) whose work has already
been referred to several times. Since 1985 Reed (1992) has only slightly shifted his
position, aware of Jackson and Carter's (1991) defence of Burrell and Morgan, in
claiming that the strong paradigm incommensurability thesis dearly 'advocate(s)
separate intellectual development within each paradigm' (Reed 1992, p261).
What Reed is saying is that Burrell and Morgan define their theory as
normatively opposed to dialogue between advocates of paradigms. Referring to
Goia and Pitres (1990) argument, Reed also claims that Jackson and Carter have
underestimated the 'permeability' of paradigm boundaries:
paradigmatic boundaries are much more permeable than
Jackson and Carter and Burrell and Morgan allow in that they
are most appropriately conceived as 'transition zones' rather
than as hard and fast domains [...] a pluralistic, multiple-
perspective view can be developed by building conceptual
bridges across transition zones in such a way that
complementary interpretations of organisational reality are
made available.
Reed (1992, p262).
He calls therefore
for a more sensible balance between diversity and
complementarity or accommodation than that made possible ly
a commitment to fundamentalist concepts of
incommensurability and closure. Diversity, plurality and
conflict are recognised as facts of intellectual life, but they are not
regarded in such a way that epistemological incommensurability
and strict closure become the only basis on which long term
intellectual development can be realised.
Reed (1992, p262-3).
Reed abstractly supports this position on the one hand by adopting a position
critical of power based orthodoxy and on the other by repudiating a Foucauldian
argument.
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To begin with he ties the strong thesis to pragmatism because the 'separate
development recipe' proposed by Burrell and Morgan 'shades', he maintains,
into the 'anything goes' option (Reed, 1992, p263). Reed then focuses on
pragmatism which is now the proxy for the real target of the strong thesis.
Pragmatism
proposes that these activities can only be meaningfully pursued
on the basis of what 'works', pragmatically, within a particular
problem domain or area of an analysis.
Reed (1992, p263).
Because what 'works' is determined by who is powerful, pragmatism 'legitimates
a focus on power relationships' that determine what is regarded is knowledge,
and how it is produced even at the micro level of 'epistemological I
methodological procedures' (1992a, p263). It is at this point for Reed that the
strong paradigm incommensurability thesis slides down the slippery slope of
pragmatism:
A rather idealistic and pristine belief in the distinctiveness of, if
not separation between, intellectual discourse and political
practice is superseded by a viewpoint that tends to collapse the
former into the latter. The organisational needs of identifiable
power groups within society now becomes the ineluctable
driving force behind intellectual development and change.
Reed (1992, p263-4).
What Reed has done is politically clever. He is really making a political
argument against the strong paradigm incommensurability thesis. He is saying
that the thesis is unsustainable in practice and melts away into the strategic and
normatively regulated action of certain powerful and dominating
academic! social insider communities:
Those organisation theories which will survive and prosper are
those which will be most closely and effectively aligned to the
interests and needs of powerful groups within the wider society.
Thus, organisational knowledge becomes a vital ingredient
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amongst a • number of socio-technical resources that power
groups mobilize to construct and maintain viable coalitions or
'actor networks'.
Reed (1992, p264).
So Reed in a neat double-shuffle explicitly argues that his own position
'resonates' with a radical critique, of the interests and ideologies underlying
orthodoxy, and roundly condemns the strong paradigm incommensurability
thesis on the grounds that it serves narrow powerful interests. A bizarre
transpositioning, if sustained, of the very motive Burrell and Morgan and
Jackson and Carter have for advocating the strong thesis as a way of resisting
domination by functionalist orthodoxy in the first place.
Reed goes further however, boxing clever, by introducing a Foucauldian notion
of the 'interpretation of knowledge growth and development within
organisational analysis' (1992a, p264). This view, he argues, has overtaken the
'moralising' and 'universalising' critiques of Marxism with the sociopolitical
critique of power-knowledge. However in a piece de resistance he rejects the
Foucauldian arguments of Burrell (1988) that organisations are dominated by
practice rather than theory, that organisations are consequently episodic and
unpredictable, and that the very discussion of organisation reproduces the
disciplinary society. Intellectual growth and development, Reed argues, is not
simply the by-product of service to political and administrative interests because
this view
grossly overstates the internal coherence of these practices and
networks which generate knowledge claims. It also
overestimates the 'totalizing' achievements of specific
disciplinary regimes or technologies.
Reed (1992a, p265).
On historical and empirical evidence, which is not elucidated, he questions the
coherence presumed by the disciplinary regimes of Foucauldian theories and he
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rejects the 'seamlessness' (or continuity) of power-knowledge domination. In so
doing, and some distance away from the original difficulty he was dealing with,
Reed rejects the seamlessness presumed by the incommensurable power-
knowledge discursive formations that constitute Burrell and Morgan's
paradigms. Whilst, for example, interpretive and functionalist discursive
formations may exist, seemingly incommensurable, according to Reed they are
flawed and not coherent. Micro-politically they are not complete and, therefore,
should not be dealt with separately. Instead, Reed endorses Goia and Pitres (1990,
p599) argument that
limited reconciliation is possible within organisational analysis
by juxtaposing or meshing alternative theoretical perspectives
into multi-faceted theoretical views of organisation phenomena.
Reed (1992, p266).
Moreover it is nothing more than 'an assumption'
that advocates of competing perspectives or paradigms are
entirely the prisoners of their preferred frameworks and the
cognitive categories which these legitimate.
Reed (1992, p266).
This is now full circle in Reed's argument: (1) Strong paradigm
incommensurability is politically unsustainable because it slips into power
dominated pragmatism, satisfying limited interests and ideologies; (2) the strong
paradigm incommensurability thesis is theoretically unsustainable because it
assumes an empirically unsupportable coherence and seamlessness of discursive
formation and of disciplinary practices in organisation; (3) therefore no political
or theoretical ground exists for separate intellectual development (which defines
an absence of dialogue); (4) hence Reed calls for dialogue.
Reed's argument is tortuous. His political argument against the strong thesis
may be seen as a validity challenge in two ways to the efficacy, and in one way to
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the normative acceptability, of Burrell and Morgan's strategy which was to resist
the political hegemony of orthodoxy (Willmott, 1993). Firstly, the strategic
success of their argument in resisting political domination is explicitly challenged
by Reed on the grounds that their theory succumbs to pragmatism. However it is
difficult to see how orthodoxy can be challenged without challenging it! - even if
this unintentionally promotes pragmatism. Jackson and Carter (1991, 1994)
continue to support the strong thesis and although it may have led, in Reed's
view, to some new pragmatic modes of domination, it remains supportive of
distinctiveness in diversity, that may allow less constrained development in new
fields as yet unreported. If the theory were abolished and struck out of the record
it might demolish novel research (as yet unreported) but it would not remove
the orthodoxy.
However, the second challenge to the efficacy of the strong thesis in resisting
domination is embodied by Reed's argument - he explicitly attempts to reassert
orthodoxy as defined by the academic community of which he is a part. Like a
'red rag' the strong thesis sets up a target for counter-resistance by academics like
Reed. Nevertheless, Burrell and Morgan's (1979) theory has contributed for more
than a decade to resistance to domination by powerful orthodoxies embodied by
academic communities - like that of the organisational analysts. It is at least a
minority resistance surfacing occasionally in the journals (for example Jackson
and Carter, 1991; Willmott, 1993). On the other hand it is a significant resistance
or else it would not get the attention it receives from Reed (1985; 1992; 1992),
Hughes (1992), Ackroyd (1992), Jackson (1987; 1991) and others. So the first two
validity challenges to the efficacy of the strong thesis are rejected - to an extent.
Burrell and Morgan's (1979) strategy is, at least to a degree, strategically efficacious
145
despite hints of pragmatism and counter-resistance. More evidence is called for
from Reed to substantiate his truth claim that the strong thesis does indeed lead
to pragmatism.
It is more difficult to redeem the claim that the strong thesis is normatively
acceptable in the light of Reed's mainly polemical accusation that it may serve
pragmatism. Jackson (1991) applies Burrell and Morgan's framework in a heavily
qualified way, as one clearly partial element of methodological analysis, in which
he is at pains to repudiate pragmatism. What is more, any theory may be (mis)
used in a pragmatic way by someone who identifies the opportunity, and
therefore Reed's accusation against Burrell and Morgan's thesis could be turned
against his own version of pluralism. To what extent, it may be asked, is Reed's
theory of pluralism (discussed in the following section) a bridge to unacceptable
pragmatism? It might also be asked in what way can a theory be insulated against
pragmatism?
The theory of dialogue suggests that only dialogue offers the conditions for the
long run legitimation of social action, including the pragmatic use of a social
scientific theory. Given that Burrell and Morgan, Reed, Jackson and this thesis
all call for dialogue, the normative acceptability issue should be resolvable. If it is
not resolvable then the process of dialogue should also reveal the distorting
factors involved. Finally, Reed's criticism of the postmodern basis of Burrell's
and Morgan's theory is weakened by a failure to directly cite the evidence. Goia
and Pitre's argument does not help to resolve the issue. Reed's rejection of the
postmodernism in the strong thesis needs more support if it is to be sustained. If
his argument is sustainable it is probably the only genuinely theoretical
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argument that Burrell and Morgan have to contend with since virtually all other
argument attacking their theory is polemical. Reed's political challenges to the
strong thesis do not wholly hit the mark and need further substantiation.
In this section the anti-pluralism of Burrell and Morgan (1979) was reviewed
with a series of political and theoretical objections to it. The following sections
deal with theories of pluralism. The first of these is Reed's (1985) alternative
'weak' paradigm incommensurability thesis which stems largely from his
criticisms of Burrell and Morgan's anti-pluralism theory that have just been
discussed.
5.1.3 The weakly incommensurable parallel paradigms thesis - pluralism
according to Reed
Reed (1985) proposes a theory of diversity in which, as Jackson and Carter (1991,
p119) put it, he seeks to 'dissolve the need for paradigm boundaries'. He argues
that the strong paradigm incommensurability thesis is a gross overstatement of
incompatibility between paradigms that leads to the circumscribed 'potential for
creative theoretical development' (Reed, 1985, p205) and maintains that it is
possible to carry out 'rational comparison and assessment across paradigm
boundaries'.
Although Reed has not spelled out the fine detail of his pluralistic argument it
assumes, in Bernstein's (1983) terminology, that paradigms are comparable in a
language that enables the logic of them to be stated and that all logics are to some
extent also compatible. In other words, the same signifiers may to an extent
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indicate different signifieds but eventually, through dialogue, their differences
can be overcome. Reed argues for a 'middle course' pluralism rejecting the
(structurally determined Burrell and Morgan type) irreconcilability of logics but,
similarly, avoiding cognitive relativisation (like that eventually seen according
to Reed and Hughes (1992) in Morgan, 1986).
Unfortunately as Jackson and Carter (1991, p120) observe it is at this point that
Reed's (1985) theory becomes inexplicit. He has not explained the theoretical
ground for the middle course mediation that he is calling for. How does the
process of mediation work? In Jackson and Carter's view it is through political
processes based on power that do not address the theoretical issue as to why one
paradigm may be regarded as containing more 'truth' than another. On what
grounds can a paradigm legitimately dominate? Jackson and Carter (1991, p121)
argue that Reed's theory is based on excluding extremists, without logical
justification, and therefore is an exercise of power that 'underlines the potential
for a return to conditions of domination'. Jackson and Carter (1991) maintain
that Reed's pluralism will inevitably lead to the incorporation of one logic as a
subset of the other or its dismissal entirely (in a Kuhnian sense), in neither case
on grounds of logic (which is impossible in the Burrell and Morgan view) but
through the distorting influences of the strategic and normatively regulated
actions of insider communities.
In contrast, and central to Reed's position he argues the reverse claiming that the
Burrell and Morgan view leads to 'production and evaluation' being
subordinated to 'ideologically mediated interests' (1985, p205). Furthermore he
argues that the unacceptable alternatives to a weakly incommensurable
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pluralistic framework are the now well known strategies of future development
(adapted later by Jackson 1987, 1991; and Flood, 1990): 'integrationism',
'imperialism' and 'isolationism' (Reed, 1985, pp174-209)4.
The final twist (but not the last laugh surely) is that Reed's (1985,1992a) pluralistic
view is, arguably, entirely politically pragmatic: it does indeed moderate along the
middle ground rejecting extremes and therefore actually fulfils Jackson and
Carter's (1991) prediction of the reassertion of the powerful orthodoxy at a
political and not a theoretical level. To that extent the Burrell and Morgan strong
thesis has (in Foucauldian terms) perhaps failed to resist the 'inscriptive forces of
orthodoxy'. However, Reed has not shown that strong paradigm
incommensurability means that communicative action is impossible. On the
contrary, like the antithetical medical systems discussed in chapter 2, dialogue is
essential if only to continually verify that old theoretical positions remain
incommensurable because of the lack of a-priori certainty about future
developments in theory and practice.
In this section Reed's pluralistic theory was held to be seriously under detailed
and based on a false premise that dialogue is impossible or unnecessary under the
conditions identified by Burrell and Morgan. Another much more detailed and
highly pragmatic theory of pluralism is proposed by Flood (1990) and Jackson
(1991) as a theoretically robust response to diversity in systems science and to the
strong paradigm incommensurability thesis. This is the theory of
'complementarism' which is now examined.
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5.1.4 Complementarism
Complementarism is one of the fundamental tenets of critical systems thinking.
It is claimed to be so by Jackson (1987, 1991), Flood (1990) and Flood and Jackson
(1991a) and Flood and Romm (1995a). In the following section I shall consider
the theory of complementarism as it has stood until recently. However in
response to criticisms complementarism has been 'brushed-up' (Flood and
Romm 1995a) and has developed in a new direction which seems to claim new
ground between the modern and the postmodern. So when I have dealt with
Flood and Jackson's version of complementarism I shall consider Flood and
Romm's post-critical corn plernentarism.
5.1.4.1 The weak-strong paradigm incommensurability theme - Flood and
Jackson's complementarism
Floods' and Jackson's complementarism is another response to the diversity and
conflict in management and systems sciences. It is another theory of pluralism
but differs from Reed's (1985) whose perspective purports to be a sociological
form of organisational analysis. It must be remembered that Reed is focussed on
the role of organisation in producing modernity and that he regards systems
thinking as a limited functionalist endeavour that produced no new insights
after Talcott Parsons (1951). Jackson meantime is closely involved in systems
methodology which is concerned with 'processes for gaining knowledge about
systems and structured processes involved in intervening in and changing
systems' (Jackson 1991, p134).
Jackson does claim a wider interest however. Although his writing is focused on
systems of, in, or as, organisations, he is also concerned with 'procedures used by
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a theorist in seeking to find out about social reality' (Jackson 1991, p3). Moreover
any principles of method for intervening in the real world must
contain certain assumptions about how we can and should learn
about reality and the nature of that reality. This is true whether
these assumptions are stated explicitly or remain hidden. The
designers of systems methodologies will have either consciously
or unconsciously incorporated into their methodologies
assumptions about the nature of systems thinking and the
nature of social systems. It would be insightful, and extremely
illuminating, if we could find some means of unearthing the
implied theoretical assumptions of different systems
methodologies.
Jackson (1991, p18).
This is an alluring manifesto commitment. It makes it politically more difficult
for other systems thinkers to practice in their fields of inquiry without
accusations of blinkering if they ignore the 'unearthing of assumptions'. To
argue against Jackson at this point would entail arguing that assumptions are
generally not important which is untenable in most perspectives.
Jackson is interested both in the theory underlying and, perhaps even more so,
the practice of systems thinking. His contribution to the development of
complementarism begins with an initial hypothetical statement that problems
have characteristics that differentiate them in unique ways to which special,
unique, approaches must be taken. Therefore
Instead of seeing different 'directions' as competing for exactly
the same area of concern [...] alternative approaches can be
presented as being appropriate to the different types of situation
in which management scientists are required to act. Each
approach will be useful in certain defined areas and should only
be used in the circumstances where it works best. The
evaluation of each different approach should be confined to
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assessment of its success in solving problems in such
circumstances. If this perspective is adopted, then the diversity
of approaches heralds not a crisis but increased competence and
effectiveness in a variety of situations [...therefore a...]
classification must be produced which matches different
approaches to different problem-situations.
Jackson (1987, p152).
Jackson's (1987) 'manifesto', which expresses a pragmatic concern to find the
approach that 'works best' in the circumstance in which 'management scientists
are required to act' (1987, p152), reads differently to that expressed in his later
work (1991). They each emphasise one of Jackson's twin interests - to act
effectively (1987, using what works best) and to act critically (1991, by 'unearthing'
assumptions).
On the face of it, it would seem to be nonsensical to separate the two: to act
effectively requires some way of discerning between options that are classifiable
as more or less effective. This requires an understanding of the circumstances
and the tools (and of the inevitable assumptions entering into the situation) but
uncertainty and ignorance always precede certainty and knowledge and therefore
actions can always be criticised - with hindsight new criteria will always makes all
previous action appear obsolete.
Yet Jackson (1987, pl52) in referring to the requirement 'to act' appears to have
some intuitive presuppositions about these situations. What is it about a
situation that 'requires' action? This becomes clearer a few years later when he
argues that there is a 'unified management task' (1991, p265) which is a claim to
some unity or meta-unity that even then he does not draw out with crystal
clarity. It is left implicit in Jackson's (1991) work for the reader to determine what
the unified task is. In Weber's (1930) terms Jackson's complementarism seems to
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have emerged from eclectic practice as a vision of increasingly competent formal
reason (in the guise of the plethora of systems approaches) and substantive
reason (through the critical use of systems methods).
The link between these substantive and formal rationalities, between critical use
and effective use, is Jackson and Keys (1984) system of systems methodologies as
revised by Jackson (1987). Through this tool, from the fragmented plethora
emerges an increasingly competent systems science, because it enables a diversity
of systems methods to be applied critically to problem situations. So it is to a
more detailed consideration of this that we now turn.
5.1.4.2 The system of systems methodologies
Figure 10: Flood's and Jackson's (1991) System of Systems Methodologies
Jackson and Keys (1984) proposed a four celled matrix of systems methods (later
revised into a six cell matrix by Jackson (1987; 1991). The revised matrix
'unearths' assumptions about the external systemic and social conditions that
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systems methods are logically designed to operate in (figure 10). This analysis is
reminiscent of Burrell's and Morgan's (1979) framework (figure 9) that expresses
social science paradigms that are purportedly based on irreconcilable social theory
and philosophical differences. Yet the difference between the frameworks on the
issue of incommensurability is marked: Burrell's and Morgan's framework resists
the notion, at an abstract theoretical level, that methods can be fitted together for
practical purposes. In contrast Jackson and Keys' framework is constructed from
empirically observed differences between systems methods, that are then
abstractly organised according to the unifying principle of complementarism,
something that has led to accusations of theoretical imperialism (Gregory, 1992).
Hence the frameworks analyse different types of logical assumption and the full
immediacy of logical connection between the two is not obvious. At first
therefore the system of systems methodologies appears to have a much simpler,
more pragmatic, basis than that of Burrell's and Morgan's (1979) framework.
Jackson and Keys do not deal with the dimensions as an empirical classification
of problem-situations but as classifications of the assumptions about problem
situations underpinning each systems method. This is a subtle but important
difference that has led, Jackson, (Jackson 1990, Jackson 1991,) argues, to the
confused and illegitimate use of the 'framework' as a 'functionalist' tool. He
cites Banathy (1984; 1987; 1988) and Keys (1988) approaches as exemplars of the
positivistic fallacy by their recommendations that the 'true' characteristics of
problem-situations be identified thereby directly indicating what methods should
be used - a functionalist correspondence. Jackson (1987, p15) is at pains to warn
against the misinterpretation of 'ideal-typ& problem contexts as 'unambiguous
features' of the 'real world' and condemns such misinterpretations as 'a
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completely indefensible form of positivism'. A positivistic lack of reflection in
the use of the framework would limit an intervention to a simplistic formal
rationality, rather than addressing the substantive end point of the intervention,
to which the assumptions revealed in the system of systems methodologies are
also vitally linked. This might lead to the pursuit of an apparently laudable goal,
taking full advantage of the features of a particular systems method, and yet
contradict or miss the crucial substantive end point because of the very same
assumptions. This might produce what may seem to be counter-intuitive
behaviour although propaganda may also be deliberately produced to disguise
any unwelcome outcome.
In the NHS, for example, which was shown in chapter 2 to be a melting pot of
political acrimony and sociocultural diversity, it is recognised by sections of
management from the Department of Health down that executive management
simply cannot address many important issues without consultation (Department
of Health 1992b; 1992c), yet the emphasis on strategic action in the NHS may
involve producing political 'smokescreens' that further distort the situation
leading to the difficulty in deciding what actually has happened - a point
observed by Maynard (1994).
Jackson (1987a, 1990, 1991, 1992) underlines his commitment to a reflective
practice in which problem situations are not functionally related to the system of
systems methodologies. Nevertheless, he does argue that problem situations are
typifiable in terms of systemic complexity and political relations. The system of
systems methodologies could not exist without the typification of problem
contexts, which is an empirical process, nor the premise that methods are
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limited, by their inherent assumptions to an appropriate domain of application -
a view now challenged in post-critical complementarism (Flood and Romm
I 995a).
At the time SOSM was devised no method was known to Jackson and Keys that
assumed a prevailing coercive problem context so the eventual 'discovery' of
Ulrich's (1983) critical heuristics of social planning (CSH) was, for Jackson, 'like
finding an element predicted by the periodic table' (Jackson 1991, p199).
Accordingly in 1987 Jackson explicitly extended the framework to include
coercive contexts. Therefore the 'existence of these six problem contexts implies
the need for six types of problem solving methodology' (Jackson 1987, p155). The
event of the discovery of CSH is an indication of both the value and the
theoretical fascination that the SOSM holds for Jackson.
At this stage, then, Jackson's framework served a pragmatic need for
management scientists 'required to act' by facilitating an appropriate choice of
system method in the light of reflection on the insights gained from SOSM. It is
this latter implicit unity of purpose ('to act') that makes both complementarism
and SOSM meaningful. Without this SOSM simply becomes a library
classification system. The requirement to act is the principle that drives
complementarism. This is as true for Flood and Romm (1995a) (who refer to the
inevitability of choice) as for Jackson (1987) but in 1987 it was less theoretically
secure. What was missing was the theoretical ground that would legitimate the
use of a particular methodology. Jackson needed to justify his pragmatic
methodological position and this he did by turning to the critical theory of
Habermas with which he was already familiar (see Jackson, 1983, 1985).
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Jackson (1990; 1991) claims support from Oliga (1988), for the keystone positioning
of Habermas's (1972) knowledge constitutive interests as the theoretical
grounding of complementarism, because they parallel Burrell and Morgan's
(1979) framework, but 'reconcile' their erstwhile incommensurable paradigms as
elements of universal human interests (Oliga, 1988, p93). It is because of this that
Jackson (1991) drawing on Habermas (1970) argues it
is not necessary to accept the full implications of the doctrine of
paradigm incommensurability. At the most fundamental level,
all of the different strands of systems thinking are necessary as
supports for the anthropologically based cognitive interests of
the human species - the technical interest in predictive and
central to the practical interest in mutual understanding, and
the emancipating interest in removing constraints imposed by
power relationships.
Jackson (1991, p263)
So the 'unified' management task (1991, p265) that requires management
scientists to act is the three dimensional human interest identified by Habermas
(discussed in chapter 3). In this statement Jackson justifies his pragmatic efforts
to utilise a range of systems methods that he and Keys had empirically analysed
(Jackson and Keys 1984). Not only was he relying on Habermas's theory to
provide the rationalisation and legitimation for his pragmatic interests but he
also claimed that there is a direct correspondence between the dimensions of the
system of systems methodologies and knowledge constitutive interests: The
participants dimension (unitary, pluralist, coercive) corresponds to the practical
and emancipatory interests while the system dimension corresponds to the
technical interest (Jackson, 1991, p3O).
Even so Jackson (1991) was still not convinced that complementarism was
adequately supported in theory although he seemed quite sure about how the
157
grounding would proceed:
While it is not possible to quell all doubts at this time, it is clear
enough in what direction critical systems thinking is looking for
answers. The preferred vehicle to support critical system's
thinking at the theoretical level (and, therefore, to give
coherence to the systems of systems methodologies) is
Habermas's theory of human interests.
Jackson (1991, p202)
Unlike Reed (1985, 1992) who is possibly 'fence-sitting', critical systems thinkers
like Jackson are 'off' the fence but, it seems, similarly short of the justification
they need for complete confidence in the 'fashion' of complementarism and this
causes problems.
In chapter 3 I showed how Habermas had moved on from knowledge and
human interest, preferring to ground critical theory in communicative action.
Jackson's (1991) continuing adherence to knowledge and human interest
therefore seems surprising. Furthermore neither problem-contexts as they have
been expressed by Jackson and Keys (1984) onwards, nor the associated systems
methods, are unequivocally predicted by the sociological theory called upon for
support. Jackson's suggested connection between knowledge-constitutive
interests and problem-contexts of the systems of systems methodologies has not
been fully spelled out. Consequently the difficulties inherent in
complementarism have led, to some extent, in Jackson's version of
complementarism being developed in a new direction - or perhaps being replaced
altogether in at least one community of critical systems thinkers. This
development Flood and Romm (1995a) label post-critical corn plernentarism and
it is to this that I now turn.
5.1.4.3 Post-critical complementarism
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On the face of it the definition of complementarism given by Flood and Romm
appears wholly in keeping with Jackson's view. It remains a commitment to
'reveal and critique the theoretical (ontological and epistemological) and
methodological bases of systems approaches, and to reflect upon the problem
situations in which approaches can be properly employed and to critique their
actual use' (Flood and Romm 1995a). However they also believe that
complementarism is 'a little dusty' and needs to be 'brushed-up'. Clearly critical
use and effective use of diverse systems methods appear to remain on the agenda
but there are some major differences between Flood's and Jackson's, and Flood's
and Romm's versions of complementarism.
Firstly SOSM is dropped as the lynch-pin of complementarism. It is not
mentioned by Flood and Romm (1995a) and it has been expurgated from the
latest published versions of Total Systems Intervention 5
 (TSI) (Flood, 1995).
Whichever way you look at it this is such a major change that the old TSI and the
old form of complementarism embedded in it (Flood and Jackson, 1991) is not
instantly recognisable in its new guise.
Secondly Habermas's knowledge constitutive interests are relegated from
dominance as the theoretical ground of complementarism while elements of
postmodernism are brought in. In old complementarism knowledge
constitutive interests are regarded as the expression of a universal human
interest which underlies even seemingly incommensurable paradigms. In new
complementarism the theory of incommensurability (or commensurability) is
the lynch-pin. However it is reconstructed and replaced with a new term that is
written '(in)commensurability' (Flood and Romm 1995a, p479). Plainly there is
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something going on here which deserves a closer look.
Flood and Romm (1995a) begin with the problem, a version of which was
expressed at the beginning of the thesis and this chapter, which is how can a
choice be made between methods? They argue that the answer depends upon the
meaning of commensurability (building on Flood (1990) who previously dealt
with it, in his terms, theoretically and methodologically). They claim that this
term has not been clearly defined in the systems literature but, following Gregory
(1995), argue that to be commensurable theories must be 'measurable by a
common standard' (Flood and Romm 1995a, p471). This means that theories can
be reconciled and integrated. However integration, they argue, means that
theories are 'denatured' because they are 'reduced in meaning to the fundamental
tenets set by the measurement standard' (p471). In other words it is assumed that
the integration (or unification?) of theories can mean no more than whatever
principles and philosophy is contained within the measurement standard6.
Flood and Romm argue that once the standard for measurement has been set
then, naturally in modernistic terms, measured action can be taken. This they
argue is a recipe for what they also term isolationism (by which they mean that
all action and intervention is measured by the one standard with no way of
radically changing it) and which results in the inhibition of diversity and the loss
to participants in a situation of possible solutions to their problems.
Flood and Romm set out the alternative to this, which is reminiscent of the
position of Burrell and Morgan (1979). Incommensurability means (in theory)
that no common measurement standards can be produced (so any frameworks
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that purport to achieve this must be manifestations of power). These can be
resisted7
 and diversity can be maintained. However Flood and Romm argue that
the corollary of this is that participants in a situation are confronted with choices
that they can only make on arbitrary grounds. Put simply choice is unmeasured
which means that there are n o grounds for choice which seems to stifle all
possibilities for action. Or they are choices made consistently on some arbitrary
and relative criteria, ironically leading to the isolationism mentioned above.
Flood and Romm then turn to the postmodern perspective which they argue
fares no better than the modern except that postmodernists do not want to
'resolve dilemmas' but instead wish to 'live by them'. However Flood and
Romm reject 'naive postmodernism' on the grounds that by denying all
possibility of measurement there is no way to choose between actions which are
all perceived to be relative and contradictory. They argue that because there is no
possibility of choice relativism is 'gloomy' and, ironically, may lead to the
inherently conservative choice of inaction because there can be no measurably
better alternative action to take. Crucially Flood and Romm regard action as
unavoidable - even inaction is a choice. So how do they try and resolve this
dilemma of the inevitability of choice without adequate criteria?
Firstly they believe that comparisons can be made between differing theories
according to 'locally generated criteria' (p473). For example people can make
comparisons between each other's perceptions of their own needs. Furthermore
metaphors permit comparison between things that are unlike each other in a
literal sense.
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Secondly Flood and Romm go further by reasserting Flood's (1990) view that
knowledge can be liberated from repression and then critiqued. They imply in
this that arguments against measurement and comparison of theories and
practices (leading to relativism) can be as equally dominating and repressive as
arguments for such measurement. In other words the anti-comparison critique
offered by postmodernity needs itself to be resisted tactically with such devices as
the assertion of directly opposed argument (or 'oppositional thinking' (p4?4)).
However they also point out that postmodernists still face the problem of choice
after knowledge has been liberated - there are more options to choose from but
still no basis for choice. In the end Flood and Romm argue that good argument is
necessary in order to choose. Indeed they argue that the tension between the
need for good argument and liberation is a key feature of 'postcritical' theory
(p474). They observe that there have been other attempts to preserve diversity of
theory and practice, by resisting domination whilst not sacrificing the possibility
of good argument. One theoretical approach they suggest is the 'discordant
pluralism' of Gregory (1992 ,1995).
Gregory (1992) deals with the issue of pluralism as a problem of appreciation,
beginning with a key observation that Burrell and Morgan (1979) presume to
accurately represent the paradigms of social science without reflecting on their
own position. This point is similarly observed byWillmott (1994) although the
latter's viewpoint is rejected by Jackson and Carter (1994). While Gregory has
criticised the unreflectiveness of Burrell and Morgan's theory she does accept the
pith of their argument that social science paradigms may express incompatible
logics, something rejected by Reed (1985, 1992a, 1992b).
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Gregory argues that a rigorous mode of appreciation must necessarily be reflexive
and critical. Only through a reflexively acting combination of empirical-analytic,
historical-hermeneutic, critical-self inquiry and ideology critique can the
emancipative goal of Habermas (1972) be achieved. So far though critical systems
thinking in the guise of Jackson (1991) has, Gregory argues, limited critical
awareness to a methodological boundary which cannot fulfil Habermas's (1972)
emancipative goals. Arguably, this constraint on the meaning of critical
awareness arises out of the pragmatic need to act in the development of critical
systems thinking discussed previously. Gregory's intention contrasts with this by
raising the sights of critical systems thinking toward its theoretical ideals. Again
in Weberian language a comprehensive approach to substantive reasoning
should take precedence over formal rationality If critical systems thinking is to be
performatively consistent. Gregory calls this mode of comprehensive reasoning
'critical appreciation' (1992).
Critical appreciation sets conditions under which the ernancipative potential of
critical modernism may be achieved. However, in order to begin critical
appreciation political space is required in which to carry it out. This space is
necessarily politically pluralistic because critical appreciation requires peaceful
coexistence between potentially irreconcilable theories. Gregory illustrates this
with the example of abortion which is both a theoretical (in religious and secular
senses) and (micro/macro) political issue. Discordant pluralism is a condition
where logical irreconcilability is not allowed to become the political criteria for
the elimination of a contrary form of knowledge. It is grounded in the critical
theory of Habermas which advocates, in Gregory's view, a critical appreciation
that may emancipate both individuals and society through reflexive processes.
163
There is a key ethical implication of the logic of critical appreciation and
discordant pluralism. Discordant pluralism necessarily entails the co-existence of
antithetical viewpoints, like those of so called 'pro-life' / 'pro-abortion' factions,
or political elements in Northern Ireland, where normally it would be expected
that strategic action would lead to the (attempted) elimination of one or the other
viewpoint. Moreover even if through a dialogue process all distortions are
accounted for it does not necessarily follow that logical consensus, or political
consensus, will result. However the possibility of reaching this stage of
development necessarily requires a commitment to communicative action and a
rejection of strategic action. Put another way, in the terms developed in chapter
4, strategic action is limited to the attempt to create insider communities without
the strategically or normatively imprisoning or ideologically excluding
tendencies that may ordinarily dominate social decision making. The Trent
Quality Initiative was an exploration of this kind of political development and it
is discussed in chapter 7.
Another approach Flood and Romm discuss is the 'ideology-critique' of Brown
(1994) who argues that the destructive pessimism and relativism of
postmodernisrn can be rejected, in favour of discussion between researchers, on
the failure of knowledge to be explicit about it's construction. This critique seeks
to establish how diversity and inventiveness can be preserved in knowledge
creation. Turning to incommensurability Flood and Romm argue that this can
be subjected to an ideology critique which thus juxtaposes the 'dark' (gloomy
relativistic) side of postmodernism with it's 'positive' side represented by the
view of Jackson and Carter (1991, discussed earlier in paragraph 5.1.2). This is
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taken one step further by their reference to McKay's and Romm's (1992)
argument that the issue of domination is common to both Habermasian critical
modernism and (positive/dark) postmodernity and that therefore this can be a
focus for an 'encounter' between positions.
The heart of Flood and Romm's post-critical theory then is in the way that there
can be a juxtaposition of what might be termed Foucauldian (positive/dark)
postmodernity with Habermasian (good argument) critical modernism. What
they propose boils down to a call for dialogue between positions on local, not
universal, criteria (see paragraph 3.19) because 'alternative positions do not meet
outside of the process of people attempting to make sense of the variety' (p479).
Hence measurement is confined locally to evaluating the range of opportunities
for choice created for people in a situation. Argument is confined to local
discussion of these choices. Incommensurability is advocated until this stifles
diversity at which point it too is subjected to critique and resistance.
Moreover all knowledge is locally grounded in 'specific practical agendas for
action' (p479) rather than some universalist theory. It is this principle that
underlies the need to promote theoretical diversity since this also entails
promotion of diverse practical (and local) agendas for action - and possible
choices between them.
Flood and Romm cannot avoid making use of some universal 'truths': they d o
claim that action is inevitable. People must act individually or collectively,
either by doing nothing or something (and even perhaps with systems
methods!). Diversity is better than dearth of theory and action. Some actions are
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better than others (but specifically which is only locally decidable through
argument). In other words the primacy of the local is universal.
Although Flood's and Romm's universals seem to contradict their premise of the
non-universality of knowledge, ethics and action they explain this kind of
problem away as a postmodern irony. By irony they appear to mean that in
striving critically to get away from one difficulty sometimes such striving leads
directly to another equally unpalatable difficulty. Inescapably one must simply
choose and that is that. Flood and Romm make a choice about how to choose
between methods: they propose choice according to critical principles that
preserve and promote diversity in a local context with argument according to
local criteria. Put another way Flood and Romm choose to make a justification
breakoff (using Ulrich's, 1983 terminology) with these particular universals. This
boundary judgment (about which are the 'best' or only legitimate universals) can
be disputed and this leads, in my view, to the need for special arrangements for
dialogue as discussed in chapter 3.
They do not discuss whether or how local individuals may coordinate their
actions collectively but leave this polemically circumscribed as 'people attempting
to make sense' (p479) by using various tools and argument according to local
criteria. In other words they do not specify the arrangements necessary in order
that people can make sense of their local situation. Of course if they did it would
be to appear to claim another universal generality - something forbidden by their
theory. Yet omitting a discussion about how local people may engage in dialogue
seems to presume that local critique is inherently proof against distortion or it
does not matter that some (perhaps non-local) individuals can distort or
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disregard the local agenda. This presumption flies in the face of the necessity for
critique in the first place. If there is critique it is presumed that critique is
necessary (an ironic postmodern universal). Flood and Romm's theory like that
of Bauman's (reviewed in chapter 3) must consider how dialogue can be practised
if their theory is to have any optimistic meaning. Habermas's theory of
communicative action might be thought a possible framework for local dialogue
but Flood and Romm appear to reject this because they argue that Habermasian
theory invokes universal validity claims and universal consensus seeking. This
needs some careful consideration.
The heart of the theory of communicative action is the ability to say 'no' to a
validity claim. If this rejection is respected and responded to (with an attempt at
redemption) then local participants in a situation can identify (or reach a
consensus or mutual 'understanding') as to where they are in agreement and
disagreement with each other and diversity is preserved. This process of
identification is the only necessary consensus for dialogue to occur. It does not
necessarily follow that any other kind of consensus will emerge even though
Habermas (1990) seems to believe that this is a natural ethical outcome of
dialogue.
However if the denial of a validity claim is not respected (which arguably is an
origin of the necessity of critique) then critique must give way to the explicit
exercise of power and/or the functioning of blind steering mechanisms such as
the market. In this case as I argued in chapter 3 diversity is diminished. Without
arrangements for the encounter differences between localities are likely to
mediated by power rather than argument. Hence Flood and Romm's theory
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needs the support of dialogue.
Another aspect of Flood's and Romm's theory that needs to be considered is the
meaning of local. What is local? How local is local? Again Flood and Romm are
vague and avoid a universal generality that would answer these questions. Yet
without a criterion of locality there can be nothing other than what is local - no
boundary between local and non-local. Local would then be a non-existing term
since there could be no 'outside' to the locality. There would be no such thing as
local decisions and no place for dialogue between positions.
However the term does exist and it is used by Flood and Romm. Local
conceptually divides the world into two parts: the local and non-local. Such
binary concepts are rejected by postmodernists as repressive (e.g. Fox, 1993) - a
point noted by Flood and Romm yet the concept of local is a key element of their
theory. If local is meaningful then it brings into focus the boundaries between
localities and local and global issues. Flood and Romm argue that no other
localities or global authorities are permitted to impose a non-local decision - that
is to be resisted. A valid post-critical decision must be made locally. This creates
the need for local people to make a boundary judgment as to whose opinion
counts, and what wider considerations need to be represented and accounted for
in their local argumentation, then they may choose.
This seems to overlook the problem that differing localities may compete in their
judgments over their common boundaries and have differing effects upon their
neighbours. For example is it any of our business what the Brazilians do with
their rain forest? Or our business with what happens in Sellafield? Or with what
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occurs in hospitals? Or with quality standards in the NHS? Ulrich (1983)
implicitly offers one definition of local - all those involved in making a decision.
He subjects this to critique arguing that the views of all those affected by but not
involved in a decision should also be accounted for. This wider recognition of
stakeholders in decision making is commonplace in NHS quality literature TM and
in systems literature9. This thesis is itself based on the premise of pushing out
the boundary of involvement in NHS decision making.
All this implies that the term local is subject to inflation! However it is
important to recognise that this is because the local and non-local interact..
Unless the participation of the non-local is carefully organised it might
overwhelm the local because it will often dispose of greater resources, diversity
and potential - or a locality will concentrate such power as to resist or command
and then dominate the non-local. Either way the outcome is unfair on those
dominated. This is the 'mountain root' of inequality. The lack of an adequate
process of mediation between the local and non-local will mean that a number of
people (whether Asimov's Emperor's or Orwell's proles) will never have the
option to deny validity claims raised by others or to choose an alternative way of
life.
If locality is an issue there will always be processes of inclusion and exclusion
from participation in decisions which will involve a whole variety of local/non-
local claims - including universalistic ones! Under these circumstances dialogue
is essential as a process of mediation between local and non-local influences. In
the contemporary modern world local and global are bound together. As
Giddens (1991) argues, it is the dynamic global nature of modern life that is one of
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modernity's defining characteristics. The consequences of local decisions are
global in nature. Everyone alive now (or in centuries to come) is affected (if only
with doubt and uncertainty) by myriad individual choices systemically steered or
collectively managed. The only answer to this globalisation is to make
arrangements that can address both the local and the non-local on a 'level playing
field'. By definition this must be a suitable democratic process (as called for Ly
Giddens, 1994) but this implies certain conditions for the process - such as those
outlined in chapter 3. It is another universal that Flood and Romm (like
Bauman) cannot avoid: arrangements must be made to convene a suitable forum
so that boundary judgments can be disputed. Or else nothing can be decided, as
Flood and Romm note, except on purely relativistic or arbitrary terms. Reducing
the problem of choice to moral subjectivity in its entirety as advocated by
Bauman (1991), Fox (1993), Taket and White (1994) and other postmodernists,
does not avoid the need to make suitable arrangements for dialogue between
individuals so that individuals can learn how to make morally subjective
decisions from those who claim they know how.
It can be seen, that there are many theories of diversity and diverse practices to
match. I have argued that CST which currently espouses several theories of
pluralism must, almost inevitably, embrace the communicative paradigm in the
form of the process of dialogue more fully than hitherto. What I will discuss
now are the implications of dialogue for critical systems interventions, how the
communicative deficit in CST has been dealt with, and I will end the chapter by
defining the elements of a dialogue framework for CST.
5.5 Critical systems thinking and dialogue
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If dialogue is the only process within which to embed critical systems
interventions then surely this repudiates any form of intervention not based on
dialogue and surely this appears to condemn all interventions that do not
achieve it? This identifies dialogue with the 'ideal speech' situation and with
'communicative competence' (discussed in chapter 3). These concepts are used 1y
Jackson (1991) in communicative critiques adjunctively to the critiques of human
interests in his methodological study of systems thinking. In chapter 3 it was
shown however that Habermas does not find it necessary to directly refer to these
early concepts in his major work on communicative action (1991a; 1991b). Indeed
the presence of perfectly competent speakers in an ideal speech situation is not
essential to the pursuit of dialogue. Instead dialogue must be seen as an ideal
seeking political process comprising participants who have a minimum
communicative competence of the ability to deny the validity claims raised 1y
others, and who are genuinely committed to the process. So the insidious
argument against the consideration of communicative variables in systems
thinking as 'hopeless idealism' is directed at the wrong target. Ideal speech may
never exist - while dialogue can exist as I believe is demonstrated by the Trent
Quality Initiative (Gregory, Romm and Walsh, 1994) which I review in chapter 7.
If communicative variables are disregarded it simply means that some unstated
criteria are involved in discriminating for or against some participants in a
situation. Yet clearly the participant selection criteria may be challenged, as
'unrepresentative' for example, but if so then communicative variables are being
admitted to some extent. If communicative variables are being allowed into the
intervention equation (to allow a challenge to the validity of participant
selection) then, as Ulrich (1983) points out, a polemical alternative may always be
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employed to challenge any existing boundary judgment. So far from being
'hopeless idealism' the consideration of communicative variables is
methodologically inescapable and is inevitably dealt with implicitly or explicitly.
However at this stage the argument has become recursive because the question
remains, polemically raised at each boundary judgment, how do you decide
whose opinion counts? It is the failure to address this that Jackson (1991) finds
communicatively deficient about Soft Systems Methodology' 0. However
similarly the same might also be levelled at Flood and Jackson's (1991) version of
Total Systems Intervention as I shall now explain.
5.6 A communicative critique of Total Systems Intervention (TSI)
Nowhere do Flood and Jackson (1991a) describe guidelines that specify or
prescribe under what conditions an 'undistorted' Total Systems Intervention
may occur although there was recognition of the need for communicative
competence and for the creation of ideal speech. There was also critical
awareness of the communicative deficiency of the methods within the TSI
framework (e.g see Jackson, 1991). However there was no method to invoke
communicative principles. To use a colleague's phrase there was no 'front end'
on TSI. Yet the whole issue in contemporary Habermasian critical theory is that
without systematic communicative action between participants in a situation, i.e.
dialogue, there is a potentially pathological distortion of culture, society and
individuality (Habermas, 1991b). In its 1991 published form TSI was (and is)
dependent upon forms of participation that are necessarily sensitive to the effects
and consequences of power. Yet previously published TSI research cannot now
be qualified as to the degree of distortion of the substantive grounding of the
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strategic goals of intervention because there is no evidence of the systematic
validity challenges that characterise dialogue.
This has created suspicions, raised by Tsoukas (1993), that the substantive goals
are narrowly defined by boards of directors although publications may not allow
the space to explain the democratic processes involved in TSI. However the
under development of communicative variables in the old TSI is equivalent to a
failure to deal with the issue of power, a point also made by Tsoukas (1993).
Conversely, where dialogue is achieved then power is being systemically and
systematically dealt with, through the mobilisation of resources in new forms of
coordinated action, in a way that may be evaluated through an examination of
dialogue records11.
If TSI as published in 1991 were proposed as a tool for any work in the NHS it
would be confronted with the increasingly anti-corporatist atmosphere that is
imposing more and more strategic responsibility on executives, and narrow
performance indicators on management. This increasing emphasis on strategic
action as a legitimate mode of management militates against the use of dialogue
processes, which may be seen by managers to incur an undesirable loss of control.
Without addressing the communicative variables of any particular intervention
in the NHS it would be impossible to validate it except in narrow strategic terms
already broadly given. Consequently the old TSI (Flood and Jackson, 1991) in the
NHS might achieve little more than a limited reform similar, for example, to a
soft systems study like that of Atkinson, Stanley and Bundred (1989).
5.6.1 The communicative development of TSI
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It might appear that there are only four possible responses to the apparent
communicative under development of systems approaches including TSI. Firstly
assuming the ideal speech situation is unattainable, then on the face of it there
seems no way of making any arrangement for participation that does not lead to
an arbitrary boundary judgment, by the dominant participant, as to who is
permitted to participate in an intervention. If this is so then critical systems
thinking, interpretivistic systems methods, and hard system methods, all
ultimately depend upon the dominant participant. In this view it would simply
have to be accepted that interventions are optimised within the bounds of what
the dominant participant believes is right12.
A second approach suggested byUlrich (1983) rejects the above scenario and takes
an heuristic route to systemically and systematically challenging the boundary
judgments involved in instrumental social planning and intervention. He
similarly rejects as an idealistic impossibility the Habermasian 'ideal speech'
route. Nevertheless according to Jackson 'Ulrich is unable to reflect upon the
conditions that would guarantee free and open debate and how these might be
brought about' (1991, p209) in other words communicative variables are
inadequately addressed although, contradicting himself somewhat, Jackson also
argues that Ulrich's approach 'is highly original in the matters of promoting
informed and challenging debate and safeguarding his methodology from the
possibility of authoritarian usage' (1991, p211).
Yet if Ulrich's methodology does not adequately address communicative
variables then it does not necessarily protect against autocratic interventions and
authoritarian usage although it is more likely not to be used at all. Ulrich (1988)
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appreciates this arguing that an expansion in the use of practical reason, e.g. via
SSM, is sufficiently emancipatory without regard to the political complications of
communicative variables. Nevertheless Ulrich's method was used in the Trent
Quality Initiative (see the next chapter).
The third route is to intervene obliquely in organisations as Flood and Romm
(1995b) put it. This notion is tied to recent developments in TSI specifically but
also in critical systems thinking in general. I shall discuss this briefly.
Flood and Romm (1995b) argue that methods for intervention in organisations
are usually presumed to have a 'given and immediate purpose' (p378). For
example hammers are used to hammer, nails are used to nail, and SSM is used to
produce interpretivistic models of what is, and what should be the case, in
complex situations. Flood and Romm argue that this given can be challenged:
'for example, with astute and careful handling a cybernetic or soft systems
method can be employed to tackle emancipatory issues in a way which undercuts
and redirects its theoretical underpinning' (p378). If this is true then it indicates
another radical departure from the old TSI (Flood and Jackson, 1991a) in which
methods had to used where they were most appropriate and in which the System
of Systems Methodologies was a prime tool. Now it seems that methods
previously regarded as making assumptions (revealed in SOSM) restricting their
use to particular situations (as assessed by the practitioner) and often needing the
support of other methods to deal with the full situational complexity, are more
flexible than hitherto supposed. This 'sophistication' is necessary Flood and
Romm argue because it
provides a useful alternative when head-on employment of
emancipatory methods in a problem solving context comes up
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against barriers such as subversion of the intervention by people
who feel threatened by it.
Flood and Romm (1995b, p378)
This interesting remark is full of implications. It says that emancipation requires
a strategy in order to be achieved because of resistance coming from narrow,
selfish, interests. It also says that emancipatory methods sometimes (or often?)
only work in the absence of subversion (which may be overt or covert). It also
begins to distinguish between 'head-on' and what is later termed oblique use of
methods. What is meant by these things?
In the first place Flood and Romm observe that some stakeholders are
'disadvantaged' and situations may be socially asymmetric (p378). in other words
there is a condition of inequality. This they link with the issue of coercion which
they define as a dynamic variable which they imply causes these inequalities. (In
their view) coercion causes inequality13. They also reiterate the criticism of
cybernetics and soft systems thinking (made, for example, in Jackson, 1991) that
these methods still cannot address coercion despite their authors commitment to
debate. They argue that this is because the 'immediate and given purpose' of
these methods and the principles for action arising out their purpose 'are not
immediately best suited to coercive contexts' (p378). Moreover the use of 'head
on' (p387) emancipatory methods may lead to the entrenchment of situations and
therefore may be unable to resolve the dilemma faced by practitioners who
would like to intervene to help disadvantaged people but cannot without
making the situation worse, or without result.
This appears implicitly to reject the idea that dialogue (and a communicative
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framework) is a necessary or feasible part of intervention. After all dialogue is
potentially the most threatening form of emancipative intervention of all - it
specifies the conditions under which selfishness, insincerity, immorality and
failure can be exposed and criticised. If 'head on' methods based on dialogue are
always debarred by powerful individuals and interests then this seems to rule out
the use of dialogue in any setting (for example the NHS) characterised 1y
inequalities that have been generated by coercion. This seems a grave blow
against dialogue but it is necessary to dig a little deeper before Flood and Romm's
meaning becomes clearer and also to qualify the use of dialogue. So how do
Flood and Romm envisage the operation of oblique use?
Flood and Romm argue that enhancing the process of choice (in TSI) can
overcome the problem of coercion. They claim that this is because TSI allows the
possibility of choosing to fulfil a purpose other than the immediate given one.
Flood and Romm term this the oblique use of a method and they claim the same
basis for this as Flood and Jackson who argued that tackling coercion is a 'matter
of (both) strategy and conscience' (flood and Jackson 1991b, p244).
The choice is made in TSI by 'aligning method(s) with their immediate and given
purpose to the core issues in the circumstances (or, [...] by deciding to employ
methods obliquely)' (p380). This latter extension of choice is placed in the context
of post-critical complementarism (discussed earlier in paragraph 5.1.4.3) in which
local argument and decision criteria are given primacy. Indeed Flood and Romm
see TSI as the framework through which post-critical complementarism is
operationalised. Therefore the strategy and conscience clause of the new TSI is
also a post-critical clause. Strategy and conscience are subject to local argument
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and choice. It is in these terms that oblique use of a method can be considered.
Flood and Romm (1995b) give a key theoretical justification for considering
oblique use of methods. They argue that all methods express three purposes: they
express h o w something 'should' be done (arising out of a technical need for
prediction and control, p383), what should be done (arising out of a need for
mutual understanding, p384) and why it should be done (arising out of a need for
fairness, p384). These needs are reminiscent of Habermas's technical, practical
and emancipatory interests (see chapter 3) although that particular source is not
acknowledged. However the important link Flood and Romm make between
emancipation and (otherwise non-emancipatory) methods is that each purpose
can be expressed in terms of freedom (or emancipation in the older terminology
of Habermas): (in answer to 'how?') freedom can be technically designed into
efficient and effective organisations. They also claim that (in answer to 'what?')
methods exist that encourage freedom through open debate and finally (in
answer to 'why?') there are methods that encourage group freedom through
debate.
Flood and Romm are little unclear in their narrative about what the difference is
between the debating methods for the latter two purposes. However what they
perhaps mean is that some methods facilitate the achievement of what Habermas
terms the human practical interest (through for example soft systems
methodology) while the final mode of debate facilitates the emancipatory interest
(through for example critical heuristics of social planning). The notion of
designing freedom comes from cybernetics (Beer 1981) and the idea that
cybernetics could be used in an inherently (if obliquely) emancipative way is
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another sign of how far TSI has moved from its state in 1991. So how is this
obliqueness realised?
Oblique use means continuing
to work in the situation, with clientele that includes all the
stakeholders (including the powerful) and make best use of it -
even if some of TSI's principles (such as those which support
emancipation) have to be temporarily sidelined.
Flood and Romm (1995b, p389)
In other words, in the terms developed in chapter 3, Flood and Romm argue for
strategic action in coercive situations by using systems methods (within the TSI
framework) to realise s o m e benefit for disadvantaged participants. What they
argue is that, for example, a technical method may be used according to the
principles of an emancipatory method. There are two pivotal aspects to this:
Firstly Flood and Romm specifically exclude 'duping any of the clients' (p390).
Indeed they argue that the
purpose of oblique use of methods is to manage likely client
resistance by formulating one's mediating role as a practitioner
in such a way as to begin to engage the various parties in
acceptable terms - as a starting point for continued conversation.
Flood and Romm (1995, p391)
So Flood and Romm see oblique use as a strategic approach to facilitating a form
of dialogue! What they do not do, paradoxically, is explain what this form of
dialogue entails.
Secondly they argue that oblique use will be acceptable to the dominant powers in
some organisations because, as Habermas (1982) argues, the failure to engage the
support of employees and other stakeholders, is ultimately self-destructive.
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Flood and Romm argue that self-preservation (if there is no hint of altruism in
the management) puts emancipation on the agenda. Practitioners can help
managers understand why emancipation of the workforce is 'good' for the
business - but without advocating a (perceived) dangerous loss of managerial
control or threat to their self-interest.
This is a remarkably ironic argument because it defines a universal rather than
local principle for intervention ('selfishness is self destructive') - and suggests
that emancipative intervention (overcoming disadvantage) need be non-
threatening (to the advantaged). Put crudely everyone can he 'levelled up' to a
condition of fair diversity without sacrificing elite privileges, strategic
advantages, and with the elite's support.
It is this latter point that is perhaps the weakest part of Flood and Romm's rather
optimistic argument. Yet they are vague about how you do explain to (or
'persuade'?) a manager about the self-destructiveness of selfishness. In the end
Flood and Romm do not supply the conversational details for oblique use of TSI.
TSI is left as an ethical tool (mobilising moral subjectivity and argument) that
may well be rejected by those with power because the basis of their self-interest is
unchallangeable. Once more dialogue is indicated and not debarred but the
strategic motivation for participation in dialogue needs to be strengthened..
I will argue in the next chapter that there are persuasive strategic reasons for
engaging in dialogue: dialogue is necessary if quality is to be achieved and longer
term organisational viability is to be assured. However I will also argue that
'short-termism' remains a serious threat to quality in industry generally
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(including the NHS) and only nation-wide dialogues can achieve a fair result.
This leads me to the fourth route for overcoming the communicative inadequacy
of TSI - it is that of implementing dialogue as a genuinely local political
framework within which to work out the methods of intervention.
The implementation of dialogue means that, rather than beginning with an
impossible ideal, a dynamic situation may be created in which situations may
move toward an idealised state and in which imbalances of power may possibly
be handled with increasing effectiveness. This sounds very similar to Flood's
and Romm's conclusion to their argument. However it also flies in the face of
the demand for strategic relations that the government has tried to propagate in,
say, the NHS. Dialogue sounds expensive in terms of resources and inefficient as
a mode of decision making as well as threatening the powerful. This is a fallacy
though.
Giddens (1994), Beck (1992), Habermas (1991a; 1991b) and Ulrich (1983) each in
their different ways reflect a belief that strategic action is only one facet of human
nature. Habermas's theory of communicative action is specifically directed
toward stating the democratic conditions under which the rationality of the force
of the better argument can begin to operate in public life. Giddens (1994)
advocates democratisation in new ways reaching from nations to individuals. As
I argued in chapter 3 it is simply not supportable to state (like the public choice
theorists) that only strategic actions count. The pathological social condition this
represents (Habermas, 1991b) is highly destructive of individual life chances, of
institutions, and of society. What is more this process of destruction should
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already be visible were strategic action dominating to the extent claimed by public
choice theorists, economists, the government and so on.
Yet there are signs of altruism in some social groups like health care workers in
the NHS that contradict the wholly strategic Dawkins-eqsue view of social life.
Furthermore dialogue processes can offer a society at least sufficient coordination
and control of social action that some social 'good' is generated and is distributed.
As I will argue at length in the next chapter it was communicative failures
between industry and the public that allowed Far Eastern competition to 'kill off'
many British industries. Therefore dialogue is indicated, and not debarred, ly
situational difficulties. It makes strategic sense. Consequently the oblique use of
methods should be grounded in dialogue. Ironically, since dialogue is called for
by both modernists and postmodernists, dialogue may be the 'ideal' post-critical
framework. Within this options for action can be identified hitherto regarded as
mutually exclusive but, like homeopathy in the NHS, have been suppressed.
Choice would be made on the basis of understanding rather than selfishly in the
(often coerced) absence of understanding. The tools of TSI that are being
subjected to ever more rigorous critique (see Wilby, 1995) could then be mobilised
in the fundamental pursuit of fairness without expert knowledges and skills
becoming the sole basis for decisions and action. The NHS quality gap can then
be tackled with leading edge technology but on a fairly agreed and broadly
understood basis. Dialogue is in, not out. Thus the development of a dialogue
framework for intervention is a crucial step in critical systems thinking. I will
now summarise the elements of such a framework.
5.7 Elements of a dialogue framework for CST
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There are two key elements of a dialogue framework for CST. The first is
strategic and the second is communicative. Since dialogue is not a 'natural' state
but a special process (unlike communicative action, see chapter 3), and given that
it is absent and needs to be created (by definition), it appears that strategic action
(or 'oblique use') is the starting point for dialogue. The enriched insider /
outsider model may be one starting point for dialogue based CST interventions.
It could form an element of the strategic preparation by a research team preceding
the start up of dialogue. By reflecting on the insider / outsider relations between
the groups (nominally identified) their social action potentials become a focus for
critique - for example like the analysis of the NHS at the end of chapter 4.
Strategic motives can be identified that, in the right circumstances, might create
an insider forum mediating with a low profile between a few or more of the
groups. Later the model can be used by the participants to reflect on their social
action potentials and of those groups they would like to draw into dialogue.
Notice that this is a local issue - h o w can you create a strategic motive for the
participation of a group in dialogue? Such motives can be looked for and sought
out. The users of the NHS want quality services. So strategic motives can be
harnessed - but critically. However this analysis may also reveal that localities
want to 'war' on each other metaphorically or otherwise. Such intractable
strategic relations need to be referred onward and outward to a greater assembly -
if one exists. In Northern Ireland for example the non-local is vital if the local
are to engage in dialogue rather than war. If it does not then there is no
'solution' to local conflict which may even begin to dominate the non-local. In
this way there will always be a strategic dimension to dialogue in which creating
i	 and sustaining dialogue is the goal. Arguably this should be a prime goal for CST
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interventions.
The motives for participation in dialogue may become clearer as the technical
problems of finding the forum and discussion tools for it are considered. CST is
well equipped to provide these tools (as well as others for designing other
organisational structures and processes) through, for example, TSI. However the
process of dialogue itself provides the critical basis for such an intervention.
TSI's new focus on choice, and alternative possibilities, including oblique use of
methods seems well suited to a dialogue setting. The dialogue can convene
around an agenda in which technical, practical and emancipatory methods are
considered in direct or oblique modes. Hence the communicative element of a
dialogue framework for CST is the practice of dialogue according to the
conditions identified in chapter 3 which are: the option and minimal competence
to say 'no' to validity claims, the expectation of a genuine response to this and
equal or increasing equality of access to the process.
Devising a means of operationalising dialogue as a process within which to
embed the process of intervention represents a profound step out of
precommunicative paradigm that is dominated by strategic relations. It is such
an attempt, concerning a critical systems intervention on quality in the NHS, that
is discussed in the final chapter. However before considering this I will examine
the final part of the NHS quality gap jigsaw - the theory of quality, and why
'quality' is proving such a popular variable in the NHS.
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'As discussed in chapter 4 the term pluralism is also widely used in political
science (Grant, 1989) and in natural science (see Popper, 1979).
2 Dr Madsen Pine is an economist and has been the head of the right wing
Adam Smith Institute. In Micro politics (1988) he transfers the logic of
economic arguments about markets to public policy. This is often referred to
as political economy. In the course of this he discusses the views of Kuhn
and scientific revolutions. I shall be returning to Pine's political economy
explanations when discussing the emergence of critical systems thinking.
MPherson (1974) has argued that so-called 'hard' systems thinking (being
associated with quantitative engineering type management problem solving)
is a subset of 'soft' systems thinking (associated with multiple-view,
qualitative management problem solving). On the other hand Checkland
(1981) has argued the reverse. Either way each is claiming to represent the
diversity of the field with a theory that unifies differences of practice at
theoretical level - these are theories of pluralism.
What Reed (1985) termed integration ism (meaning a theoretical pluralism)
is dropped by Jackson (1987) and Flood (1989). Instead they refer to
pragmatism. Jackson (1987) and later Flood (1989) defines pragmatism as a
trial and error approach to systems practice lacking theoretical insight and
grounding. According to Flood Isolationism can consist of a narrowness of
theory (sticking with one theory) or a narrowness of systems practice
(sticking with one methodological framework). Imperialism occurs when
narrow theory / practice is broadened by adding on bits of theory and practice
from other perspectives but always subordinate to, and sometimes
completely subsumed by, the original theory / practice view. Scientific
medicine can be seen as imperialistic because it defines the criteria by which
insights can be acquired from other disciplines e.g. from herbalism or
acupuncture. The practice of homeopathy in the NHS may be seen as
pragmatism. Complementarism was the expression of fundamental
theoretical unity emerging out of a lawless diversity (Jackson, 1987). This
view, and subsequent revisions to it, is discussed later in this chapter.
5 See appendix B.
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6 This is not necessarily true in natural sciences - for example spacecraft
regularly navigate the Solar System on Newtonian mechanics without
Einstein's theory of relativity being applied. Yet the former is a narrow
special case integral to the latter broader (and later) theory. Unfortunately the
theory of relativity though mathematically 'simple' is just too complicated
for the day to day business of navigating around the globe or the Solar
System. In contrast the social world is far more complex than the natural
world and this leads to the question about what theoretical grounds there are
to believe that integrating social scientific theories 'denatures' them? I
suspect that any denaturing occurs because of the drive for what Habermas
calls 'cognitive instrumental abridgements' of social complexity (see chapter
3). Denaturing in this view is a distorting simplification of a theory caused
through a lack of dialogue between advocates of differing theories who then
may act strategically. If dialogue were established then any suspected
denaturing of theories and practices could be challenged, the grounds of
propositions and areas of agreement or disagreement between participants
rigorously established. I will be returning to the issue of dialogue in the
social sciences at the end of this chapter.
In chapter 3 I explain that Habermas aims his theory of communicative
action at resistance to cognitive abridgement and simplification in the
pursuit of instrumental success. This might be termed a 'critical modern
resistance' in contrast to 'postmodern resistance'.
6 A search of the HELMIS database of NHS literature produces some 2000
references to quality. Within these references a large proportion promote the
idea that increased participation is good for quality. No reference seems to
assert the reverse.
The ISSS conference in 1995 held in Amsterdam was repetitively confronted
with the need to increase participation. To my knowledge no-one
recommended less participation. Other examples of recent work on
participation include Brown (1995) on enskilling, Wexier (1987) on
education, and Arce et al (1994) on rural development.
See appendix B.
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"In chapter 7 I argue that the Trent Quality Initiative provides empirical
evidence of a meta-dialogue. The records of the dialogue are potentially
useful in producing efficient forms of democratic control through dialogue.
More about this in the final chapter.
12	 scenario seems to say there is no point making any effort to be more
participative - it just gives strategic control to some other (equally arbitrary)
actor.
does not cause diversity but it does cause inequality - an inequality
can be defined as an unfair and unjust diversity.
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chapter 6
The theory and practice of quality
So far I have discussed how the NHS is characterised by social, political and
cultural diversity, and how the lack of dialogue has led to an unfair specification
of the boundaries of quality in the NHS services. In the last chapter I suggested
that CST can provide a framework for a systems intervention that can be
embedded within a dialogue process. It is necessary now to reconsider the simple
definition of quality with which I began the thesis. I will propose an alternative
communicatively based definition of quality - critical quality - and suggest that
achieving critical quality is an appropriate goal for critical systems thinking in the
NHS. The concept of critical quality builds upon the theory of dialogue and social
action potentials between politically and culturally differing social groups that
was developed in chapter 3. Finally it draws upon the social action perspective of
chapter 3 and the critical systems thinking of chapter 5 for a critique of
contemporary quality methodology and for a practical framework for critical
quality.
The chapter begins with an overview of quality defintions. The development
and spread of strategic quality within industry is reviewed. The contribution of
the so-called 'quality gurus' to this strategic view of quality is assessed. Then I
discuss the development and basis of normative quality. Next I review Total
Quality Management (TQM) and in particular Flood's (1993) contribution to
quality methodology. In the light of the strategic, normative and 'total' views of
quality I then examine quality in health care. I examine key differences between
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services and physical goods, and I assess the applicability of TQM to the
management of quality in the NHS. Finally I set out the elements of an
alternative view of quality: critical quality. To begin with then I shall consider
the various attempts to define the meaning of quality.
6.1 The meanings of quality
Quality literature like that of Ellis and Whittington (1993), Flood (1993), Munroe-
Faure and Munroe-Faure (1992) Hutchins (1990), Shaw (1989), Witcher and
Wilkinson (1990) and Oakland (1989) are representative of the huge number of
attempts to explain why quality has recently become so important. Quality
literature often deals very briefly with traditional views of quality as it has been
implicitly defined by producers and consumers in market places in the pre-
industrial revolution era. There is often some discussion of the effects of the
industrial revolution but the majority of accounts deal mainly with the post
Second World War rise in importance of quality. Service industries often appear
to be mentioned as an afterthought because most texts deal primarily with
manufacturing industry but assume that quality principles are applicable to all
industries. Moreover, quality in farming or fishing is hardly ever mentioned,
and there is a specific literature on quality in health care that appears in many
ways to have developed quite separately. What usually follows the historical
analysis of quality is an instruction manual on how to manage quality.
Quality is an old concept implicit throughout the history of civilisation.
According to Ellis and Whittington (1993) there were 'traditions of good practice'
in the medicine of ancient Egypt, Assyria, China, Japan and Mexico and ancient
Egyptian tomb paintings depict brick inspectors. Yet it is only in the late 20th
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Icentury that the term has gained a widespread and common use or meaning.
The most often cited contemporary definitions are those of the so-called quality
gurus.
Quality is a predictable degree of uniformity and dependability,
at low cost and suited to the market.
Deming, 1982
Quality is fitness for use.
Juran, 1988.
Quality is conformance to requirements.
Crosby, 1984.
Quality is best for the customer use and selling price.
Feigenbaum, 1984.
Quality is the loss imparted to society after the good is shipped.
Taguchi, 1979.
All but the last one of the definitions refer to an individual's use or requirements
of the product which is related to the notion of a customer. However, Taguchi's
definition differs markedly from the rest in allowing a social and temporal
element to the definition of quality. Oakland (1989) and Flood (1993) (with a
caveat about cost) amongst others offer what is probably a good summation of all
bar Taguchi's definition of quality:
Quality means simply meeting the customers requirements.
Oakland, 1989
It is this summary definition that is the basis of Total Quality Management
(TQM) as described by Flood (1993), Munroe-Faure and Munroe-Faure (1992), the
Department of Trade and Industry (1991), Witcher and Wilkinson (1990),
Oakland (1989), and others. It is interesting to see that many British companies
have produced their own definitions of quality, examples of which are listed 1y
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the Department of Trade and Industry (1991), that all reflect the themes of
meeting customer requirements or completely satisfying the customer.
There have been a number of attempts to define quality of health services.
Maxwell (1984) defines quality in terms of
Access to services.
Relevance to need (for the whole community).
Effectiveness (for individual patients).
Equity (fairness).
Social acceptability.
Efficiency and economy.
A similar formulae was proposed by the Joint Committee on the Accreditation of
Healthcare Organisations (JCAHO) (Ellis and Whittington, 1993). Another
famous quality formula is that of Donabedian (1980) who defined quality in terms
of structure, process and outcome of a health service.The Kings Fund probably
come closer to a succinct definition of quality in the NHS: "quality' is accepted as
defined by a combination of criteria of service including effectiveness,
acceptability (to consumers and providers), equity (of access and distribution) and
economy.' (Kings Fund, 1986). This is really only a restatement of Maxwell's
(1984) quality formula.
All of these formulae are used in exactly the same way. They are frameworks
that are explicitly intended to guide standard setting, performance measurement
and review. They differ considerably from the guru definitions of quality that
simply refer to consumer requirements or conformance by attempting to specify
some of the attributes of a service. None of the definitions focus on the
I	 possibility of individual loss or failures to conform to consumer requirements
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being instead very generalised. In a sense there is a closer match with Taguchi's
(1979) definition of quality as a loss to society since a generally inadequate quality
of health care implies a similar general loss to the community.
The guru definitions are underpinned by the major assumption, that goes with
hardly a qualification from any author, that quality is a tool to facilitate
commercial success by improving competitiveness. As Oakland (1989) puts it,
competitiveness is measured by price, quality and delivery of a good that simply
meets the customers requirements. In public services, such as the NHS, 'value
for money' is a proxy for competitiveness that it is the explicit role and goal of the
Audit Commission (1992) to assess on behalf of the government and the taxpayer.
In the terminology of chapter 3, quality is viewed by virtually all authors as a
variable specified strategically to obtain more profits or value for money. The
assumption that quality is a variable mediating between the selfish strategic
interests of consumers and producers dominate the accounts of Munroe-Faure
and Munroe-Faure (1992), Hutchins (1990), Oakland (1989) and other authors. I
call this a condition of strategic quality.
Where quality is a variable mediated through the intermeshing of normative
entitlements between producers and consumers there exists what might be
termed a condition of normative quality. To an extent Shaw's (1986) account of
quality in medicine illustrates the rather separate development of quality in
health care by dealing predominantly with normative quality.
None of these authors consider the possibility that quality might also be a
variable mediating between communicatively acting consumers and producers
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in which all the forms of social action identified in chapter 3 might be
coordinated. This may be termed critical quality. I now want to enlarge on these
meanings for quality, beginning with an overview of strategic quality in which I
will assess the contribution of the so-called quality gurus. Then I will explore the
concept of normative quality. I will use the notions of strategic and normative
quality to analyse Total Quality Management (TQM) which is currently in vogue.
Then I will consider quality approaches in health care services with a view to
assessing the applicability of TQM to the NHS. In particular I will draw out some
of the chief differences between, and difficulties inherent in, specifying services as
opposed to the physical attributes of manufactured goods. At various stages in
these discussions I will assess the place of communicative action and the role of
dialogue in these quality approaches. This leads to a final discussion and
definition of critical quality. To begin then, I will consider strategic quality.
6.2 Strategic quality
According to Flood (1993) the quality of foods, animals and goods has, for
hundreds of years, been measured by discerning customers buying from
producers in markets and shops. Perishable goods brought to market had to to be
sold to discerning customers. The produce would be inspected by the consumer
and rejected if it did not satisfy their requirements for freshness, firmness, price
and so on. Feedback was instantaneous and the producer would strive in future
to meet the buyers requirements because unsold produce was a loss to the
producer. Flood implies that this process was based upon strategic actions
between producers and consumers who were bargaining with each other. Like
the majority of writers about quality he does not explicitly envisage the operation
of normatively regulated action in traditional markets in which producers and
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consumers fulfil obligations and entitlements in their transactions. He does
mention the role of feedback in the bargaining process that occurs during the
strategic interaction of producers and consumers in a market.
It is possible, however, that feedback in traditional markets may have offered the
possibility for degrees of communicative action because of the familiar
relationships between buyers and sellers and the potential benefits of longer term
collaboration in terms of security of production and consumption. Although
traditional markets are often characterised as a focus of idealistic strategic
bargaining over price and quality it is likely that this is a gross simplification of
the social action relationships between the producers and consumers. The
further investigation of the ancient role of quality would be an interesting
anthropological, even palaentological, research subject - for example what was
the meaning of quality in Viking Jorvik or in flint tool exports to Europe from
Britain during the stone age? - but unfortunately these questions are beyond the
scope of this thesis!
Flood also mentions traditional crafts, trades and arts in which the producers
often formed monopolistic guilds with long apprenticeships for those who
wished to learn the master's rare skills. Ellis and Whittington (1993) regard this
as an early form of quality assurance. Buyers perhaps relied more upon the
producers reputation than their own judgment about the quality of the goods.
This meant for example that woollen cloth from mediaeval Colchester could be
marked with a special stamp and be exported for sale in Europe, where it would
attract a higher price than other cloth. Interestingly it was monks that seemed to
control prices (Ellis and Whittington, 1993). In this way both Ellis and
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Whittington and Flood implicitly touch upon the largely one sided normative
regulation of quality by professions and other bodies. This is discussed in more
detail later.
World wide trade was boosted by such innovations as Harrison's maritime
chronometer that enabled ships to navigate precisely in longitude rather than 1y
guestimating (Beet, 1976) and by the exponential growth of railways (Hutchins,
1990). These innovations increased the potential for the mass production and
distribution of other goods and in the process altered the idyllically ancient
principles of quality. While in small markets the traditional 'inspection and
reaction' (Flood, 1993, p4) mode of quality regulation may have continued the
mode of mass production and rapid distribution that began in the industrial
revolution removed the possibility for an intimate and immediate feedback from
the buyer to the producer.
The industrial revolution produced a massive change in the
pattern of production and consumption. In Great Britain for
instance transport was revolutionised through mass production:
Blast furnaces in its Northern towns poured out quality steel at
such a pace that in one short ten-year period from 1840 to 1850
its railway lines reached every corner of its shores. Never in the
history of mankind had the creative forces of an entire nation
been so galvanised to success. Risk-taking, entrepreneurial
drive, and creativity moved at an almost unbelievable pace.
Hutchins (1990, pI)
Consequently quality mediated between producers and consumers became more
reliant upon strategic action and the possibility for communicative action with
consumers was largely eliminated.
In the novel mass markets of the 19th and early 20th centuries the balance of
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strategic power lay heavily in favour of the mass-producing entrepreneurs.
Producers who were confident they could sell all their mass produced goods at a
good profit for the foreseeable future may not have even been (or be!) aware of,
or may have simply ignored, the negative reactions of non-buyers. As Ford
famously put it: 'any colour you like as long as its black' (Nevine, 1957). Quality
in this case was being defined primarily by the producer for the strategic reason of
production cost minimisation but in so doing established a normative quality of
production that also favoured the producer. Another illustration is more recent
and far more cautionary: one might question whether battery egg and intensive
poultry farming and butchery would have boomed in the United Kingdom had
the public been more aware that these forms of mass-production could spread
salmonella throughout the supplies. The public assumed that eggs were free of
any such infections. This created the strategic opportunities for the egg producers
to increase their sales of cheaper eggs who did so without the intention of
spreading salmonella. Yet if the public distaste for salmonella and egg or chicken
had been communicated more personally and immediately to the producers
during the 1980s egg crisis (leading to the resignation of a junior Minister,
(Economist, 1988)) then the crisis would perhaps not have occurred in the way it
did.
Visible in these two examples is a limitation in the relationship between strategic
action and quality. Classical economic theory which is based on assumptions
about strategic actions by utility maximising buyers (Rosenberg, 1988) would
deem the egg crisis an unfortunate market failure due to the inadequate feedback
of information between purchasers and producers about the quality of produce.
The limitations of strategic interactions have already been discussed in chapter 3
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when it was shown that information is a tool that may be strategically distorted
by an actor. The egg-crisis is therefore typical of and not incidental to the strategic
action relations between producers and consumers in which quality issues may
be deliberately ignored or obfuscated.
These examples also typify the changing strategic social action potentials between
producers and consumers as mass market goods and services became available.
Henry Ford could ignore the demand for green cars because of the strategic
strengths of his business (cheap and reliable cars and many buyers) and the
strategic weakness of potential consumers (options to buy other cars were very
limited). Quality had become a variable strategically specified and normatively
regulated by one side - the powerful producer with a market to exploit - and this
situation remained in many industries in the United States, Europe and Great
Britain until after World War Two when things began to change.
According to Flood, Munroe-Faure and others attention to the quality of mass
production through inspection and testing in factories was stimulated by the two
World Wars. Control over industrial processes was enhanced by statistical and
scientific methods especially involving newly developing operational research
skills (Jackson 1991; Flood, 1993). To that extent quality had perhaps also become
strategically two-sided with the military consumers demanding outstanding
performance from products.
After World War II consumer demand was so great that quality became more one
sided again in the producers favour. Arguably it is possible to see the increasing
dominance of normatively regulated quality by producers in the post war period
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Iin Britain. According to Hutchins manufacturers in the 1950s and 1960s seemed
to believe in making inferior goods as a matter of principle even though the
means existed to make better and more reliable goods. For instance car and
motor bike manufacturers refused to rustproof their products in spite of 'massive
public criticism' (1990, p22). Hutchins argues that this attitude was justified 1y
powerful producers in terms of the 'throw away society' of higher volume and
cheaper disposable goods. Producers could make inferior products and sell them
all - there was no strategic reason it seemed to make better goods - although as
Hutchins points out this lead to the downfall of many British industries with the
onset of Japanese competition.
The impression is usually given in the quality literature, for example in Flood
(1993) or Munroe-Faure and Munroe-Faure (1992), that Japanese industrial
competition was able to exploit the quality weaknesses of British, European and
North American industry by obtaining and putting to use the skills of statistical
process and quality control acquired by the Americans during the war. Hutchins
(1990) heavily qualifies this view by pointing out that the Japanese at an
executive level in industry generally already understood the statistical control of
processes. What they gained from the Americans were ideas about management
which they nevertheless found lacking. This is often obscured by the accolade
heaped upon Deming and Juran as 'quality gurus' - they both received the
highest Japanese imperial awards for their work in Japanese industry. It may be
more logical to treat these awards (and guru status generally) as part of the quality
propaganda machine that the Japanese constructed (and others since like the
Department of Trade and Industry, 1990)
199
Meantime British industry, despite being the developmental niche for many
inspection and quality control methods during the war, may generally have only
became aware of the so-called guru approaches to quality in the 1980s following
their promotion by the Department of Trade and Industry. Lately this has been
through the 'Managing into the 1990s campaign' that was launched in 1989. It
seems ironic that the victorious powers in World War Two, that recognised the
military value of quality as a variable of strategic importance to both consumer
and producer, failed to recognise or propagate its commercial value. Instead
virtually all accounts of quality explain that American and European industrial
nations became industrial casualties when Japan and other industrial
competitors seized upon and developed quality management.
In particular quality was not seen by the new industrial powers as something the
producers strategically or normatively controlled without regard to consumers.
As Hutchins (1990, p22-23) explains Japanese producers were able find consumer
requirements of common manufactured products like electrical goods, cars and
motorbikes which British producers, as argued above, either barely acknowledged
or even wilfully ignored - such as rustproofed cars and motorbikes. In other
words quality came to be seen as a two-sided variable by the Japanese, defined
strategically between consumer and producer, and this enabled their industries to
exploit consumer requirements in a way seemingly invisible to British business.
The two-sided strategic view of quality should not be confused with the strategic
roles of quality in traditional markets. The Japanese had not reintroduced an
ancient notion of quality. Their industry, based on what Hutchins (1990, p22)
describes as a 'marketing mentality' did not rely on the intimate two-way
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definition of quality negotiated in traditional markets. The 'marketing
mentality' of post-war Japanese industry used generalised feedback from
consumers to redefine specific attributes of standardised production. Consumers
were still not in intimate and immediate contact with the producers and their
control over quality was not based on the possibility of longer term
communicatively coordinated actions. Rather consumers were able to choose an
alternative 'better' product strategically made so in a few highly publicised ways
by the producer. So the producers were selectively exploiting the consumer
demand for incremental improvements in products by making these
improvements available rather than reaching understandings with consumers.
Having become aware of the commercial value of quality as a two-sided
strategically defined variable it is currently being promoted as a matter of urgency
by the British government. The Right Honourable Peter Lilley MP, while he was
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry (DTI), stated in the introduction of a key
Department of Trade and Industry publication for British business that '(t)he
competitive edge now is with those who manage their resources most effectively
in offering a timely response to the demands of the market' (Department of
Trade and Industry, 1990). Lilley was voicing the Government's view that British
business must strive to produce a superior combination of price, quality and
delivery of goods and services during the 1990s in what is perceived to be a
fiercely competitive world market by concentrating on four things: design,
production, purchasing and supply, and quality. With the help of Peat Marwick
McLintock (business consultants) the Department of Trade and Industry proposed
what they called a 'complete programme' to improve the commercial
performance and competitiveness of businesses. Lilley even added a warning to
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his introduction:
This programme can assist you in moving towards the kind of
strategy which is at the heart of some of the world's most
successful companies. I hope you would agree this an
opportunity you cannot ignore.
Department of Trade and Industry (1990)
You certainly cannot ignore the importance the Government attached to this
programme and it is perhaps quality (particularly in the form of Total Quality
Management) which has generated the greatest public awareness (and cynically
speaking the greatest income for management consultants). Again let us refer to
the DTI:
Coping with the increasing importance of product quality and
greater service content is seen as the No.1 strategic marketing
issue for the decade by Europe's top businessmen. And quality is
the responsibility of the chief executive who must be personally
committed to it.
Department of Trade and Industry (1990)
One of the ways in which the DTI is promoting quality, is by highlighting the so-
called 'quality gurus', who are perceived to exemplify the ways in which the
strategic value of quality may be commercially exploited. In the next section their
contribution to strategic quality is considered.
6.3 The quality gurus
It is interesting to note that British quality literature mainly refers to British,
American and Japanese quality initiatives. However, alone of the so-called gurus
only Moller is a European the rest being mainly Japanese or American. There is
now a long list of quality gurus: Deming, Juran, Crosby, Feigenbaum, Ishikawa,
Taguchi, Shingo, and Moller are all listed by the Department of Trade and
Industry (1991) and are described as "charismatic", and "deified". Such an
outpouring is remarkable. In the following sections I will summarise the
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approaches of the most commonly cited quality gurus, concetrating more fully on
Deming (1986) and then concentrating on the differences between Deming and
Crosby (1979, 1984) Ishikawa (and Lu, 1985), and Juran (1988). All of them make
certain recommendations about how quality should be managed. These take the
form of various activities that have to be undertaken in a particular way to attain
particular goals. The gurus also make make implicit or explicit assumptions
about the meaning of quality, the purpose and nature of organisation, and the
nature of opportunities of difficulties faced by industry. To begin with then I
shall consider Deming.
6.3.1 Deming
W.E.Deming worked as a statistician for the US Department of Agriculture and
the Bureau of Census. Although it was during the Second World War that he
began to develop an interest in methods of statistical control of variability in
manufacturing output (Flood, 1993) it was after the war in Japan that his
influence on industry in general became significant. Unfortunately the usual
accounts about Deming's work in Japan like those of Flood (1993) and especially
Munroe-Faure (1992) give the impression that it was he who introduced the
Japanese to statistical process control and that it was their adoption of his ideas i n
toto that largely explains Japanese industrial success. Hutchins (1990) corrects and
qualifies these views by pointing out that statistical techniques were in use in
Japan before the Second World War. Moreover the Japanese Union of Scientists
and Engineers (JIJSE) was formed in 1946 and began to promote 'Quality Control'
throughout Japanese industry based on various sources including the American
Standards Organisation publications Z1-1, Z1-2, and Z1-3, Shewhart's (1932) 'The
Control of Quality of Manufactured Product' and so on. Finally before a single
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quality guru came to Japan the first major Quality Control training programme
commenced in 1949 led by the chairman of JUSE, Ichiro Ishikawa - the father of
Professor Kaoru Ishikawa who is an acknoledged quality guru (Hutchins, 1990).
It was in 1950 that the Japanese Government invited Deming to lecture on
statistical methods. JUSE followed this by inviting Deming to give eight days of
seminars. According to Hutchins (1990) Deming's achievement was to 'cut
through' academic theory which was well known to Japanese academics and
make it meaningful to production workers. Shortly afterwards the Japanese
created an award (the 'Deming Award') to promote Deming's techniques but it
was considered necessary by 1955 to launch a massive media campaign of 'self-
improvement' programmes to enhance this promotion. Hutchins argues that 1y
this time the Japanese 'had extracted all they usefully could from the statistical
techniques, and they needed to take Quality up to the level of upper
management' (1990, p78).
It was the statistical control of variability in all processes that was originally
central to Deming's approach to quality. Reducing process variability by
systematically eliminating causes of variation should improve the consistency of
the output, eliminate waste, and enhance the reputation of the product.
Deming's initial concern was therefore with the producer's strategic control of
quality. The chief tool required to assist the statistical control of manufacturing
processes is the statistical process control chart on which are plotted observations
of production. If there is a statistically significant deviation from the parameter
specifications for a particular process then investigative and corrective action is
taken to locate and eliminate the cause of the deviation.
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Deming also devised sampling methods for use in door to door consumer
surveys (Flood, 1993) thereby attempting to identify the strategic quality
requirements of consumers. It is the selection of the consumers requirements for
standard production that completes the two-sided view of quality discussed
previously that generated the strategic opportunities for Japanese manufacturers
to exploit in world markets.
Deming was awarded the highest Imperial honour in 1960 for his contribution to
the development of quality in the regeneration of postwar manufacturing in
Japan (Munroe-Faure and Munroe-Faure, 1992) which perhaps corroborates
Hutchins view that Deming's contribution to quality in Japanese industry was
impressive, rapidly exploited but nevertheless quickly superseded. Hutchins
(1990) and Flood (1993) seem to differ on this point. Flood (1993) states that
Deming's essentially 'machine-like' approaches to statistical process control were
well suited to the reconstruction of Japanese post-war industry. Hutchins argues,
however, that Deming's techniques had worked well in America during the war
but were not suited to Japanese post-war reconstruction. Labour relations
deteriorated rapidly and this was traced back to the vogue for American style
machine-like management philosophy. Unlike European and North American
industries that could sell everything they could make Japanese industry was
weak and could not afford poor labour relations. Consequently
They were thus the first nation to become aware of the need to
break the mould and avoid the problems becoming entrenched.
This was because they had experienced the disadvantages of the
Taylor1 systems before they had experienced its benefits. For
example, if Japan in the early 1950s is compared with Western
Europe and the United States at the time, a vivid contrast can be
observed.
Hutchins (1990, p49)
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So Deming's techniques were valuable but by themselves inadequate modes of
management. According to Flood (1993) Deming's 'success' in Japan was not
matched in North America. Flood attributes this to Deming's methodological
emphasis on the machine-like strategic control of quality which failed to
recognise post-war North American workers cultural and political attitudes:
He encountered major difficulties arising from poor motivation,
leadership and training. Difficulties were also found in
standards of practice, and too heavy a reliance on technology
rather than people. These issues significantly affected the
development of his ensuing ideas. Deming became more
human orientated in his writings.
Flood (1993, pl4)
While Flood correctly identifies the human relations weaknesses in the early
Deming approaches to quality management he perhaps overemphasises his role
in Japanese management. If Hutchins' view is correct Deming's methods were
uniquely adapted by the Japanese to compensate for the cultural and political
deficits that Flood argues obstructed the implementation of Deming techniques
in North America. What is more Hutchin's argues that Deming developed
awareness of the need to encourage some form of employee participation from
the Japanese rather than from his failure in North America. The corollary is that
anyone attempting to implement Deming's guidelines cannot look to the early or
maybe any Japanese industrial success for anything other than the use of statistics
as exemplars of Deming quality management.
Deming argued that industry suffered from five 'Deadly Diseases':
1. A general lack of constancy of purpose.
2. Too much emphasis on short term profits.
3. A lack of or unsuitable evaluation of performance, merit
rating or annual review.
4. Management are too mobile.
5. Management decision making too readily relies on
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quantitative data without paying due consideration to less
tangible or hidden factors.
Deming (1986)
These 'diseases' form Deming's 'theory' about what is wrong with industry and
they mainly concern strategic social action: Industry generally lacks consistent
strategic actions and appropriate validity criteria aimed at longer term
profitability. Only the fourth disease is a structural criticism but this implies that
management are unable to take and evaluate appropriate strategic actions because
they do not stay long enough with the business. However Deming's theory fails
to recognise the importance of communicative variables and it assumes that if
only strategic action can be improved then all would be well. The theory of
dialogue developed in chapter 3 shows this to be a partial view.
Deming's diseases may have some relevance to the NHS. For instance, although
the NHS is clearly not (yet) in the business of making corporate profits, the
creation of internal markets may have introduced the possibility of a new kind of
revenue-based 'short-termism' in NHS Trusts. The lack of performance criteria
is often cited with respect to the NHS. Maynard (1992) for example argues that
many NHS decisions are made in the absence of any relevant data. To an extent
Deming's fifth disease could be rephrased for the NHS as 'decision making is too
often based on irrelevant quantitative data'. However Flood (1993), with a much
more comprehensive model of business, organisation and social interests, finds
Deming's list too short adding nine further diseases to compensate for Deming's
lack of structural, political and cultural detail. These include regimented
bureaucratisation, cooercive organisation, management / worker distinction,
excessive individualism, crisis management, ignorant managers, sporadic
management and reliance on simple tools (Flood, 1993, pp286-7). In other words
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Deming's diseases form an highly partial view about the nature of industry and
organisation. To an extent he addresses this inadequacy in the rest of his
guidelines which form the 'cure' for the diseases. The guidelines include his
famous fourteen 'points for management', the seven points of his 'action plan',
and the never ending cyclic management steps: Plan - Do - Check - Action. In
addition to Deming's own publications lots of other books summarise Deming's
work (e.g. Flood, 1993; Munoroe-Faure, 1992, Oakland, 1989). I will deal with
specific issues very briefly here.
While Deming argues that commercial strategic actions must reflect longer term
goals in his 'points of management action' he calls for the elimination of
'slogans, exhortations and numerical targets [...] quotas or work standards and
management by objectives or numerical goals'. Deming calls for these to be
replaced with 'leadership' instead (Deming, 1986). One of the key outcomes of
leadership is expected to be effective teamwork and to facilitate this he calls for
'fear' to be driven out 'so that all employees can work together effectively' and for
'barriers' to be removed that 'rob people of their right to pride in their work'
(Deming, 1986). In this Deming is trying shift emphasis from narrowly defined
strategic and normatively regulated actions to more broadly participative social
action. Deming does not clearly explain what is meant by the process of
leadership but he is clear that it involves strategic action to implement the
guidelines, following the 'plan, do, check, action cycle'. In the 7 point 'action
plan' leadership is made a responsibility of management who have to explain
everything to the workforce. What is meant by 'explanation'? Deming may be
implying a degree of dialogue between employees and management but it more
likely refers to an exercise in strategic action (with or without degrees of
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normative regulation) in which case explanations may seem to lack sincerity. Far
from bring 'driven out' coercion might become necessary in order to implement
the plan with sincere explanations being reserved for the issuing of threats and
incentives. Given the importance attached to leadership seeing this as a purely
strategic skill, rather than being sincere to employees, is a very serious limitation
in Deming's scheme.
Flood (1993) points out that Deming notably prioritises management over
technology. These 'people-orientated' steps as Flood (1993) refers to them are
complemented in Deming's overall approach by steps involving 'systemic
functional analysis' because Deming is also concerned about the structural logic
of organisation. Therefore he proposes that all stages of organisational processes
be identified and the relationships in customer-supplier terms be worked out and
improved through a coordinated team effort (Deming, 1986). This introduces
what are now referred to in quality literature (Oakland, 1989; Munroe-Faure and
Munroe-Faure, 1992; Flood, 1993) as internal and external customers..
Internal customers are employees of a business who receive some product or
service from another employee or department as part of the process of
production. An external customer is the person who buys the product of the
business. In this way customers and suppliers can be identified at all stages of an
industrial process which has clearly defined inputs and outputs. This model is
then amenable to statistical control. Deming has not given a name to this
organisational model but it is nearly ubiquitous in every current text on quality
and every guru approach. It corresponds to the management cybernetic model of
organisation discussed in detail by Jackson (1991). A management cybernetic
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model is based on the theory that an organisation consists of processes, which
may involve human activities, that transform inputs into outputs. The output is
measured in some way, for example physical attributes of the good, or the
quantity produced or production time lost, and this information is fed back to the
process controller which may be fully automatic. This is virtually analogically
congruent to the control of a domestic central heating system in a house.
However, the simple negative feedback control model is often generalised in
quality management to involve the whole organisation with varying degrees of
political and cultural amendment to compensate for the un-machine-like
tendencies of people. I will deal with criticisms of this model after reviewing the
gurus.
These potentially destructive inconsistencies are indicative of the fundamental
methodological flaws in Deming's work: that his guidelines are not really an
explicit theory of quality management, or of organisation, but simply a set of
pragmatic steps. The real theory is hidden as a set of assumptions entering into
each polemically stated step. This is why, for instance, a management cybernetic
model is visible in Deming's approach but not explicitly defined. As Flood
observes quality management generally 'lacks the rigour of established
management and organisation theory'.
The social action perspective developed in chapter 3 also reveals some other
assumptions in Deming's work. There is a belief expressed in Deming's
guidelines that people act as utility maximising agents as is assumed in classical
economic theory (Rosenberg, 1988). This belief underpins the maximising of
long-term profits through strategic quality. It is assumed that people are on the
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whole more likely to buy better quality goods for the same delivery and price if
they have a choice. Of course in chapter 3 it was shown that strategic 'utility
maximising' action is only one of several kinds of social action and these are
largely unaccounted for in Deming's approach to quality management.
It is assumed that the workforce will accept the carefully explained rational goals
of the management who are assumed to be entitled to manage the organisation.
It is also assumed that business is managed in the interests of shareholders who
aspire to the maximisation of profits in the long term and that this is in the
general social interest.
Flood rightly argues that Deming's methodological guidelines are too vague to
form a 'Deming Method' of quality management. Although he has emphasised
the role of people Deming has failed to deal with the meaning and nature of
participation, motivation and leadership, a criticism echoed by Hutchins (1990).
Moreover Deming's approach is theoretically partial and inconsistent. There is a
communicative deficiency in the Deming approach. I now want to consider the
other gurus more briefly.
6.3.2 Juran
Juran followed in Deming's footsteps in going to Japan in 1954 where he gave
seminars for middle and top executives. He advocated 'Management of Quality'
which Hutchins argues was the basis of the current Japanese notions of 'Total
Quality'. There are clear differences between Juran and Deming. Juran (1988a;
1988b) emphasises the role of management rather than process variability as the
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cause of quality problems. Therefore the management of quality requires starting
at the top with his famous 'quality trilogy' borrowed from financial
management: quality planning, quality control, and quality improvement.
One similarity with Deming is in the identification of internal and external
customers and their needs. However, Juran differs from Deming in making the
two-sided strategic view of quality, strategically determined between producer
and consumer, into the high profile and crucial starting point for managing
quality. What the organisation produces internally or as an end product is based
on finding practical ways to satisfy the needs of customers. It is this commitment
in social action terms that Hutchins (1990) identifies as the basis of Total Quality
in contemporary Japanese industry.
Another similarity with Deming is found in the implicit management cybernetic
theory about the nature of organisation. However, Juran emphasises goal setting
as a way of gaining control of processes which Deming clearly rejects. This is not
a dispute about statistical control of processes. Rather it is a dispute about the
nature of employees and social action. Juran is advocating closer and more
explicit social control of the workforce through the strategic use of goal setting.
This extends the range of machine-like thinking clearly from the machines
themselves to the machine and process operators. This is congruent with his
belief that management cause quality problems (Flood, 1993) and not the
machines (and their operators) whose output may be statistically controlled.
Juran specifies a further ten steps to quality improvement which, like Deming's
management points and action plan, specify various conditions, activities and
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kinds of social action. These include a call for leadership, training, measurement
and monitoring of performance all of which Deming subscribes to. Unlike
Deming, however, Juran sees it as essential to set quality goals for all activities
and publicise and reward achievement. That is Juran wholly believes in the
rational utility maximising actor who will, as an employee, strive harder for
strategic rewards or to avoid strategic punishments. This narrow political and
cultural view of the workforce is noticed by Flood (1993) who argues that Juran's
emphasis on the responsibility of management and leadership for quality
ironically fails to account for theories of motivation and leadership. For example
Juran makes no reference to removing fear from the workplace perhaps because
fear is useful in creating the machine-like conditions he believes necessary to
manage quality. Dealing with the workforce in this way overlooks the
possibilities for communicative action and dialogue, the potential for which is
hinted at in Deming's scheme, relying instead on normatively regulated action
(through performance measures, training and publicity) and strategic action in
the form of incentives.
It can be seen that many of the criticisms levelled at Deming's approach above
may also be levelled at Juran's. While Juran does more strongly emphasise a
two-sided strategic view of quality than Deming his view of the workforce and
the political and cultural nature of organisation is more primitive.
6.3.3 Crosby
Crosby (1979, 1981, 1984) did not go to Japan and has not received an imperial
award! His reputation as a guru therefore originates in a slightly different sphere
to that of Deming or Juran. He gained experience in quality management by
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I.
working on American missile projects and from being corporate vice president
responsible for quality for fourteen years at ITT (Munroe-Faure and Munroe-
Faure, 1992, p289).
His approach to quality management is more integrated and more succinct than
Deming or Juran and it is based on the explicit consideration of the meaning of
quality, the measurement of quality and organisation for quality. These are
pithily summarised in his famous five (originally four, Flood, 1993) 'absolutes of
quality management':
1. Quality means 'conformance to requirements' and not a
degree of excellence.
2. There is no such thing as a quality problem.
3. It is always cheaper to do it right first time.
4. The only performance measurement is the cost of quality.
5. The only performance standard is zero defects.
Crosby (1979)
Quality is defined in such a way by Crosby that there can only be degrees of lack of
quality. If a product does not conform to the customer's requirements there are
additional costs incurred in using it, replacing it, or reworking it, so that it does
conform to requirements. So lack of quality is costly and measuring the costs of
non-conformance is the only useful measure of quality. If production can be
achieved without errors then conformance to requirements will nearly always
occur, apart from wholly random deviations, and the cost of quality will
therefore be very nearly zero. Consequently Crosby (1979) maintains that quality
is free within an ideal-type process with 'zero defects'. It is necessary therefore to
constantly measure non-conformance and to strive continually for the ideal.
Unlike Juran Crosby does not centre his approach on planning the organisation
and processes from the external customer requirements inward although his
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definition of quality is not incompatible with this.
Flood (1993) observes that Crosby has recently added point 2 - 'there is no such
thing as a quality problem' - to emphasise that quality problems do not create
themselves or exist independently. They are a symptom of a poorly managed
process. Again this is idealistic rather than realistic: there may be some processes
where uncontrollable errors occur that create non-conformance in a proportion
of the end product. A spell of warm weather might shorten food shelf life for
example. This might be labelled a quality problem by the end user or even by the
producer simply unable to control all the elements of the process. Neither
Deming nor Juran opt for this idealism although in terms of goal setting Crosby
is closer to Juran than Deming.
Where Crosby differs from Juran is in the greater emphasis that is placed upon
managing people with a number of tools that each imply a theory about people
and organisation. One such tool is the 'Quality Maturity Grid' which states how
the quality 'maturity' of the organisation can be evaluated. This comprises a
series of stages beginning with uncertainty characterised by managerial confusion
and a lack of commitment to quality and ending with certainty characterised 1y
management understanding why they have no quality problems. Each stage is
evaluated in six categories that deal with the degree of managerial
comprehension, the position in the company hierarchy of certain employees, the
manner of problem handling from prevention to crisis management, the cost of
quality as a percentage of sales, the amount of quality improvement activity, and
the overall understanding of the nature of quality problems.
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Another tool is the 'Make Certain Programme' in which facilitated employee
groups identify big problems and by who and how they should be tackled. There
is also a 'Management Style Evaluation' tool that measures individual
management performance on a simple scale on such issues as listening,
teamwork, helping, transmitting, being creative, leading and so on.
The final tool is the 'Quality Vaccine' which is a preventive programme. The
vaccine requires commitment from everyone to conformance with
requirements, the presence of systems to undertake various functions like costing
of non-conformance, education programmes and so on, the communication of
information, the continuation of operations in smooth cycles, and lastly clear and
unambiguous policies.
Crosby's approach is more accessible than Deming or Juran. Like them Crosby
implicitly applies a management cybernetic model of organisation. The
workforce is expected to produce machine-like activities that are controlled by
measures of deviation from conformance. There is an emphasis on strategic
action in which the employees are regarded as rational utility maximisers who
will respond to rewards (or punishments).
There is an emphasis on the development of normatively regulated action in the
workforce, through training and education, so that the management are entitled
to the cooperation of employees in achieving zero defects. There is a call for a
degree of dialogue but only between groups of employees so that they can identify
the cause of problems originating in another department. This information is
then used strategically and not as part of communicative action between those
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claiming to be victims of error and those 'blamed' (as Flood, 1993, p27 puts it) for
causing it.
Like Juran Crosby does not reject the use of fear as a strategic incentive to create
the utterly cohesive team effort demanded in a quality driven organisation
although Flood argues that Crosby intends to 'free workers from externally
generated goals' and wants then to work together in an 'open and conciliatory
way' (1993, p28). This inconsistency can be explained in that, like Deming and
Juran's quality approaches, Crosby's lacks theoretical rigour. For instance Flood
(1993) rightly points out that political divisions are not addressed. The simplistic
management cybernetic model at the heart of each guru approach presented so
far is criticised for facilitating authoritarian control of organisation (Jackson, 1991)
and this contradicts Crosby's purported intention.
These three gurus largely represent the American establishment. The last guru
discussed is Japanese, Kaoru Ishikawa, and he arguably offers a strikingly
different approach.
6.3.4 Ishikawa
Hutchins (1990) regards Kaoru Ishikawa as the exemplary Quality guru and as
going beyond Deming and Juran by developing 'Total Quality'. This is also
variously called 'Company Wide Quality' (Flood, 1993), 'Company Wide Quality
Control' (Ellis and Whittington, 1993) and 'Total Quality Control' (Ishikawa and
Lu, 1985). Ishikawa does not provide a step by step recipe like Deming, Juran and
Crosby for quality success. As Hutchins puts it 'there can be no 'paint 1y
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numbers' guide to implementation and for different companies the route will be
different' (1990, p53).
In Hutchins view the chief contribution of Ishikawa is essentially to make the
planning, doing, checking and acting elements of Juran's quality management
approach into a group responsibility. In this way people are required to be less
individually machine-like - a key characteristic of Deming, Juran and Crosby
approaches - and more autonomous. To an extent Hutchins sees this as
reintroducing at a group level the ancient principles of craftsmanship that are
fragmented and lost with Tayloristic modes of management while retaining the
benefits of a machine-like corporate whole (1990, pSO).
Flood (1993) describes Ishikawa's approach as requiring vertical cooperation
between managers, supervisors and workers with horizontal cooperation
between departments and functions. This horizontal component is to an extent
understated in some quality literature (see Flood (1993), Munroe-Faure and
Munroe-Faure (1992) or Hutchins (1990)) because Ishikawa sees the marketing
function as the principle reference point with which all other functions must
coordinate (Ishikawa and Lu, 1985). In other words as Oakland (1989) argues
(taking the lead from Ishikawa) marketing is the business both of finding out
what are feasibly and most-profitably satisfiable customer requirements and then
delivering that satisfaction. In fact marketing becomes the principle strategic
function of the business (and it is where the chief executive should have an
office) rather than being a 'bolted on' corporate function that is often in conflict
with finance: a common problem noted in British industry by Witcher and
Wilkinson (1990). Ishikawa therefore extols the two-sided strategic view of
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quality par excellence.
The main tool for implementing Total Quality are Ishikawa's celebrated 'Quality
Circles' (sometimes also referred to as 'Quality Control Circles' see Flood, 1993).
Quality circles have become a very widespread approach to implementing quality
management in industry generally and in the NHS where there have been
numerous implementations2. Hutchins discusses these in great detail. He
describes them as the only way in which genuine craftsman-like 'self control'
may be achieved by groups of workers in their work place (1990, p108) but he adds
a caution that there 'is a great variety of types of group operating in the West all
using the term Quality Circle. This is regrettable, because when such groups fail,
the impression is that the Quality Circles concept itself is invalid' (Hutchins,
1990, pill). In the light of this Hutchins specifies the defining attributes of
quality circles quite precisely. These refer to the size of group, the nature of
participation, the compatibility of members, the regularity of meetings, the
activities undertaken. Broadly a quality circle will consist of 3 to 12 individuals
from a workplace voluntarily meeting for an hour a week in paid time. They are
trained to identify, analyse and solve work-place problems, present them to
management, and implement the solutions where this is feasible (Hutchins,
1990, pIll).
Hutchins argues that quality circles go through several stages of maturity. Newly
formed quality circles have to be acquire the skills through training to undertake
problem solving. After a while quality circles develop a simple degree of self-
monitoring and feedback control. Eventually a degree of innovatory flair
emerges at which time the quality circle members attract a degree of acceptance
219
and respect from other non-members including management. The final degree
of maturity is self-control. At this stage the organisation is making available all
the resources that the quality circle members demand to maintain their
autonomous development and innovatory activities. Members undertake self-
development outside of the place of work.
Unfortunately quality circles need not operate a process of dialogue. Instead of
being free insiders, quality circles could have 'prisoner' status or be 'outsiders' to
some dominant circle, department or authority, in which case strategic and not
communicative actions would dominate interrelationships. At this point quality
circles may only remain intact because of the coercive strategic actions of
management, who may issue threats and incentives, or because of normatively
regulated action making the group cohesive but of low value. Additionally,
there may be potential for the outsider quality circles to become ideological
outsiders. At this point, the quality circle may be viewed by management as a
dangerously independent group against which strategic action would be taken,
such as the dismissal of members.
Interestingly, Hutchins (1990) argues that no quality circles in western Europe
have yet reached the ultimate self-control stage of development. It may be that
self-controlling quality circles are viewed as a strategic ideal, which will probably
never be attained, and there is a consequent lack of effort. However, Hutchins
appears to reject this, and argues that it is a Western management fault for failing
to go to visit Japan to see self-controlled quality circles in operation. On the other
hand, it may that Hutchins has not grasped the possibility that what he terms
I	
self-controlling quality circles are really strategically controlled. In any case, like
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Hutchins, Flood (1993) also seems to feel that management may fail to
implement quality circles properly by not listening to the ideas generated and
facilitating the implementation of solutions. This would undermine the groups,
and make them into outsiders, with respect to the dominant management group.
It is possible that this may be a normatively regulated reflex action of British
managers who cannot contemplate the creation of autonomy at work. It may be
symbolic of a deep seated lack of trust or respect from those who own' resources
for those who are employed to use and create resources. Flood (1993), Hutchins
(1990) and Witcher and Wilkinson (1990) all argue that there are profound
attitude problems in British industrial management that seriously and adversely
affect the potential success of quality implementations. Hutchins (1990) blames
management for the perceived lack of quality in much British industry. Witcher
and Wilkinson argue that failures in quality implementation arise through
boardroom 'short-termism', sectionalism and managerial leadership that
'directs' rather than 'facilitates' (1990, p18). Some of these points have been made
for decades. For example Deming identified 'short termism' as a a 'deadly disease'
in the 1960s.
There is also a counterpoint to the benign view of quality circles as self-
controlling forums for dialogue. Although Ishikawa's quality circles allow a
much broader view of people than the rational utility maximising actors of
Deming, Juran and Crosby, quality circles are nevertheless tools of two-sided
strategic quality. Quality circles must gear their efforts towards achieving the
narrowly defined corporate profit goals. Moreover, although mature quality
circles may be fluid and autonomous organisations, they may have been highly
selective of members, in which case it is moot to ask what happens to those not
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selected or ousted? Finally, quality circles operate an industrial process which is
still viewed as essentially a simple feedback control process, the output goals of
which flow from marketing decisions, and not quality circle decisions. Ishikawa's
approach is, Flood (1993) argues, much more people orientated and holistic than
the previous three guru approaches reviewed. Moreover, Flood argues (briefly!)
that the notion of quality control circles is more easily applicable to service
industries - perhaps one of the reasons why quality circles are tried so often in the
NHS. He also argues that Ishikawa's approach lacks systemic logic because it does
not incorporate a view of feedback and interrelationships between the causes of
errors. However, this may largely depend upon the way that quality circles
operate. Self-controlled quality circles may function analogously to the white
cells of the immune system in the human body, by identifying and eliminating
errors, in the way that white cells identify and eliminate invading organisms.
Similarly they perform functions that contribute to the survival of the whole -
and of course their own survival - in this way Ishikawa's approach potentially
operationalises what has been identified as an organic view of organisation and
this, arguably, carries a more powerful systemic logic than that of the other gurus
whose approaches tend to reflect mechanistic thinking (see Burns and Stalker,
1961; Morgan, 1986)3 . Nevertheless Ishikawa's approach is, as the social action
analysis of quality circles above indicates, politically and culturally deficient. In
respect of these Flood (1993) argues that Ishikawa's ideas would struggle in the
politically divided situations that are typical of Western organisation.
Each of the gurus above are widely regarded to have significantly contributed to
the development of notions of quality. They each espouse a set of views about
the meaning of quality and how it should be managed. They all accept in some
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way a strategic two-sided view of quality that is determined between internal and
external customer/supplier relations. They all support the identification of
errors and their elimination from the process of production. They all advocate
the systematic control of errors through various statistical and problem solving
tools. They differ in their approach to managing people with Juran and Crosby
(despite his philosophy) stressing a strategic goal setting and determinstically
manipulative view of people. Ishikawa and Deming contrast with this 1y
stressing the voluntary nature of cooperation between groups of people and leave
open the potential for dialogue. None of them discuss how to deal with
dissenters and employees who disagree with the corporate goal: they all assume
that awards, information, training and leadership can deal with political
differences and create a coordinated machine-like team effort.
Although strategic quality has undoubtedly been highly influential it is necessary
to consider another view of quality that has been referred to above: normative
quality which arguably has had a greater role in health care.
6.4 Normative quality
Normative quality means that the specification of what is produced is regulated
through qunatitiative of qualitative standards of expectation. Failing to meet
these standards leads to some rule guided sanction rather than a simple loss of
benefits or performance bonuses. The traditional market notion of Flood (1993)
may be a locus for normative quality because of the longer term benefits accruing
to a community, that avoids the uncertainties of strategic action. In this case
bargaining may still occur in the market, and this may appear to be the traditional
two sided strategic mediation of quality, but boundaries of entitlement may
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become established. Amongst these are issues of who has the right to sell in a
particular market, what currency is acceptable and so on.
The advent of mass production also led to standardisation, which is perhaps the
clearest sign of normative quality. Woodward (1972), in his account of the
establishment of the British Standards Institute, argues that it was distribution of
mass produced products, through better transport worldwide on railways and
ships, that acted as a driving force toward standardisation. The American Civil
War was also a driving force behind late 19th century standardisation. It was the
incentive behind the first example of product inspection by measurement of
dimensions rather than gauging by eye alone. This technique was adopted later
by Singer sewing machines and McCormick harvesters (Ellis and Whittington
1993, p38). Ellis and Whittington (1993) observe that the manufacture of
components for the 'new' technology in manufacturing industry meant that
different sources of parts were incompatible. Replacement parts for industry had
to be customised at great expense. Similarly manufacturers in iron and steel had
to hold large stocks of raw material to their unique specification. So there were
incentives to standardise production which would reduce costs and ease
manufacture. This led to degrees of normative quality being established in all
sorts of intermediate and end products including Whitworth's standard screw
thread and iron and steel specifications (Ellis and Whittington, 1993). Once
standardisation of various products was achieved it was probably nearly
irreversible. For instance there would be no question about the dimensions of
pipe to make or buy - it became an industry standard. Failing to produce the
entitled attributes of product might lose customers to other standard producers.
Exceeding these attributes simply wastes money - as Crosby observes in his
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approach to quality management.
During the 1960s some big British manufacturers destroyed their strategic
competitiveness by failing to recognise that British consumers felt entitled to
purchase bel±er (Japanese) specification goods (e.g. rust-proofed cars). Otherwise,
as Hutchins (1990) argues, Wolsey and Fairy might now be market leaders selling
their vehicles in the USA and Europe along with Nissan and Yamaha. The issue
is that the 'low-quality' norm was structurally unchallengable. British car and
bike manufacturers were able to produce and attempt to sell inferior goods
because they had the means to do so without regard for dissenting views. A
possible way to save these industries was seen to be the strategic intervention of
government as indeed occurred in British Leyland. Unfortunately Government
strategy perhaps only preserved the flawed norms of the industry and therefore
failed to deal with the problems that remained structurally unchallengable. The
Thatcher era from 1979 onwards dealt with nationalised industrial problems by
removing the governmental structural support that sustained the industries
against foreign competition. Surviving industries then had to compete on price,
quality and delivery and had to acquire competence in the strategic management
of quality. Consequently there was a massive loss of uncompetitive British
heavy industries (Hutchins, 1990).
One of the key actors in the strategic propagation of standards in Great Britain
was, and is, the British Standards Institute (BSI). This began as a civil engineers
committee devising standard specifications for heavy industrial goods in 1901.
Later the committee worked during World War One on the standardising of
weapons and munitions. In 1929 it received a Royal Charter and became the BSI
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in 1930 (Woodward, 1972). In this way a single committee became crucial in the
spreading of normative quality in British industry.
Inspection became a key mode of managing quality and became central to
Taylor's so called 'Scientific Management' (Ellis and Whittington, 1993). As Ellis
and Whittington note the responsibility for inspection in the munitions industry
gradually became the purchaser's which in the late 20th century is now also a
common retailer practice - retailers now often inspect a proportion of the product
rather than relying on the producer. Inspection is dedicated to the normative
regulation of quality, because comparison is made with a constant standard,
which may be defined wholly outside of the organisation's control. Inspectors are
usually entitled to take certain actions if more than a particular amount of
product is produced that does not meet specification. In 1992 I visited a factory in
Lahore, Pakistan, that makes garments for a major American 'blue jeans'
company. This company permitted only 10% non-conforming production at the
time of my visit and arranged random inspections to assure this. Interestingly
the output was 100% inspected by factory quality controllers. This is probably
only possible in a low-pay, hard-labour, 'sweatshop'. According to a former
manager at the factory 'vagabonds' are employed to bring back any absconding
workers who are therefore virtual slaves.
In contrast to this end of the line inspection, as Flood (1993) explains, since World
War Two quality management has involved progressive steps back, from
concern only with the quality of the end product, to concern with the design
before it is fabricated - this is exemplified by Taguchi (1979) who advocates
designed in quality. Although these changes have occurred for strategic
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competitive advantages, both the inputs and the outputs of manufacture will
conform to a whole range of standards, defined externally in Iso 9000 and so on4.
So normative quality is incorporated into the design of products. When the
process of manufacture has settled down it becomes, to an extent, a process based
internally on normative regulated quality.
Normative quality in manufacturing has had a significant impact on
manufacturing. Arguably it may have had a much greater impact on health care,
and on the NHS. Health care professions, such as doctors, nurses, pharmacists
and so on, usually regulate quality by licensing members if certain standards have
been achieved in examinations, worktime has been spent in a particular
environment and so on (Wilding, 1986; Ellis and Whittington, 1993).
Continuing membership often depends upon demonstrating continuing
competence with theoretical and practical development. This is especially so in
the health care professions where continuing registration of nurses for example
is now linked to a demonstration of constant professional education and practice
(Ellis and Whittington, 1993).
The professional regulation of quality is often based upon legally enforceable
entitlements by the public and the profession to work carried out according to
certain explicit principles. These principles may even be codified, published and
often put in public places such as the code of conduct for nurse, midwifes and
health visitors (UKCC, 1994). Shaw (1986) and Ellis and Whittington go back to
the 1518 Royal Charter of the Royal College of Physicians of London for the
earliest British example of a code which required that doctors uphold the
standards of medicine for professional and public benefit. At this time only the
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guilds and crafts referred to by Hutchins (1990) and Flood (1993) would have
similar control over members but it is interesting to note the public centred
value expressed in the code. The Creek Hippocratic oath despite being some 2000
years old remains amongst the most well known ethical codes governing the
quality of medical practice (Seedhouse, 1988). The 1518 Royal Charter of the
Royal College of Physicians of London might be construed as an attempt, by the
King, to gain strategic control over the quality of medical care for the community,
but it also formed a new basis for normative quality: the Royal Charter was the
institutionalisation of Regal and public entitlements and expectations.
Codified practice resembles the attempts, characteristic of strategic quality
management, to create corporate cultures around mission statements. However,
professional codes apply to individuals who must take legal and professional
responsibility for their actions. This is not the case if an employees fails to
conform to the corporate mission statement which in any case are usually very
general without any legal precedents to clarify the detail of its commitments.
Professional codes are usually far more complex and they constitute legal as well
as professional obligations far in excess of industrial mission statements.
The usual reason that a guild or profession is created is probably a strategic one:
They are often seen to confer power over the public to the professional body and
its members (Wilding, 1986). However, the Royal Charter referred to above and
the ancient Hippocratic ethics of benficence (do good) and non-maleficence
(above all do no harm) (Seedhouse, 1988) imply a degree of altruism - a
willingness to self-sacrifice. This might still be interpreted as the effect of the
socially valuable long-run benefits of normatively regulated action (Habermas,
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1991a). However it might also reflect a non-strategic value or motive that might
be expressible as dramaturgical action. Yet the sincerity of this might only
become visible in special circumstances - such as in dialogue processes.
Now that the strategic and normative meanings of quality have been discussed I
want to consider the implications of these in the most publicised and prolifically
written about form of quality management: Total Quality Management (TQM).
6.5 Total Quality Management
Not only is TQM the most promoted form of quality management in industry,
there have been numerous claims that it has been implemented in the NHS
(Sewell, 1994; Ovretveit, 1994; Spackman, 1993; Munroe-Faure and Munroe-
Faure, 1992; Holloway, 1991). Munroe-Faure and Munroe-Faure (1992) are typical
of the TQM genre in having no doubt about the current totality of TQM's
solution to quality management: "Total Quality Management' is a proven,
systematic approach to the planning and management of activities. It can suc-
cessfully be applied to any type of organisation' (Munroe-Faure and Munroe-
Faure, 1992, p136). Flood, aware of shortcomings in other TQM guides as we shall
see, sees TQM as genuinely beneficial for business but only if it is developed,
hence his manifesto tone: 'Beyond TQM'. However in this section I want to raise
some important questions about TQM that may be overlooked or misunderstood
by those implementing TQM. I will give a special consideration to Flood's (1993)
version of TQM since this represents an attempt to deal with some of the serious
shortcomings of the traditional total quality approaches.
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TQM is frequently based on eclectic and pragmatic compilations of guru and
other approaches. Typical of this are the accounts of Munroe-Faure and Munroe-
Faure (1992) and Oakland (1989). In part the analysis of TQM that follows is a
response to the under-theorised state of the art. Witcher and Wilkinson argue
that research is needed to determine TQM's status as a theory for or of
organisational behaviour (1990). Nevertheless TQM is regarded by its
protagonists as the state-of-the-art approach to quality. The DTI promotional
videos, in advocating TQM, go to great lengths to illustrate the practical dif-
ferences between a 'quality' organisation and 'non-quality' organisation from
being greeted at the door to the finished job. Even Flood (1993) eulogises:
TQM is sweeping the industrialised world, with good reason.
TQM is helping to remove unnecessary and costly waste, to
locate and eradicate sources of error, and to provide the
consumer with reliable products that they actually want. It also
makes people's jobs more meaningful. TQM makes common
sense.
Flood (1993, pxi)
In Ackoff's (1992) ironic words TQM is a panacea. It is important to ask, however,
whether there are any other consequences or effects of using the TQM approach
besides the claimed improvements to industrial competitiveness or value for
money in the NHS?
To help answer this question let us begin with an account of the principles of
TQM that have been usefully summarised by Flood (1993). He identifies ten
main principles of TQM. These are:
1. There must be agreed internal and external customer
requirements.
2. Customer's requirements must be met first time, every time.
3. Quality improvement will reduce waste and total costs.
4. Prevention of problems is better than cure or crisis
management.
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5. Quality improvement can only result from planned
management action.
6. Every job must add value.
7. Total involvement of all employees from top to bottom and
across functions is required.
8. There must be an emphasis on measurement to help assess
and to meet requirements and objectives.
9. There must be a culture of striving for continuous
improvement involving breakthroughs as well as
incremental steps.
10.An emphasis should be placed on promoting creativity.
(Source: Flood, 1993, p48)
Witcher and Wilkinson (1990) provide a model of TQM that draws on Oakland
(1989) in which TQM is viewed as the holistic interaction of teams, methods and
internal markets facilitated by leadership. This is broadly similar to the approach
taken by other authors on TQM such as Munroe-Faure and Munroe-Faure (1992)
or the Department of Trade and Industry (1991). It can be seen that TQM
involves all the elements already introduced previously in the discussion of the
guru approaches. There are special emphases, however, on the 'market' nature
of organisational processes involving customers and suppliers in long chains and
on the costs of non-conformance in the chain.
The 'quality chain', which is emphasised by Oakland (1989) and the DTI literature
(parts of which Oakland may have written), is one of the key unifying strands
within TQM. It is explicitly based on the view of an organisation as a series of
interconnecting processes which have inputs and outputs. Every member of the
workforce is understood to be undertaking some process. Internal suppliers
produce an output for someone else. Internal customers are defined as those
who receive as an input to their process something that a supplier has produced
as an output. Everyone is regarded as someone's customer and someone's
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supplier in long interconnecting chains through the whole organisation and
beyond.
While internal customers requirements are being met, first time every time,
there is no problem. However, when a supplier fails to meet a customer's
requirements then it is more difficult for that customer to meet the next
customer's requirements. In this way a defect at a point in the quality chain can
create defects all along the chain. What is more defects can cascade along
branches. In extreme cases a single defect, such as a missing spare part, may stop
an entire business because everyone is wholly dependent upon the
manufacturing process. In health care a late consultant doctor can tie up a large
variety of staff who have independent commitments elsewhere. Therefore one
defect may create dozens of other defects creating 'non-conformance to
requirements' in many other places.
A major justification in the literature for the TQM approach is that it helps to
reduce business costs by the elimination of such 'non-conforming' output.
Output which does not conform to the requirements of the customer, internal or
external, at the very least wastes their time in handling and disposing of it. It also
involves wasted effort and materials on the supplier side. The Department of
Trade and Industry (1990) and Munroe-Faure and Munroe-Faure (1992) give
various examples of industries that have calculated the potential financial
savings on costs of non-conformance. For example the National Westminster
Bank in 1988 claimed that 25% of their operating costs was due to non-
conformance6.
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TQM authors, like the gurus, always focus upon the ways in which these defects
can be eliminated. Usually, as Flood (1993) observes, authors of standard TQM
texts describe one particular toolkit for 'problem solving' and this is exemplified
byOakland (1989) or Munroe-Faure and Munroe-Faure (1992) who advocate such
tools as Ishikawa fishbone cause and effect diagrams and a flowchart 'problem
solving method'.
One of the central claims of TQM is that it is total or holistic.. However what
does this mean? Upon what theory does this stand? Does this help in deciding
whether or not TQM should be implemented in industry in general and in the
NHS in particular?
6.5.1 TQM: total or partial?
Witcher and Wilkinson (1990) emphasise that TQM is an holistic form of
management, rather than simply a goal of management, but they do not justify
their argument. More helpfully, Flood (1993) describes TQM as 'total' because it
seeks to involve everyone, everything and all issues in the management of
quality. However, the involvement of 'everyone, everything and all issues' is a
large claim to make of any method of management. How is this claim justified?
It is through the practical application of the idea that every employee is involved
in a process with inputs and outputs. The simple definitions of customers and
suppliers (that I introduced earlier when discussing Deming) are operationalised
by applying the management condition that 'quality' output is the goal of every
process of the business thus applying the familiar management cybernetic model.
In one sense input-process-output, as observed by Jackson (1991), is an extension
of machine-like thinking (see Burns and Stalker, 1961 and Morgan, 1986). That is,
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organisations are expected to work 'like clockwork'. Well-oiled, timely and
utterly single-minded. However while management cybernetics is stuck with
this limited model, organisational cybernetics, according to Jackson (1991), goes
far beyond it with brain-like thinking (Morgan, 1986), which as we shall in a
moment see has been utilised by Flood (1993). TQM, however, usually relies
upon the simple machine-like model for organisation.
This model is arguably so limited that it is reliant for sophistication upon a
variety of tools, including for example Ishikawa's quality circles, his famous
fishbone diagram for identifying the causes of errors in production, and, for
controlling workplace activity: control charts and graphs, histograms, scatter
diagrams, and Pareto charts 8. Other tools include Best Practice Benchmarking for
quality improvement (Holloway, 1995; Oakland, 1989), or more complicated tools
such as Quality Function Deployment (see appendix C and Munroe-Faure and
Munroe-Faure, 1992). In the end, however, no matter how big the tool kit or
intricate the feedback controls, standard TQM remains a very late 20th Century
application of mid-2Oth Century management cybernetics. If TQM has any
methodological claim to holism then it arises from these rather old cybernetic
ideas carrying the single-minded philosophy and tools of TQM into every aspect
of the organisation and its market.
Yet this has a cost. The major criticism of management cybernetics is that it is
clearly open to authoritarian organisational applications: 'Models that treat
organisations as simple input-transformation-output systems, with an externally
defined goal, clearly lend themselves to autocratic usage by those who possess
power' (Jackson 1991, p122). This is reflected in TQM and the guru approaches
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previously discussed where strategic action is seen to dominate over dialogue as
the dominant mode of social action. It is the reduction of error in the output of a
process that TQM teamwork is directed towards without allowing the goal of the
process to be substantively challenged. Flood expresses it this way:
In this machine-like cybernetic structure people become cogs
operating without freedom. There is no room for freedom, not
even to make local relevant decisions. Mindful people must
become mindless parts. Creativity is suppressed by restricting
commands and extrinsic control, originating or operating from
the outside.
Flood, 1993, p130
Deming and Ishikawa each appear somewhat aware of these limitations of
machine-like organisation, hence their proposals to 'break down barriers' or
facilitate self controlling quality circles 9. However it might be counter argued
that a TQM organisation is orientated to the satisfaction of its external customers
by delivering products and services that conform to their requirements.
Therefore the substantive goals of a TQM organisation, are strategically defined
by its external customers, who therefore guarantee the legitimacy of the corporate
goals. So long as the business succeeds strategically, society benefits from more
productive industry, and more effective delivery of satisfaction to consumers.
This is a standard economic argument for the maximisation of social welfare
through efficient markets (Rosenberg, 1988). It does not reflect the strategic
control over quality exerted by the producer nor the ignorance of the consumer
both of which reduce the efficiency of markets. Strategic action will involve the
distortion of information in a way that will affect consumer decisions by making
it less possible to make a rational buying decision. In this way the machine-like
limitations of TQM organisations affect social welfare in a potentially negative
way by (more efficiently) achieving the wrong social welfare goals - such as the
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creation of a 'short term profit' economy.
The coordination of effort in a TQM organisation to achieve corporate goals
requires a machine-like commitment from a team whether this be departmental
or in a quality circle. Hence the need for such TQM paraphernalia as cultural
cohesion to prop up the simplistic cybernetic model of organisation. TQM
culture serves the cybernetically (and externally) defined goal of the organisation
and is, naturally, reproduced wherever there are supplier-customer relations. It
is the creation and reproduction of the TQM culture, or in other words certain
kinds of values and normatively regulated action, that is made a strategic
management goal by virtually all TQM authors. This is done largely through
propaganda disseminated through so-called leadership, training, facilitated
groups and so-called 'explanation'. It is propaganda because it is a strategic
exercise: as we have already seen dialogue simply does not on the whole appear
to be supported in quality management although Ishikawa and Deming offer a
chink of light. The political question about dissenters who will not cooperate
with the TQM regime is never addressed explicitly: it is implicitly left to the
organisation's disciplinary processes and the control of personnel through
contracts.
TQM in social action terms, or in systems terms, must be seen as highly partial
and unreflective, perhaps even dangerously simplistic in its standard form. The
upshot of this is that the adaptability of organisations implementing TQM may be
limited rather than enhanced. Deming recognises the dangers of rigidity and
advocates the abolition of slogans, targets and so on, which is contrary to the
spirit of TQM as it is being practised, according to Oakland (1989), in the UK.
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Not surprisingly, given the serious methodological shortcomings in the standard
approach, TQM has encountered difficulties in implementation in British
industry. Witcher and Wilkinson (1990) claim that nearly all TQM
implementations they know of in the UK fall short of being 'holistic' and 'total'.
According to Flood (1993) there are largely unexpected problems being
experienced by those implementing it. However, the problems faced TQM
implementation are not all due to general theoretical weaknesses. The 'partial'
implementations of TQM are, argue Witcher and Wilkinson (1990) due to the
dominance of particular values and structures in industry. For instance, short-
termism is seen to be the consequences of banks and big investors demanding
short paybacks in conjunction with the numerical domination of accountants on
boards and in senior management. This leads to 'quick-fix' TQM. The 'reluctant
manager' problem arises because participative teamwork with middle
management leaders is based on little more than 'exhortation' (1990, p14).
Middle managers are often assigned roles without consideration of their ability,
attitude or propensity for the teamwork tasks. The culture creation strategy based
on identifying 'core values' often expressed as a 'mission statement' leads only to
agreements on vague and meaningless corporate objectives with even these
remaining subject to dispute (1990, p15). Leadership under these conditions
naturally is difficult and highly pressurised with ever closer monitoring by
performance targets (1990, p14). The limitation or absence of participation, by
definition, means that performance is determined by a senior manager according
to the short term requirements of the board. The machine-like team is therefore
created and sustained by strategic action and not through dialogue.
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Witcher and Wilkinson (1990) recommend that firms should be more market
orientated, a finding familiar from the gurus above, and that it is the two-sided
strategic mediation of quality that should drive the TQM implementation
programme. In this way it would be the strategic selection of longer term plans to
deliver satisfaction to external customers from which would be derived the
specifications of requirements throughout the rest of the internal quality chain.
Witcher and Wilkinson (l99O,pl5) argue that commitment may not be necessary
in order to achieve this but merely compliance. In their view by revising the
implementation strategy, and securing compliance from the workforce, TQM
would become an holistic success. Central to the securing of compliance is
leadership which, they argue, 'is about quality committed senior management
which must ensure that the principles of quality management are implemented
continually' (Witcher and Wilkinson 1990, p6).
What Witcher and Wilkinson have done is little more than state that leadership
means securing compliance from everybody (including 'top management') about
the way activities are undertaken. What they imply by this is that strategic action,
in the form of threats or incentives, is required. Yet their root argument as to
why TQM implementations fail is that the existing threats and incentives are
inadequate and so they have contradicted themselves. This is a pity because they
recognise the structural and value problems that usually foil strategic actions and
appear to prevent successful TQM implementations. It must also be said they
completely overlook the general theoretical shortcomings of TQM.
A better response to the problems Witcher and Wilkinson identify would be to
set up dialogues that permit the problem structures, goals and values to be
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challenged. Participants in dialogue would not find disagreement over corporate
goals to be a problem, since genuine dialogue values dissensus as much as
consensus in coordinating actions. The only compliance required is that
participants do not resort to strategic action because this may destroy a dialogue.
Moreover leadership in a dialogue then takes the form of facilitation and not the
strategic posturing advocated implicitly by Witcher and Wilkinson.
Witcher and Wilkinson's criticism of TQM implementations and their
definition of leadership leads us back to the dominance of strategic action as a
British management modus operadii. However, like Hutchins (1990) they view
the problem as an inadequate strategy by management in the pursuit of
commercial success rather than as a lack of dialogue between workers. It seems
bizarre that TQM is, in Flood's words, 'sweeping the industrial world' given the
problems discussed so far. Flood's (1993) version of TQM is an attempt to redress
these problems and realise the potential of TQM by theoretically strengthening it.
This is discussed next.
6.5.2 Flood's theory of TQM
The distinct limitation of the reliance of TQM on a limited cybernetic model has
been recognised in other literature. Both Flood (1993) and Holloway (1991) each
respond to TQM limitations by proposing the implementation of TQM through
the Viable System Model (VSM) which is the main organisational cybernetic
method (Jackson, 1991) par excellence. Flood's arguments deserve a very close
look, because he claims to have largely overcome all the drawbacks of the
traditional modes of quality management, in a theoretically rigorous and socially
and politically superior version of TQM.
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Flood's theory of TQM is explicitly based on Habermas's (1972) knowledge
constitutive human interests, the original theory of complementarism
developed in critical systems thinking, and anticipates post-critical
complementarism. It makes use of three perspectives - machine-like traditional
management thinking, brain-like cybernetic systems thinking and socio-cultural
systems thinking. Each of these perspectives are deemed to imply each other in a
complementary interrelation that Flood argues is not recognised in the general
quality literature. Instead industry Flood argues is dominated by traditional
machine-like quality thinking which is contradictory and neutralises the value of
quality ideas. What is central to Flood's argument is that emancipation, in the
form of disimprisoning and freedom, can be secured for both workforce and
society only by debate and design of organisations for quality.
The design of organisation that Flood forcefully advocates is Beer's (1972, 1979)
Viable System Model (see appendix B). Flood views quality as a functional
requirement of the VSM rather than seeing the VSM simply as a superior means
of implementing TQM as Holloway (1991) implies. By applying the VSM, Flood
is attempting to overcome the serious methodologically un-total and unholistic
partiality of TQM. Moreover, the VSM is a key part of his explicit social and
political manifesto: 'Practising freedom' (1993, pl2?).
Flood argues that the VSM is politically and socially superior to management
cybernetics - a view also taken by Jackson (1991) - and that Beer (1973) 'preempted
and smashed the arguments to be levelled by the critics of his organisational
cybernetics who still fear autocratic dimensions to his work' (1993, p128). The
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cybernetic element of Flood's TQM is claimed to be more robust that in the
standard version of TQM.
The premises of each argument are summarised in the following paragraphs
with a discussion at the end of each brief section.
The design premises are that gaining knowledge and expertise is necessary in
order to overcome the social ills of the modern world such as unemployment,
starvation, poverty and so on. Being inefficient, as a way of guarding against the
autocratic use of cybernetically excellent design, does not overcome these ills.
The older machine-like approaches to management reduce freedom because they
are inefficient and coercive. In contrast organisational cybernetics potentially
enables all human activities to become more efficient by sacrificing only just that
amount of locally agreed individual freedom, within an organisation, that is
needed to maintain a viable whole into the long term. This produces more
freedom for everyone than it consumes (a 'Liberty Machine': Beer, 1973).
Anarchy, argues Flood (1993, p131), may represent the ultimate individual
freedom but is self-destructive because social life needs organising to deliver
social goods like food, drink and leisure. Consequently autonomy which is
essential for creative and free human life is finely balanced against regulation
which is necessary for achieving social goals. The VSM is proposed as the flexible
design that can achieve these fine balances.
Beer (1973) argues that social ills are caused to an extent by a lack of cybernetic
efficiency. This assumes that VSM organisations cannot operate to profit from
creating social ills, and also that everyone is agreed about what a social 'good' or
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'ill' is. Moreover he and Flood (1993) appear to assume that anarchy is the
opposite of total regulation 1 ° and that it is a question of finding a balance point
between the two. If this balance is right and locally agreed then the organisation
is viable and it will produce social goods rather than social ills.
However VSM organisations have corporate and subcorporate goals that together
define the purpose of the organisation. Whether the organisation produces a
social good depends upon the nature and means of definition of the corporate
goal. If the process of corporate goal definition is a strategic process, undertaken
solely by the board of directors, then they will want to be completely confident
that the locally agreed sacrifice of freedom by an employee serves the
predetermined goal of the organisation. If Witcher and Wilkinson are correct in
their analysis of British industry then local agreements will only serve short term
goals. In a purely strategic mode the VSM is no different to any other mode of
quality management discussed previously. It simply gives the board better
control and maximises autocratic power - a criticism levelled by Ulrich (1981).
However if debate is mobilised, as Flood (1993) suggests, then the VSM can be
implemented in a more critical process of quality management. Flood argues
that dialogue and debate as crucial to the 'freedom' design of viable organisations
(Flood, 1993, p133). Debate is seen by Flood to be essential to reveal what Vickers
describes as a 'mind trap' which is 'only a t1ap for creatures which cannot solve
the problems that it sets' (Vickers, 1970). Escaping from one mind-trap leads
inevitably to another but experience builds up and increases individual and
social freedom. Debate contributes to trap-solving because participants may each
have part of the 'combination' that others can learn and understand (Flood, 1993,
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p134). Flood therefore proposes the use of a variety of methods that facilitate
debate. These include the use of Quality Circles (discussed earlier), Strategic
Assumption Surfacing and Testing (Mason and Mitroff, 1981), Ackoff's (1974,
1978, 1981) Interactive Planning and Soft Systems Methodology (Checkland and
Scholes, 1990)11.
However Flood identifies a limitation in debate, and argues that design and
debate are in themselves insufficient to create freedom, because they are often
used as tools to serve narrow interests by structurally powerful groups. Powerless
or subjugated groups are effectively imprisoned (prisoner insiders or outsiders by
necessity in the terms of chapter 4). The agenda for debate is given and inflexible.
This echoes the criticism made earlier, that quality management in industry is
dominated at the corporate goal level by strategic quality, in which the producers
favour their own short term interests. Flood argues that it is vital to empower
people 'at least with the knowledge that they are subject to the interests of others'
(1993, p137) following which appropriate changes may be made. Unfortunately
though, unlike 'designing and debating, however, disimprisoning is not flush
with models or methods. Very little practical work has been done on
disimprisoning' (Flood, 1993, pl37-l38). The only approaches to disimprisoning
that Flood can identify are Ulrich's (1983) Critical Systems Heuristics (CSH) and
one of the elements of Flood's (1990) Liberating Systems Theory (LST) that deals
with freeing knowledge suppressed by dominant institutions 12. Neither of these
are deemed by Flood to be highly developed and effective ways of
disimprisoning. Yet without development in these areas Flood argues that
'practising freedom' will remain only a 'good idea' (1993, p141). Disimprisoning
is therefore very high on Flood's research agenda. Post-critical complementarism
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(Flood and Romm, 1995a) and the oblique use of methods (Flood and Romm,
1995b) appear to be contributions to that agenda.
This is perhaps the big crunch moment in Flood's TQM. How can freedom be
attained if strategically powerful groups are able to do what suits them? What
force can be identified with which to equip a disimprisoning method that will
neutralise strategic (or normative) superiority? What is required according to
authors such as Habermas, Giddens and Ulrich (and Bauman whose postmodern
agenda is notwithstanding) is that dialogue processes are structurally bound into
modern living. Through this, imprisoning structures would be revealed, and it
would allow participants to coordinate their actions to counteract them in ways
otherwise invisible or impossible. It is through the democratic process of
dialogue and not simply the incidental tools through which disimprisonment
may be achieved. Habermas's theory of communicative action is specifically
directed toward stating the democratic condtions under which the rationality of
the force of the better argument can begin to operate in public life. The next
chapter outlines an attempt at operationalising dialogue in the Trent Quality
Initiative (Gregory, Romm and Walsh, 1994) and this can also be seen as an
attempt at disimprisoning.
Flood's argument is by far the most comprehensive and radical of any quality
approach yet published. He regards the implementation of TQM through the the
use of Total Systems Intervention (TSI) as a way of encapsulating the design,
debate and disimprisoning elements within an intervention. He does attempt to
address the theoretical issues that underlie the pragmatism of the guru and other
quality approaches. He rightly criticises the neglect of individual and social life
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although his TQM pathway of design, debate and disimprisoning is still
communicatively underdeveloped. If dialogue principles can be incorporated
into it and spelled out then this may be the seed for a new movement in quality
that I have termed critical quality. Before I introduce this idea however I want to
review the approaches to quality found in health care services and consider more
fully the status of quality in the NHS.
6.6 Quality in health care
Perhaps the acrimonious and anecdotal atmosphere of discontent about the NHS
that I described in chapter 2 is one of the motives behind the burgeoning of
quality schemes in the NHS during the 1980s. Yet as I have aready argued quality
in health care generally or in the NHS is not a new consideration. Probably the
most famous influence on the quality of health care in the Western world, is that
of Florence Nightingale, whose actions had practical significance in the Crimean
War in the mid 19th century. Although her efforts are seen as the epitome of
caring they were guided by 'a cycle of standard setting, observation, review and
improvement' (Ellis and Whittington, 1993, ph). She demonstrated that
improvements in outcome, measured on a scale of 'relieved, unrelieved, died'
(Shaw, 1986), were possible by improving caring practices. In these activities
Nightingale was displacing the existing normative quality of care with strategic
improvements in quality. In the process she was establishing more dynamic
expectations and entitlements: the 'Lady with the Lamp' created a new
normative quality of hospital care 13. According to Ellis and Whittington (1993)
the next step in the international development of quality was E.A. Codman's
systematic review of medical practice at the turn of the century in Boston (USA).
Codman called back his patients after a year to check the accuracy of his diagnoses,
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the degree of benefits and side effects of treatment. Codman even founded the
'End Results Hospital' after his ideas were rejected by colleagues (Ellis and
Whittington, 1993, p11). Ellis and Whittington claim this was the first example
of assured quality in health care being marketed.
Codman's innovation is an early example of two-sided strategic quality in health
care focussed upon the output of the service. Ellis and Whittington observe that
most developments in health care quality were directed at the process by
influencing and controlling the 'education and licensing of practitioners' (1993,
p11). For example in the USA the Flexner Report (1910) on theoretical and
practice standards in medical education stemmed from evaluation in medical
schools commenced by the American Medical Association and the Carnegie
Foundation. The Royal Colleges in the United Kingdom undertook the
inspection of hospitals, departments and training programmes to check their
suitability for medical student training. Other health related professional
organisations followed suit. In this way normative quality of health care began to
spread. Recently this has included moves to introduce regular relicensing as a
way of maintaining strategic pressure on practitioners to maintain their
standards of practice (Ellis and Whittington, 1993).
Ellis and Whittington argue that the emphasis on practitioner training
demonstrated great confidence that this guaranteed the quality of the output of
health care. The normative and strategic quality of output was believed to be
assured by the normative quality of medical input. This is markedly different to
Codman's strategic quality emphasis on output evaluation that can be seen to
have exploited his colleagues' reliance on normative quality.
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According to Ellis and Whittington it was the period from the 1930s onwards
where outputs of care gained in importance in the UK and the USA as a variety
of studies produced useful data. Many of these studies are continuing to the
present day. They are mainly concerned with one particular kind of outcome -
death - in a variety of settings: maternity (Hooker, 1933; Maxwell, 1984);
Anaesthesia (Lunn and Mushlin, 1982); deaths under 50 years of age (Royal
College of Physicians, 1978) and pen-operative deaths (Campling, Devlin, Hoile,
and Lunn, 1993). Other outcomes of health care have been studied such as the
success of cardiac surgery, diagnostic testing and ceaserian sections (Ellis and
Whittington, 1993, p12).
These studies correspond to attempts at statistical process control and are
analogous to the cybernetic feedback controls in quality management reviewed
earlier but at the stage of retrospective inspection of the output14. The feedback of
a limited range of outcome measures that began in the 1930s is complemented by
an informal tradition of clinical meetings in hospitals to discuss unusual or
difficult cases (Shaw, 1986; Ellis and Whittington, 1993). Ellis and Whittington
point out that this usually begins with a review of medical records which also
corresponds to a methodological bias toward retrospective inspection (1993, p12).
However, another analogy may be made: unusual or difficult medical cases are
analogous to the errors that most quality management methods in
manufacturing seek to eliminate at source. Clinical meetings can be seen in
strategic quality terms as a problem-solving approach1 5•
Amongst the first and most well known explicit theoretical attempts to tackle
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quality consistently were those of Donabedian (1980) and Maxwell (1984). They
each designed quality assessment schemes which have been of great influence in
NHS quality management. Since then activity in quality intensified constantly.
Ellis and Whittington identify 13 varieties of quality initiative (table 2 - see
appendix C) that they classify as 'quality specific techniques' (because they were
devised as means to manage quality) (1993, p66-154) and 'generic techniques'
(because they were devised for management generally) (1993, p155-188). They
then discuss over 40 examples of quality initiative drawn from these categories
that have emerged mainly in the 1980s. Kitson, Harvey and Guzinska (1987)
produced a directory of nursing quality assurance, including long lists of quality
related activities, cross-referenced with health authority locations. For example
they list 29 health authorities in which quality circles were being used, 5 health
authorities in which patient satisfaction surveys were being used and so on.
Monitor, a checklist of hospital quality items was the most widespread and
frequently used quality initiative in District Health Authorities. 'Patient
satisfaction systems', which means patient questionaires, suggestion and
complaints procedures and opinion poiis, were a small proportion.
There was also a boom in 'medical audit' which is a term defined by Shaw (1986)
to mean the evaluation of quality of NHS services. Shaw states that medical
audit was not widespread at the time he was writing. He argues that this was
because the medical profession was confident that it was self-critical in practice
for instance through case conference meetings. Nevertheless he states that 'it has
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Quality specific techniques	 Generic techniques
Professional standards systems 	 Surveys
Comprehensive review systems	 Consensus development
Case selection techniques 	 techniques
Local problem solving techniques 	 Psychometrics
Process measurement techniques	 Interpersonal skill analysis
Quality control techniques
Outcome appraisal techniques
Consumer involvement techniques
Records techniques
Table 2: NHS approaches to quality management
been shown many times that.. .(via systematic analysis)...unexpected findings and
improvements are possible' (Shaw, 1986). He therefore argues that medical audit
should be a part of clinical practice. Ellis and Whittington, in contrast to Shaw,
argue that the reason for the slow spread of audit is because the medical
profession 'has been notably unwilling to participate in quality assurance, and
once persuaded of its value, has been very creative in setting up separate systems
in which its ownership can be clearly established' (Ellis and Whittington, 1993,
p195). They further argue that these 'separate systems' are important for the
preservation of medical professional power. They believe it is no accident that
the term 'medical audit' is used frequently since this is a sign of medical power.
Shaw's remarks about medical audit seem to leave out the majority of activity
related to quality in the NHS which is dominated by nursing and the 'professions
allied to medicine' (Ellis and Whittington 1991). This has been a source of
confusion and dissension and so the phrase 'clinical audit' is sometimes used to
denote a much wider scope of quality interest than that of the medical profession.
For example Normand, Ditch, Dockrell, Finlay, et a! (1992) undertook a
government commissioned comprehensive survey of 'clinical audit' in the
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'therapy' professions.
Shaw (1986) argues that clinicians in groups, or individually, have organised
systematic analysis with a view to improving the quality of practice, in spite of
limited resources, because of a tenacious commitment to provide services of the
highest possible quality. Here perhaps again can be seen something of what
appears to be a caring altruism which, in health economics, is often termed the
'caring externality' (Mooney, 1993). This is the the sense of satisfaction (or
'utility') associated with caring for others. Putting it this way throws into relief
both the mysterious nature of human agency and the inadequacy of economics to
account for caring: If the need to care (and obtain satisfaction) was as imple
strategic action then, on the whole, nurses and doctors would pay to work in the
NHS rather than the other way around. Yet otherwise caring is an economically
bizarre behaviour. Dawkins (1989) explains apparent altruistic behaviour as the
consequence of natural selection at the level of genes within what is essentially a
prisoners dilemma16. The alternatives in social action terms are that caring is a
normatively regulated action that is supported, amongst other ways, by dutiful
ethics (Seedhouse, 1988) or that it is a subjective phenomena corresponding to
dramaturgical action (Habermas, 1991a). Or finally perhaps it is a way of reaching
understandings with those cared for, or with others.
Whether it is called altruism or a caring externality (or love?) there is a
behaviour expressed in caring that confounds the logic of strategic quality. The
market reforms of the NHS introduced the strategic motives of revenue gains,
and threats of revenue losses, in order to drive up quality, drive down price and
demonstrably improve value for money (Gregory and Walsh, 1993). Has this
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created a new tension between strategic imperatives and altruistic motives
amongst NHS employees? Nurses in the NHS have always attracted the
sympathy and gratitude of the general public. However, if altruism is being
replaced by strategic bargaining in the NHS will the public remain sympathetic to
a workforce that only cares for as much as it is paid? The likelihood is that caring
will continue and will merely be exploited, perhaps as it always has been, by the
employers whether these be NHS trusts or directly managed NHS units through
the underpayment or over working of staff. It is precisely this sort of tension that
could be managed were the reformed NHS based on the principles of critical
quality rather than on what are explicitly principles of strategic quality.
Other interprofessional tensions and struggles can be seen in Adam's (1987)
comments that community doctors, already monitoring 'quality' implicitly along
Maxwell's (1984) lines in 1974, have been marginalised by other groups who
seized the initiative including nurses and General Managers. Adam goes on to
complain about the superficial 'shop-window' quality approach emerging from
the emerging NHS business orientation, for example emphasising hotel services,
rather than what the patient is really interested in - the outcome of medical and
nursing care (1987, p18). In Adam's view quality in the NHS suffers from a
'partial approach'. This is echoed by Donabedian (1991) and Ellis and
Whittington (1993) who argue that there is professional fragmentation of quality
which is clearly visible in the way a multitude of separate records are kept for an
individual patient. It is difficult to pin down who can or should be responsible
for improvements or developments in quality. There is a lack of 'dialogue'
between the NHS professions (Ellis and Whittington, 1993, pl96) a view similarly
expressed by Normand, Ditch, Dockrell et al (1991) on inter-disciplinary
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communications in the professions allied to medicine. Far from NHS
management being able to overcome these fragmentation problems Ellis and
Whittington believe that they are more likely to tackle the seemingly easier
issues of throughput, efficiency and hotel services (1993, p196).
Audit of medicine and surgery (perhaps this could be called 'medical audit') has
become a statutory requirement with the 1989 NHS reforms. This is because a
crucial element in the operation of the internal market of the NHS is the
specification of services in what are euphemistically called 'contracts'1 . Quality
is something that must be implied by these service specifications because an
imperative of the Government was to measure and improve value for money - a
proxy for competitiveness.
Specifying services in the quasi-contracts of NHS providers can only be done if
the specifications are measurable either qualitatively or quantitatively. Since
much of the effort expended during the 1980s on quality in the NHS focussed
upon standard setting (Ellis and Whittington, 1993) this activity probably proved
useful in the creation of the internal market. The assessment of value for money
or provider performance in the NHS internal market is reliant upon the auditing
of performance against specifications. Consequently there are now a vast range of
quality initiatives throughout the NHS that are directed at the 'observation,
review and improvement' (Ellis and Whittington, 1993, p13) of NHS services.
Inquiring into the breadth of involvement of NHS practitioners and other staff
in quality initiatives in Trent Region was a survey element of the Trent Quality
Initiative (Gregory, Romm and Walsh, 1994). This found that many staff at all
levels from domestics to senior consultants were often involved in several
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quality initiatives, such as quality circles and standard setting for example, but
that possibly only a minority of initiatives were considered to be 'working well'
(Gregory et al, 1994, p29). This may reflect a problem that the 'efflorescence' of
quality initiatives, as Ellis and Whittington (1993, pl3) put it, may be at a very
superficial level an observation echoed by Dalley and Carr-Hill (1991) in a country
wide survey of NHS quality assurance. It may also reflect a general lack of
theoretical and practical insight. All this leads to the reasonable question as to
why, with all the specifications required for contracts, the quality of NHS
production remains so contentious? To answer this it is worth comparing the
nature of a service with that of a manufactured good.
Problems with specifying NHS services
Some NHS products take the form of manufactured goods, such as medicines,
spectacles, hearing aids, prostheses, dentures and so on. However most NHS
products are not physical objects because they are predominantly services. Even
obtaining physical goods from the NHS requires that a mainstream service be
delivered to the consumer first. This is usually in the form of primary care (a
medical consultation that offers access to treatments) through general
practitioners or through accident and emergency or some special clinics such as
genito-urinary medicine.
Services differ from physical goods in a variety of ways. Nelson (1970)
differentiates between search goods which may be investigated prior to purchase
and experience goods that have to be consumed before they can be more fully
known. While as K. Walsh (1991) points out most goods have an element of
either characteristic NHS services may be regarded as primarily as experience
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goods.
Services, unlike physical goods, cease to exist at the moment of their creation
according to Marshall (1947). They are intangible, instantaneously consumed as
they are produced, involve the actual maker of the service intimately in a close
relationship which might itself be the product, and only exist if the consumer
uses them (Bowen and Schneider, 1988).
Not only physical intangibility but mental intangibility may characterise a service
to the extent that it may not be possible to determine whether it has been
received at all (K Walsh, 1991, p507). This is most clearly understood with respect
to preventive services like immunisation where it can be difficult to convince
parents of the need to protect their children against 'rare' diseases like measles or
polio.
It is the combining of time and effort with the produced service by the user that
completes the production of the service (K Walsh, 1991, pSO7). Yet while a degree
of control over the production of the service is usually attained by the producer
there may be no control over the simultaneous consumption. Recently there
have been disputes about whether smokers should be entitled to heart surgery
(Independent, 1993). This could be construed as an attempt by clinicians, or by
resource managers, to gain strategic quality control over the way surgery services
are consumed.
Services, unlike physical goods, are not stored prior to consumption, but often
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consumers are stored on waiting lists, to minimise the waste of the producers
time (K. Walsh, 1991). This became a focus for the government when it ring-
fenced budgets to deal with the NHS back-log of work in 1989. Unfortunately
what may have occurred is the perverse rewarding of poor producers (Holloway,
1991) and the strategic reshuffling of waiting lists 18. All of these characteristics
make it difficult to specify the attributes of services. It also leaves the door open
to the temptation to specify the measurable trivia of a service because the
important things are too difficult. This arguably occurred in the Caring Principles
project (Trent Regional Health Authority, 1991) which deliberately avoided
conflict by identifying 'broad', 'non contentious' standards for a wide range of
health services including primary care (GPs) and hospital care.
Perhaps the key issue in the production of services is the role of the user
especially in the face of the socio-cultural complexity of the community served l'
the NHS. Ironically Maynard (1992) comments that the role of the consumer is
one of the unresolved issues of the 1989 NHS reforms and yet this is at a time
when there has been increasing professional consciousness about the importance
of the consumer's judgment. Yet the very nature of NHS services places a
constraint upon a prospective patient's ability to make a knowledgeable decision
about the nature and means of any treatment. However K Walsh (1991) points
out that this does not stop an experience good, such as NHS care, being
reasonably evaluated even if the consumer is unable to say precisely why one
service is preferable to another - it simply becomes 'a matter of judgment and an
exercise in practical wisdom' (K Walsh, 1991, p505). Hirshmann (1983) argues
that because people become used to a service, it no longer yields pleasure but
simply comfort, and this may differ from the consumption of physical goods.
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Consequently expectations rise. This assumes, however, that all people are
always strategic utility maximisers who experience a diminishing degree of
additional satisfaction (or marginal utility). This is simply too simplistic when
viewed from the multiple-social action perspective of chapter 3. The premise
inherent in dialogue is that expectations can be attenuated to a rational level.
Another problem with controlling the quality of a service is that since largely
unspecifiable services cannot be assessed until they are used, then non-
conforming product cannot be eliminated prior to delivery. Yet it is attempts to
eliminate non-conformance with procedures and controls that has dominated
performance measurement in public services (K Walsh, 1991, pp505). Indeed the
audits extolled by Shaw (1986) and by Ellis and Whittington (1993) have attracted
criticism because they are often seen to be aimed at the political control of
expenditure and employee activity (Pollitt, 1988).
Since service quality is a matter of judgment K.Walsh argues that any decision at
all where there is a group of individuals probably involves the denial of an aspect
of someone's values. Since '(t)here is no single value base' (1991, p5O8) this leads
to the difficulty over whose values should determine the quality of services
(Mooney, 1993). Often in the case of services decisions have been heavily
weighted by professional values (K.Walsh, 1993) which corresponds to the
dominance of normative quality in the NHS seen earlier.
This situation has been changing somewhat with the increasing political and
professional recognition that NHS service users have a legitimate and practical
role in the determination of quality. Towell (1987) argues for a 'pluralist'
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approach to the assessment and assurance of quality because of the differing
emphases of various interest groups. Sanderson (1987), a physician in Wessex
Region, remarks that:
The role of the consumer in quality assurance is important and
generally underrated. Their alleged ignorance of the true value
and quality of services has been used to deny their rights and
prevent their involvement in setting standards of quality.. .(but
there are)...general changes in society...(and therefore)...QA
(quality assurance) programmes should take the opportunity to
work with consumers and help change attitudes to their
involvement.
Sanderson (1987, p6).
The NHS Management Executive (NHSME) published a consultation document
that expressed the need for a 'move away from one-off consultation towards
ongoing involvement of local people in purchasing activities' (Department of
Health, 1992a, p'l). They supported the publication of research method guidelines
for Health Authorities to facilitate research into the views of local people about
the purchase of NHS services (Sykes, Collins, Hunter, Popay, Williams, 1992).
This 'listening' initiative is part of the increasing awareness of the patient-
consumer role with respect to NHS services. James in a report to the Department
of Health on social services states that the 'primary definition of quality should
be that of the service user' (1992, p5).
These calls for feedback from consumers may affect normative and strategic
quality in the NHS but do not correspond to a call for dialogue. The Sykes,
Collins et a! guidelines on listening to views about purchasing are very similar to
basic marketing approaches (Collins is a Professor of Marketing at City
University). However, marketing approaches like those recommended are
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aimed at providing producers with information of strategic value and not at
reaching understandings with consumers. Moreover a marketing survey tool is
often conceptually and theoretically fixed as to what is inquired into - the
conceptual models on which they are based are presumed to be adequate.
Similarly 'patient satisfaction instruments' (Ellis and Whittington, 1993, p151)
and tools such as the survey by the Health Policy Advisory Service (1993) (HPAU)
also possess limited domains of validity. For example altough the HPAU survey
provides comparative data with NHS services nationally, so that an NHS
provider can 'bench-mark' service performance, this does not accommodate local
issues and local values. Nor do these tools permit a balancing of the national and
the local issues of NHS quality - that can only be undertaken in some forum
where choices are made. These can only be critical choices if strategic and
normatively regualated action is not allowed to dominate decisions. In other
words without permitting the users of services to challenge the claims to validity,
implicit in quality tools, there can be no grounds to regard NHS users as rational
determinants of quality. While the 'listening' initiatives certainly serve well the
notions of strategic quality that characterise the market reforms of the NHS it is
the purchasers who are really the NHS customers (Gregory and Walsh, 1993).
Any feedback about NHS users viewpoints will be interpreted in the light of the
strategic interests of purchasers and providers. The providers strategic interest in
surviving and prospering is paramount in the reformed NHS. It is their struggle
and striving under the influence of strategic imperatives that is supposed to
improve value for money. Yet it was shown in chapter 3 that the predominance
of strategic action limits the possibilities and options for coordinated action
between stakeholders.
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Only to the extent that there is congruence between the interests of the user and
interests of the NHS purchaser will contract specifications suit the user. Yet, such
congruence cannot be demonstrated without the operationalising of dialogue
since communications will be dominated by strategically employed information -
or in other words propaganda. Propaganda is employed continually. For
example in the media the constant scare stories about the NHS are counter-
balanced by reasurring statements by the government.
A dialogue process in contrast permits any participant proposition to be
comprehensively challenged thus opening up ranges of possibility and domains
of validity that are completely missing from strategic or normative quality. This
sort of challenge requires fundamentally democratic structures and processes to
facilitate but, in accordance with Government policy discussed in chapter 2, local
coucillor membership of health authorities was ended with the 1989 reforms
(Department of Health, 1989a). While the presence of an elected counsellor on a
purchaser does not in itself produce critical quality in the NHS, the absence of
such a representative may weaken feedback to consumers. Perhaps symptomatic
of the communicative failings of the NHS, both in the past and currently, are the
increasing number of self-help user empowerment groups (for example see
Winn, 1990).
Organisation for quality in the NHS: will TQM do?
Quality approaches in the NHS are increasingly viewed as best implemented
within some organisational framework that confers a supposedly comprehensive
approach like those of the gurus reviewed earlier. This almost without fail
consists of borrowing ideas such as TQM from business and industry (e.g. Ellis
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and Whittington, 1993) and other management cybernetic based patterns (eg:
O'Leary, 1991). Ellis and Whittington are cautious, however, about the
appropriateness of industrial models of organisation for the NHS. They argue
that NHS costs unlike manufacturing industry are difficult to account for, the
effectiveness of NHS output is often disrupted, the NHS is also one of the largest
and most complex conglomerate organisations, and there is less managerial
control over its professional workforce than the case in commercial industry
(1993, pl93). Nevertheless Ellis and Whittington tend to overlook the inherent
difficulties of specifying a service but Harman (1992) points out that flexibility is
often needed in the NHS. Attempts to specify NHS services may therefore
reduce rather than enhance quality.
Given the intangible nature of services compared with physical goods, the
contentious role of NHS users, the professional fragmentation of quality, the
difficulties faced in TQM implementations in simple industries, and the nature
of the NHS quality gap (see chapter 2) it might be thought that TQM would be
ineffective in the NHS. Yet, despite their caution Ellis and Whittington support
Oakland's (1989) version of TQM as a suitable mode of NHS quality
management. Holloway (1991) similarly argues that there is no basic
incompatibility between the NHS and TQM. Indeed the NHS Management
Executive budgeted £4 million in 1991/1992 for the support of quality initiatives
including TQM (Department of Health, 1992a). Holloway (1991) lists various
quality initiatives from 1985 until 1989 of which she describes some as 'relatively
comprehensive'. She also assesses the possibility of a VSM version of a TQM
implementation at St. Mary's hospital Luton.
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Munroe-Faure and Munroe-Faure (1992) give two examples of 'Quality
Improvement Initiatives' which they regard as 'TQM in practice' at the East
Birmingham Hospital outpatients and at Doncaster Royal Infirmary and
Montague Hospital Trust. On closer inspection these simply comprise elements
of TQM such as setting mission statements. The Trent Quality Initiative survey
revealed claims to TQM implementations mainly in radiology and non-clinical
areas in hospitals within Trent Region but these were certainly not coordinated
initiatives within the whole organisation (Gregory, Romm and Walsh, 1994).
There are many other claims that TQM has been implemented in the NHS (e.g.
Butler, 1993; Spackman, 1993; Sewell, 1994). However, the critique of TQM
already carried out finds it lacking politically, culturally, communicatively and
structurally. This has caused unease that perhaps TQM is not appropriate for the
NHS (Ovretveit, 1994). There is simply no basis to accept that TQM in its
standard form is suitable for the comprehensive quality management of the
NHS. What is required instead is the implementation of critical quality.
6.7	 Critical quality
If quality is regarded as a variable mediating between communicatively acting
consumers and producers, in which all the forms of social action might be
coordinated in the long run, there exists a condition that may be termed critical
quality. In other words, critical quality in a situation is achieved when dialogue
is institutionalised. Several conditions can be stated on the basis of this
definition to guide the implementation of critical quality.
One structural requirement of critical quality is that participants in the dialogue
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must have the means to implement communicatively coordinated actions
including coordinated strategic action. The adequacy of such structure can be
revealed in the course of dialogue. The lesson to be drawn is that critical quality
can only be achieved where structural requirements can be satisfied.
Another structural requirement means that everyone involved or affected (to
use Ulrich's, 1983 terminology) by the management of quality in the situation
must also have an equal opportunity to participate in the dialogue. This may
appear to be an onerous condition but it does not mean that everyone has to be
simultaneously involved. Rather it means that the boundaries of the dialogue
must be open to challenge. If the boundaries of dialogue are structurally fixed by
a small membership as is characteristic of industry then it would close itself off to
the diversity of differing views that might challenge it. This is quite clear in the
NHS where Normand et al (1992) argues that multi-disciplinary working, though
supposedly widespread, is more often talked about than accomplished. Giddens
(1994) argues that political reform is needed to overturn the destruction of
welfare in the 1980s and to achieve this requires that democracy should reach
both up and down, from nations to individuals. Critical quality might then be
seen as an element of this kind of political restructuring.
The other conditions for critical quality are those relating to dialogue itself as
were specified in chapter 3. Briefly these are that participants have at least the
mimimun communicative competence to be able to deny a validity claim while
being committed to redeeming any claims when required.
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6.8 Critical quality and the NHS
Standard TQM cannot cope with the complexities of the NHS, however,
combining dialogue processes with a framework such as Flood's TQM (which is
itself an expression of critical systems thinking) may offer a mode of critical
quality management for the NHS. This would differ radically from any existing
mode of NHS management. The task of the final part of the thesis therefore is
the elaboration of methodological guidelines for the implementation of critical
quality in the NHS in the light of the practical research into dialogue undertaken
in Sheffield in 1994 - the Trent Quality Initiative.
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Notes
The architect of machine-like 'scientific management' (Flood and Carson,
1993).
2. In a survey of employees of the NHS in Trent Region during 1992, more
than half of respondents claimed to be involved in a 'quality circle'
(Gregory, Romm and Walsh, 1994). One of the participants in the Trent
Quality Initiative (see chapter 7) was thinking about starting a quality circle
as a way of trying to overcome seemingly insoluble problems of conflicting
requirements of nurses, doctors, paramedics, patients and pharmacists, in a
hospital outpatients in a major Sheffied hospital. The rationale for this
plan was broadly that it seemed like a good idea. I suggested that a better
idea would be to begin a process of creative thinking, in which other
options are also considered, including reframing what the problems are
supposed to be. Sadly we had no time to continue our conversation.
3. However white cells are systemic and can eliminate pathogens from any
part of the body supplied by blood. Likewise quality circles would need to
be able to 'circulate' around all parts of the organisation, or at least to have
some overlap, otherwise they cannot be systemically functional. This an
example of an organic metaphor of organisation (Morgan, 1986).
4. The various standards include BS 5750 (equiavalent to ISO 9000), and
others.
5. And in America there are 'more panaceas than problems' (Ackoff, 1992).
6. Avoiding the costs of non-conformance is one of the commonly perceived
incentives to implement one or other form of error-eliminating quality
management. However, the valuation of non-conformance is usually
simplistic. It is usually seen simply as a cost on the profit and loss account.
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In health care, however, the cost of non-conformance to all the
participants in a situation may not be reflected in NHS accounts. Taguchi
(1979) recognises this failing in the usual approach to defining the costs of
non-conformance and so he defines quality as a loss to society. Yet the
practical problems in measuring loss to society may be insurmountable in
the vast number of simple but vitally important situations that
characterise the activities of health and social care. A little flexibility may
be of advantage because the costs of non-conformance must be estimated
originally in non-monetary units. In the hospital ward in Sheffield that I
managed for a period of time there were frequent instances of non-
conformance that might usefully have been investigated simply for the
learning to be gained. For example, curtains would often fall from the
windows. The curtains could never be replaced immediately for structural
reasons of job demarcation, budgets, safety and so on. Instead nurses
would improvise by hanging drawsheets up at the window. Clearly there
are issues of non-conformance here relating to the substitution of
inadequate materials, the use of nurses time on non-clinical duties, the
loss of goodwill, and so on. These would carry a monetary cost in the
hospital accounts although it would be subsidised to an extent through the
act of caring that resulted in the improvisation. However, the most
significant cost of non-conformance would be very unlikely to appear in
the accounts: that of the person whose bed was by the window. The
damaged curtains posed serious social implications for the dignity, privacy
and autonomy of life for the individual who more often than not required
assistance even to move or communicate. Most examples of non-
conformance are probably much less dramatic but unless there is some
attempt to account for the losses to other participants in the situation then
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any monetary valuation will remain partial.
It could be argued that eliminating the monetary cost of non-conformance
would also eliminate the other less tangible social costs. It would not be
necessary to attempt a more comprehensive valuation. However, this
means that the institution would prioritise monetary values over social
values where it might be the latter that are ultimately more significant. In
a private hospital, for example, neglecting a cheap and obvious cost of
non-conformance while pursuing the elimination of seemingly bigger
ones might overlook the loss of reputation and of clients.
7. See appendix B for details of organisational cybernetics and the VSM.
8. The interested reader can refer to Ishikawa and Lu, (1985) or Flood (1993)
or Oakland (1989) for more information about any of these
9. Hutchins (1990) remember argues that Deming developed his people
orientation from observing the Japanese problems of implementing
Deming techniques with machine-like management.
10. Anarchy is the opposite pole to perfect collaboration. Somewhere in
between are economic competition which requires just that amount of
collaboration in order to make it work.
11. See appendix B
12. See chapter 5 on post-critical complementarism which has developed in
the same vein.
13. Her reputation for this is such that her statue can often be found outside
hospitals all over the world: for example Laguna Honda, San Francisco,
USA.
14. All of these outcome studies comprise collections of data over periods of
time that measure a few elements of health care process outputs and
compare the output from one service producer with another. This
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demonstrates a similarity between the production of an health care service
and the production of a manufactured good. Process outputs in
manufacturing are often sampled and the information is fed back to
control the production. Sometimes this feedback is based on the
proportion of consumer complaints or guarantee claims relating to
product failure some time after manufacture - often up to a year. Similarly
the healthcare outcome studies mentioned also measure the proportion of
failures - for example death or readmission - over periods of time. For
example the National Confidential Enquiry into Perioperative Deaths
(NCEPOD) includes in the study deaths in hospital that occur within 30
days of surgery (Campling et al, 1993, p17). This information is fed back to
the improve the control over the production of health care in the form of
recommendations.
15.	 The normative regulation of quality in health care is perhaps being
established further and further back even to the design stage of human life
through genetic engineering and control. However, this is not new.
'Design' of people for zero defects has been a major political concern
throughout the UK, Europe and the USA since the turn of the century
under the influence of social Darwinism and eugenics (Alaszewski, 1988).
Whereas genetic control through sterilisation of 'mental defectives' in the
population was not acceptable because of moral and political opposition,
incarceration in special hospitals to stop people with learning disabilities
reproducing was an explicit British government policy in the Mental
Deficiency Act, 1913. Even World War Two has not expunged such
prejudices even if the opposing of Nazism made discrimination against
portions of the population politically unacceptable. Today people with
learning or other disabilities in many cases face being eliminated before
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birth through abortion. Tomorrows boundary judgments have yet to be
resolved.
16. The prisoner's dilemma is discussed in chapter 3.
17. These so-called contracts are not legally binding (Department of Health,
1989a).
18. The concept of 'Just In Time' management that emerged in Japan
(Oakland, 1989) is a way of reducing the stored quantity of physical goods
that are intermediate to the manufacture of the end-product. Each
intermediate good is produced 'just in time' for its utilisation in the next
stage of manufacture. This reduces costs and, in a way, makes 'just in
time' operations more like services that are consumed as they are
produced. However a just-in-time operation supports mass production
unlike a service. If a 'just in time' good is produced 'too late' then mass
production is lost. This is usually unacceptable and swift action to
eliminate the error will follow. However if a service is delayed the queue
gets longer and may be unacceptable to the consumers and be deplored by
management but the error may still be tolerated for strategic reasons such
as the control of costs.
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Chapter 7
Implementing critical quality
This final part of the thesis presents an overview of an attempt at implementing
a dialogue on quality between NHS users, purchasers and providers, in Sheffield
in 1994 - the Trent Quality Initiative (TQI) (Gregory, Romm and Walsh, 1994). In
chapter 3 I identified five key varieties of social action. These provide a
convenient framework with which to evaluate the TQL These include:
Aspects of strategic success or failure of the dialogue. Were the
preconditions for dialogue satisfied? Chiefly: did dialogue occur
during the Trent Quality Initiative?
Issues of acceptability. To what extent were issues of acceptability
raised in the dialogue and how were they dealt with?
Issues of sincerity and genuineness. In what ways was sincerity
challenged or claimed?
Extent of communicatively coordinated actions. Were any actions
coordinated through dialogue?
I will deal firstly with the background to the project. Then I will discuss the
strategic aspects of the project including the design	 Then I will consider
examples of substantive issues raised during the project - empowerment and
participation - and how these were handled at what may be termed a meta level
of dialogue. I will explore some of the implications of a meta level dialogue
process. After this I will give a resume of the answers to the above questions.
Then finally I will move on to consider how dialogue can begin to transform the
NHS and begin to overcome the inequality inherent in the NHS quality gap.
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VFlood's (1993) use of an organisational cybernetic structure and Hutchins (1990)
use of quality circles are briefly examined as alternative approaches to the
mobilisation of dialogical processes in deciding the boundaries of quality in the
NHS.
In chapter 6 I argued that if quality goals are strategically or normatively given
('take it or leave') then, by definition, they are uncritical. Consequently the
implementation of critical quality can only begin with the creation of the
structural possibility of dialogue out of which can emerge genuine commitments
to consensus goals and genuine disagreements over goals. Dissensus is not an
indication for the expulsion of one or other (weaker) dissenter but for dialogue
and only then can the nature of a commitment be properly assessed. The key
questions therefore are: what is a pragmatic structure for dialogue on quality i n
the NHS and how can it be created? The only example so far of an attempt at
creating a rigorous multi-agency dialogue in the NHS is that of the 'Trent Quality
Initiative' (Gregory, Romm and Walsh, 1994) which I will now review.
7.1 The Trent Quality Initiative
The Trent Quality Initiative (TQI) was an uncommissioned research project that
nevertheless attracted funding from Trent Regional Health Authority. It
involved representatives of NHS purchasers, providers and visually impaired
users in Sheffield over several months from late 1993 to early 1994. There were
more than thirty participants directly involved in the dialogue at various times.
In the following sections I will outline the design of the structure and process of
the TQI and then evaluate the project according to the framework given above.
A caution is necessary. What follows is my interpretation of the design, process
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and outcome of the TQI. For clarIty I am giving my thematised account rather
than my chronological 'blow by blow' version of 'what actually happened' in the
creation of the TQI. My co-researchers (and other participants) almost certainly
differ in their interpretations but this should not be taken as sign that either I or
they necessarily have 'got it wrong'. Rather my account should be regarded as
my attempt to enrich my understanding of the TQI and draw from it those
(disputable) things that suit my purposes. This is a contribution to dialogue.
Other versions of the TQI may be written, by others, in the future and be subject
to dialogue.
7.1.1 Aspects of strategy - the design of the TQI process
The TQI was designed to facilitate dialogue between stakeholders of differing
levels of communicative competence, with differing interests, and unequal
power. In chapter 4 I presented an embryonic analysis of the social action
potentials in the situation involving the Royal Sheffield Institution for Blind
people (RSIB), the Visually Impaired People's Group (VIPs) and the major NHS
purchasers and providers. The two NHS user groups became involved as a result
of previous contacts between the research team and the RSIB whose executive
management are keenly interested in quality issues of health and social care.
Peer group	 r.-.l-----.-.,--_	 Multi-agency
meeting	 meeting
Figure 11 The design of the Trent Quality Initiative
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The problem the researchers were tackling was how to create a 'level playing
field' so that the purchasers, providers and users of the NHS could come together
in away that constrained the distorting influences of strategic and normatively
regulated action, and allowed dialogue to occur. What was proposed was an
iterative series of peer group and multi-agency group meetings (figure 11).
Peer groups were proposed because it was thought that the forum had to be one
in which participants would feel more secure and able to speak openly on issues
they considered important. While no forum can perfectly control all external
factors it seemed that a peer group offered the possibility of normative support
and reduced hierarchical influences on the formulation of viewpoints.
This is borne out to an extent by the participant evaluation forms filled in at the
end of the last TQI meeting and again after several months. Nevertheless there
seemed to be greater tensions in multi-agency groups than in peer groups. The
majority of respondents who were multiagency representatives commented that
peer group meetings differed from multiagency meetings in style and content.
So it is clear that both kinds of meeting indeed contributed distinct kinds of
output which is some vindication in itself of the design which was intended to
reveal and deal with diversity of viewpoints. By arranging meetings for a range
of peer groups it was anticipated that these would function as independent
sources of viewpoint formulation along the lines suggested by Midgley (1992).
During peer group meetings the participants could practice the principles of
dialogue and improve their individual levels of communicative competence.
A multi-agency group appeared to offer the possibility of validity checking of peer
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group propositions as well as the generation of creative insights not available to
peer groups. The way forward seemed to be to alternate between peer group
meetings and multi-agency meetings as shown in figure 11. Peer groups could be
formed from all those individuals who wished to be in a dialogue.
Representatives from these peer groups could then form multi-agency groups as
shown in figure 12.
er group I (Peer group
I	 J	 II
• group ) (Peer group
ifi J IV
group I i' group
V	 1	 VI
Multi-	 Multi- 	Multi-
agency	 agency	 agency
group A	 group B
	 group B
Figure 12 The formation of multi-agency groups from peer groups
So it was envisaged that dialogue would occur both within peer groups and
multi-agency groups and also between groups. In this way it was hoped that the
intensity of viewpoint formulation and validity checking would be enhanced to a
greater degree than if the dialogue occurred in one bigger forum.
This arrangement also means that whatever propositions are formulated in the
security of a single peer group can be examined by several multi-agency groups.
Similarly whatever is formulated in a multi-agency group can be examined in
several peer groups. Consequently every point recorded at any stage is subjected
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to a greater and more diverse assembly for further consideration. It is the ability
to refer a point of dissensus onward to a greater and more diverse assembly that
gives dialogue its potential as a locus of creative and systematically validated
thinking. It is out of this perpetual reflexivity of discourse that critical quality
may begin to emerge.
The details and ramifications of this are discussed below but in summary
dialogue did take place both within and between groups.
7.1.2 The procedure for meetings
Each meeting was facilitated by a university researcher who guided and prompted
the participants on the use of the guidelines (table 3). The meetings began with
accounts of the last meetings given by the representatives that attended them.
Thi•s allowed a systematic dialogue to occur on the validity of the
consensus/dissensus points raised at the other meetings. Some points were
resolved without further reference but other points of consensus or dissensus
were clearly recorded. It is the recirculation of these consensus/dissensus points
around the other groups that offers the potential for insight or action that would
otherwise be hidden.
Table 3: Summary of guidelines for project meetings
We ask that each participant be prepared to:-
1. Read all documentation prior to each meeting.
2. Accept the direction of the facilitator during the meetings.
3. Listen attentively.
When listening to what others have to say, please think carefully
about four things:
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1. Do you understand what has been said?
2. Is the speaker being sincere?
3. Is the speaker's point acceptable to you?
4. Do you agree with the speaker's use of information and/or
experience?
If the answer to any of these is "no" please ask for clarification.
Issues that remain without agreement in any meeting will be discussed
further in a subsequent meeting.
(Gregory, Romm and Walsh, 1994, p153)
7.1.3 Peer group viability
There were six places allocated to each peer group in the TQI which was deemed
to be a practical number of participants in a discussion. Other numbers were
feasible and could have been selected. Fewer numbers would have reduced the
diversity of viewpoints in a meeting and would also have meant that absence for
any reason would have had a proportionately more deleterious effect. A group
reduced from four to two by sickness is less viable than a group reduced from six
to four. Greater numbers potentially increase the diversity of viewpoints but
allow less time both for making propositions and answering questions.
Furthermore increasing diversity increases cognitive stresses on individuals with
limited attention spans (Baddeley, 1990).
	
The pragmatic maximum of 12
members of a quality circle suggested by Hutchins (1990) is probably a good guide
to the maximum ideal size of a dialogue group .
Peer groups sizes in the TQI were not all the same. The NHS user group looked
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as though it might have seven members at the start but two members for health
and social reasons were unable to take part. Another member also could not
attend all the meetings due to deteriorating health. The mixed professionals
peer group had only two members at first and later grew in size to five.
Each peer group differed considerably from all the others and each was called
upon to contribute something original to the dialogue. Within peer groups
participants were able to learn how to apply the dialogue guidelines, practice the
process of dialogue, and refine the issues surfaced into a series of consensus and
dissensus viewpoints on NHS quality. The goal was to emerge from a peer
group meeting with a summary of viewpoints, collectively owned by the peers,
which a delegate would then take into a multi-agency meeting.
The collective ownership of viewpoints in a peer group taking part in a dialogue,
whether consensus or dissensus viewpoints, is important because it increases the
security of individuals participating by alleviating social pressures. Participants
are then more likely to contribute to meetings if the output is collectively owned.
Individuals can avoid the responsibility of being identified personally with a
particular view which may be strategically damaging to them. Unless this
protection is built into a dialogue there is a strategic distortion occurring that
might prevent some individual from taking part or raising an issue.
7.1.4 Scheduling meetings
The meetings schedule commenced on November 1st 1993 and ended on
February 28th 1994 with a commitment at the beginning from each individual
member to attend up to six half-day meetings.
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The practical difficulty of the time constraints of the NHS members meant that
only 3 multiagency meetings were scheduled in each phase rather than the 6
originally intended. The availability of time to participate in dialogue is a major
structural factor and it is worth reiterating that doctors seemed not to get
involved in the TQI mainly for lack of time rather than simple unwillingness.
In contrast Trusts appeared unwilling to create the time necessary for any doctor
to be able to participate. 2
7.1.5 The TQI agenda
The marginalisation of NHS users through political and cultural distortions of
NHS services had already led to the conclusion that dialogue on NHS quality
between stakeholders was needed (Gregory and Walsh, 1993). The introductory
meetings for the TQI conducted with the NHS users and a preliminary survey of
NHS staff in Trent Region confirmed that a variety of conflicts of interest existed
between all those stakeholders who were eventually to take part.
It would have been possible to begin the dialogue with a blank agenda - carte
blanche - and to begin a critical systems problem solving exercise from that point
according to the dialogue guidelines. However, there was also a need to satisfy
the funding requirements of Trent Regional Health Authority with a clearly
structured agenda. This seemed to impose a potentially terminal distortion on
the dialogue but fortunately Ulrich (1983) has provided a method that is both part
of TSI (see appendix B) and Flood's (1993) TQM (see chapter 6). This is critical
systems heuristics (CSH) (Ulrich, 1983).
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Table 4: Critical systems heuristics, questions 1,4,7,10 in the IS mode
1.	 Who is the beneficiary of the NHS quality systems design?
	
4.	 Who is able to change the measures of success?
	
7.	 Who is involved in the design of the systems?
10.	 Who, from those affected by the systems, are involved in
it's design?
Table 5: Critical systems heuristics, questions 1 to 12 in the OUGHT mode
1. Who should benefit from the system's design?
2. What should the purpose of an NHS quality systems be?
3. What should the measure of success be?
4. Who should decide on changes to the measure of success?
5. What resources should they control?
6. What resources should they not control?
7. Who should be involved as designers of the system?
8. What expertise should be used in the design process?
9. Who should be able/expected to guarantee the design?
10. Who (from those affected) should be involved?
11. How should they be involved?
12. Which point of view should determine the design?
(Adapted from Ulrich, 1983)
Critical systems heuristics asks up to 12 questions about 'what is' and 'what
should be the case' on a variety of issues in any planning situation. By using
these questions to focus on quality systems the dialogue would produce a
structured output that promised to satisfy the common basis for participation.
Phases I and 2 of the project concentrated on answering 4 questions (Table 4) to
reveal what the participants thought corresponds to the current arrangements for
quality in the NHS.
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Phase 3 of the project concentrated on answering the same questions in the ought
mode but with the other 8 questions in mind (table 5).
7.1.6 Recording and reporting
There were communication and coordination issues to be considered in the
design of the dialogue. There had to be an effective way both of recording and
reporting the output from each meeting which had then to be passed onto the
next meeting. Since any individual or group of people are limited in terms of
the volume of data and variables that they can handle (or variety as Ashby (1956)
puts it) the meetings were intended to produce summaries of points of consensus
or dissensus.
In the end with the consent of the participants a comprehensive record was made
of the discussions in meetings on flip charts, notes and audio recordings, with
summaries of the conclusions circulated to all participants prior to their next
meeting. Copies of the summaries were produced in print, large print and
braille so that all the peer group members could read or listen to the summaries
being read before each meeting. This allowed the participants the opportunity to
consider what points of validity they would like to clarify at the next meeting.
These arrangements worked extremely well in so far as everyone seemed to
receive material in a timely manner. However in the evaluation questionnaires
there were a few comments about the summaries failing to reflect the content of
the meetings (Gregory, Romm and Walsh, 1994, ppl57-8).
7.1.7 Confidentiality and anonymity
It was regarded as essential for the protection of participants, and others, that
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anonymity and confidentiality be respected during the project and everyone was
asked to avoid naming specific individuals and organisations. Yet this
potentially constrains and distorts dialogue since it limits the specific nature of
some issues being fully addressed. Therefore there was no 'rule' imposed that
forbade any names being mentioned. This allowed the possibility of existing
procedures being used by participants for pursuing complaints or other action in
the NHS.
The dialogue was arguably well equipped for doing this having CHC and NHS
members present who had access to existing mechanisms for
complaint/suggestion making although these were largely regarded as
inadequate and generated much discussion (e.g. see Gregory, Romm and Walsh,
1994, p91). It may be that this aspect of the dialogue was under-u tilised as a way
of implementing coordinated actions on behalf of the participants since very few
participants directly controlled the supply of resources to NHS services - there
were no very senior managers or consultants involved.
7.1.8 The identification of participants: stakeholders, volunteers and peer groups
The research team were already aware of the interest of the management of the
Royal Sheffield Institution for Blind (RSIB) people in research into quality in the
NHS. Following contact with them it was decided that verbal invitations would
be made to the 150 or so visually impaired users of the RSIB day centre to come to
introductory meetings. The RSIB management had also identified another local
organisation called the Visually Impaired People's Group (VIPs) with a
membership of around 60. A small group of the VIPs hold a regular meeting at
the RSIB and they were also verbally invited to attend an introductory meeting.
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The introductory meetings which each lasted approximately 45 minutes,
involved approximately 80 visually impaired people and took place in June 1993.
Participants at the meetings were asked about their experiences of using the NHS
and to tell any anecdotes or stories. Story telling has been used as a tool with
evaluative potential in its own right (Kadiri, Midgley and Vahl, 1993) and the
output from these meetings was used to identify other possible stakeholders in
the dialogue. This data has also been referred to in chapter 3 of the thesis to
illustrate the complexity of quality management in the NHS.
The output from the meetings has been published in full in the research report
(Gregory, Romm and Walsh, 1994). These personal accounts revealed a wide
variety of issues and concerns, reflecting not only the personal experience and
values of the speaker, but also the quality of their information, and sometimes
disinformation.
In the week following these meetings individual approaches were made by me to
virtually all those people who attend the day centre and VIP meetings and I
identified seven volunteers (on a first come first served basis) who formed the
first peer group: the "NHS users".
In this way the first two stakeholders, the RSIB and the VIPs were identified.
They constituted a convenient sample of willing volunteers and were not the
only NHS user stakeholders that could have been involved. However, visually
impaired people also to some extent typify a group potentially marginalised by
NHS decision making although this is a very low level of generalisation. For
instance the 'VIPs' are younger often professionally employed people while RSIB
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day centre users are typically around eighty years old. Consequently participants
from the RSIB are more often than not people whose eyesight has declined in
later life and in many ways are more typical of older people in Sheffield in
general than of visually impaired people. RSIB staff made the point several
times that there is an 'ice-berg' of visually impaired older people of which the
RSIB users are the tip.
The other stakeholders that emerged are listed in Table 6. These were
approached in a variety of ways seeking voluntary representation from them in
order to fill 6 places in each peer group. Approaches were made formally 1y
letters to chief executives and departmental heads and personal approaches were
made to contacts within each broad stakeholder.
Table 6: Stakeholders in the Trent Quality Initiative
The Local Authority
Sheffield Family Health Services Authority
Sheffield Health Authority
Trent Regional Health Authority
Central Sheffield University Hospitals Trust
Northern General Hospital Trust
Sheffield Community Health Council
Royal Sheffield Institution for Blind people
Visually Impaired People Group
The participants might have been 'peer grouped' in a variety of ways although
the peer groupings finally chosen were the simplest as listed in Table 7. The
groupings matched the current policy implementation divisions of the NHS into
purchasers, providers and users of the NHS.
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Table 7: Peer groups in the Trent Quality Initiative
Purchaser management
Provider management
Provider - nurses
Provider - mixed professionals
Community Health Council
NHS users
The "mixed professionals" peer group was created as a result of the difficulties in
finding volunteers to represent separate "paramedical" and "medical" peer
groups. Gaining the support of paramedical and medical staff was difficult
according to senior NHS management, doctors and paramedical staff, because of
the workload of the staff concerned. In addition, feedback from medical staff
who refused to volunteer indicated a reluctance to participate in "yet another
quality initiative". It was at this stage that personal approaches succeeded with
the professions allied to medicine where formal approaches had failed.
The researchers believed that a consensus about the requirements of
representation might lead to some coordinated action to change the membership
in a group and this occurred. During the dialogue in Sheffield, independent
action by the "mixed professionals" led to another paramedic volunteer, from an
hitherto unrepresented stakeholder, joining the peer group because of their
consensus about under representation.
The action was possible because of the information available to an already
participating paramedic. The research team had previously been unable to find a
volunteer for any peer group from the stakeholder concerned. Response from
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stakeholders in identifying representatives was patchy, varying from excellent to
complete inertia. Ultimately all stakeholders had some representation in at least
one peer group. The final composition of the peer groups is listed in Table 5.
Table 8: Representatives in peer groups by source
Purchaser management
Local Authority (1)
Sheffield health authority / family health services authority (2)
Trent Regional Health Authority (2)
Provider management
Northern General Hospital Trust (2)
Sheffield Central University Hospitals Trust (3)
Provider - nurses'
Northern General Hospitals Trust (1)
Sheffield Central University Hospitals Trust (1)
Provider - mixed professionals
Sheffield Central University Hospitals Trust (2)
Northern General Hospital Trust (1)
Trent Regional Health Authority (2)
Community Health Council
Community Health Council (6)
NHS users
Royal Sheffield Institution for Blind people (3)
Visually Impaired Peoples Group (2)
7.1.9 Strategic success or failure?
In chapter 3 certain practicalities emerged as preconditions for dialogue including
the opportunity to examine and reject the validity claims of each viewpoint
expressed, the expectation that a genuine response will be made to such denials,
and equality of access to the process. These conditions inevitably imply that
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there must be sufficient resources (time, place, transport, materials, people etc) in
order to undertake the process, commitments by participants to dialogue, the
possibility for independent or coordinated action between parties involved, and
sufficient communicative competence to deny a validity claim. Were these
conditions fulfilled in the TQI? Creating a systematic opportunity to examine
validity claims was the purpose behind the design, method and facilitation of the
TQI. As a precondition for dialogue it was felt to be an adequate design. The rest
of this chapter is to some extent an evaluation of the efficacy of the design in
practice.
There were clearly sufficient resources for the project to proceed to the extent that
it did but as stated already the participation of some groups such as doctors was
minimal. This may have affected the substantive content of the dialogue - or
else there would probably have been no call for medical involvement - but
perhaps had little impact on the process itself. Facilities were provided by the
RSIB, the VIPs and the CHC. Funding for refreshments, transport and
documentation was made available by Trent Regional Health Authority. A
considerable amount of time and effort was given by the researchers and all the
participants.
The explicit motive for commitment to, and participation in, the TQI was a
concern for the quality of NHS services, though it is impossible to know what the
personal reasons were for any individual joining in. Yet given the varied
backgrounds and current roles of the participants we can assume that personal
reasons and the nature of concern over quality (the 'interest') differed from
stakeholder to stakeholder.
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For instance the NHS user participants were people with visual impairment and
registered as such with the local authority. None of them had previously been
involved in a research project of this type although one NHS user was retired
from a senior post in the NHS and was very knowledgeable about health services
research in general. All NHS user participants were interested in the quality of
NHS services and each had views on this that they aired originally in a series of
preliminary interviews (Gregory, Romm and Walsh, 1994).
More speculatively the NHS purchaser representatives were presumably
following up an interest in NHS user involvement and empowerment in quality
initiatives as called for by the Department of Health (1992b; 1992c). From
personal comments made to me at least some NHS provider representatives
were interested in quality management approaches per se reflecting the current
high activity in NHS quality initiatives. Feedback at a pre-project publicity
meeting indicated that the CHC participants were perhaps fulfilling an interest in
user empowerment.
In the terms of chapter 4, each of the stakeholders were outsiders by necessity
with some low-profile insider relationships. The strategic task faced by the
researchers was to create a forum of insiders from the stakeholders so that their
knowledge could be mutually shared and actions coordinated in a way that could
possibly draw each of the stakeholders into more committed insider relations.
Everyone was warned beforehand that there was no certainty of agreement. On
the other hand it was stressed that the whole point about dialogue is that
differences of interest and purpose can be resolved or further researched as a
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concomitant of coordinated social action.
During the course of the dialogue the nature of participants commitments to the
process were clarified. For example, it became clear that visual impairment per
se was not an overriding issue for the NHS users. Rather their concerns were
mainly expressed as ordinary patients of the NHS (Gregory, Romm et al, 1994).
Commitments altered during the course of the dialogue. At the final meeting,
for example, no NHS employee spoke as a representative of a multiagency group.
This interesting fact is examined later because it may signify a constraint on the
commitment of the NHS professional participants because the dialogue had a
formal endpoint.
There were difficulties in gaining commitments initially from certain groups.
As is discussed below there were no doctors involved at first and only two
representatives of the professions allied to medicine. Eventually the 'mixed
professionals' peer group had five participants. Changing commitments
notwithstanding there was sufficient commitment from a large number of
participants to attend the majority of meetings. Although a register of
attendance was not kept from the other records attendance seems to have
exceeded 75% for the entire project of those who made commitments.
The referral of points of dissensus to the next meeting as indicated in the
guidelines was the procedure for handling dissensus. This was crucial: without
this opportunity the dialogue itself would have been meaningless. A potential
problem of the use of systematic validity checking during meetings is the creation
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of confrontation which could disrupt the process. This could take the form of
tactical repeated challenges to the validity of some propositions by other
participants. This might be designed to intimidate, distract or baffle the speaker.
In order to prevent the facilitation of such confrontation during meetings the
guidelines were kept in the background rather than explicitly employed after each
statement - the effectiveness of the dialogue was seen to be vested more in the
overall process than in individual communicative performance3.
However, there are signs that this tactic was used in at least one meeting
(Gregory, Romm and Walsh, 1994, ppll8-l22) though perhaps not as an explicitly
planned use of the validity claims. This occurred during what I regard as the
most challenging multi-agency meeting of the series I facilitated. It was the final
one in which the peer group schemes for reforming the CHC and representation
on NHS Trust boards were challenged mainly on grounds of impracticality.
Being a limited research project there was no further opportunity to redeem any
validity claims or counter-challenge the validity of the criticisms being made.
Nor were any alternative practical suggestions made despite at least a superficial
acceptance of the inadequacies of existing arrangements. In other words there
was a strategic silence. For example,
there was no disagreement, and some support for the point, that
the CHC needs to be publicised amongst the public and NHS
staff. However of the seven actions proposed by the NHS users
peer group none received general agreement or disagreement.
There was no agreement about implementing any actions.
There were no suggestions about who should implement, how
to implement and where to implement each action.
Gregory, Romm and Walsh (1994, p119)
There may even have been changes in the dynamics of participation as delegates
began to act strategically with respect to the end of the project - for instance to
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avoid any further commitments. The meeting ended on clear points of
dissensus that could not be taken forward to a further meeting because there were
none. This was unsatisfactory and stressful for the participants and limited the
possibility for coordinated action.
This was significant in several respects. On the one hand the dialogue seemed to
have failed at this point because no coordinated actions seemed to emerge from
the meeting. However, on the other hand the analysis of the content of the
meeting using the validity claims allows a precise determination of what points
would have required further clarification had there been another meeting.
These consisted in part of sweeping generalisations such as the view that local
people are apathetic as a justification for not attempting to create local
representation on the CHC (Gregory, Romm and Walsh, 1994, p120). The fact
that such propositions were made and were rejected (either by challenge or non-
response) is a positive finding for the dialogue process because the (lack of)
grounds for the rejection was stated clearly.
The validity of this particular generalisation was challenged by the facilitator but
not redeemed - it was simply repeated by some other participants at the meeting.
Interestingly enough at the 'final encounter' one of the participants who had
supported this generalisation at the previous multi-agency meeting claimed that
other participants were making 'unwarranted generalisations' (Gregory, Romm
and Walsh, 1994):135).
In each case the participant was acting strategically perhaps to defend territory
rather than acting consistently and the dialogue reveals this. The participant was
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effectively trying to prevent any discussion of issues that had not been statistically
qualified to some notional degree of significance. This challenge to the validity
of many of the experiences brought into the dialogue was itself challenged and
not redeemed. In other words it did not stand up.
That such inadequate reasoning is recorded and reported - especially given its
origin in senior NHS staff - creates an opportunity for independent action even if
this opportunity is not immediately taken. Moreover since the dialogue
involved NHS users their social networks will have new information. While
this may only be at the level of stories passed around the social peers of
participants, these may be significant in altering the interactions the public have
with the NHS. In the theoretical terms of chapter 3 such stories become part of
the lifeworid of previously present experiences on which NHS users, purchasers
and providers draw in making decisions and evaluating the quality of services.
Lastly the situation at the end of the multi-agency meeting referred to would not
be mirrored in an institutionalised perpetual dialogue where the possibility for
further referral would always exist. All the challenges raised to the peer groups
proposals would have been further reviewed and the generalisations would
themselves have been challenged. The lesson to be drawn from the Trent
Quality Initiative then is that the key to critical quality is in the continuing
opportunity to discuss issues and raise and redeem validity challenges.
Otherwise a strategic opportunity is created that will doubtless be exploited.
While in practice there will often be time horizons on the relevance of an issue -
and therefore the opportunity to act strategically by filibustering - this need not be
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a general problem. This is because the potential strength of a dialogue process is
in successful dialogue between groups rather than simply within groups as part
of a perpetual series. This point is exemplified by the multi-agency meeting
referred to above.
7.1.10 Options for action
During the process it was originally envisaged that action might result from both
peer group and multi-agency meetings. Anticipated examples included the need
of a peer group to do research by gathering more information or expert
viewpoints in order to clarify an issue or to resolve a point of dissensus. In
another instance there may have been campaigning (as suggested by Midgley,
1992). This might have occurred completely independently of any other group.
Action may also have been taken after a multi-agency meeting that was
coordinated amongst the peer groups. It can be seen that the possibilities for
coordinated and independent action were highly varied and are increased 1y
diversity.
In the TQI the purchaser management peer group (including the local authority)
and the provider management peer group each had executive officers or their
representatives. In theory all these individuals commanded or helped
command NHS and community resources with implications for action resulting
from the TQI dialogue. In practice there were perhaps very few significant
resources commanded by these representatives (or that they admitted to) that
were of concern to the other participants. This was a structural problem in the
TQI that would need to be addressed in a critical quality forum.
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The dialogue did create other opportunities for action of which the simple
passing on of information proved more significant than may have been
previously suspected by some of the participants. A key finding was that the
CHC was virtually unknown to the mixed professionals, NHS users and nurses
peer groups with patchy knowledge dominating the NHS manager peer group.
As one would expect, those with reason to be in regular contact with the 1-IC
knew about it and vice versa (Gregory, Romm and Walsh, 1994, p133). This
became important to an NHS user peer group member whose sudden illness also
coincidentally led to the first occasion that he claims to have received poor
quality care from the NHS. He was able to contact the CHC for assistance to
make a complaint which his peer group agreed is generally very difficult due to
their visual impairment.
7.1.11 Measuring dialogue - did dialogue occur?
Previously it was stated that the dialogue guidelines were kept in the background.
This immediately begs the question as to whether the TQI guidelines had any
effect on the dialogue? It may also be reasonably asked whether it is possible to
determine if any dialogue took place at all? How can the process of dialogue be
measured?
It is feasible to go back over the audio records of the TQI meetings and undertake
a linguistic analysis of pragmatic utterances (see appendix D). This would
involve examining in fine detail what occurred at each moment of discussion.
This may be done in terms of the quantity of consensus or dissensus propositions
made that were formally recorded or otherwise 'lost' (before they ever went into
the written record) with the corresponding quantities of validity claims
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challenged, redeemed or unredeemed. This analysis could assess what validity
claims appeared to lead to the termination of propositions or whether a recorded
proposition was accompanied by any unrecorded challenges to validity. The
main use of these analyses would be to inform the participants of the results so
that their meaning could be evaluated in the course of dialogue to help in the
selection of agenda items. It should be possible to observe systematic distortions
of the dialogue - appearing as silences or repetitions. While dialogue occurred to
the extent that validity claims were checked both within and between groups
what I shall now discuss some of the substantive issues raised by the TQI process
beginning with empowerment and representation.
7.2 Empowerment and representation
Earlier it was stated that one of the ways in which commitment to dialogue was
gained was through the focus on the quality of NHS services. Yet, NHS user
commitment to the dialogue would not have been forthcoming were there a lack
of confidence in the process. Moreover, this confidence had to be sustained. For
this to be there had to be a degree of what is sometimes termed empowerment
Empowerment literally means giving power to someone, making them stronger
in some way for example physically, politically, socially or economically 4. A
central premise of the TQI was that creating what might be termed a
communicatively 'level playing field' is, by definition, empowering. One of the
key purposes of the dialogue was to empower those NHS users who might
otherwise be marginalised in NI-IS decision making (Gregory and Walsh 1993).
Dialogue, it was thought, would create an opportunity for an otherwise absent
equitable critique of, and participation in, social action in the NHS.
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To be empowering in a wider sense though, the participants have to be
representative of others and they must be effective in their communication. Yet
the logic of dialogue does not depend directly upon quantity of representation, as
does a majority voting system, but upon the quality of representation5 . The two
key issues therefore concern whether the dialogue participants are able to handle
efficiently the self-generated or imposed variety created by the dialogue and
whether some participants are able to effectively represent themselves and their
communities.
The first issue may be regarded as a cybernetic design problem which has some
relation to the second issue which concerns the communicative competence of
the participants. Clearly, representation in dialogue is only adequate if the
representative is not overwhelmed by the data being produced. It is usually
assumed that NHS users are not equal to NHS professionals in terms of
communicative competence and would therefore be at some considerable
disadvantage in a cross-table discussion.
However, although the use of the validity claims has, arguably, demonstrated
that communicative differences between participants may be reduced - which is
equivalent to empowering - facilitation remained indispensable in guiding and
encouraging the use of the guidelines (Gregory and Romm, 1995).
It is interesting, therefore, to observe that at the final meeting of the TQI no NHS
professional had volunteered to speak on behalf of their multi-agency group. It
remains therefore that one NHS user and two CHC members were the final
representatives for groups in which NHS professionals outnumbered them four
to one. There may have been hidden strategic or other reasons for this, although
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no opportunity to reveal them remained at the end of the project. Speculatively
it may be thought that, on the whole, the professionals had lost interest within
the TQI. This might have been because there was a degree of empowerment of
NHS user viewpoints occurring that was contributing to a degree of
disenfranchisement of the NHS professionals toward the end of the project. In
other words some of the NHS professionals' commitment was waning since they
were not winning the arguments and they were nearing the end of the project.
This could not occur in a perpetual dialogue where uncommitted participants
would drop out to be replaced by those willing to sustain the process.
A clearer indication of empowerment occurred when the NHS users peer group
produced their own detailed set of proposals for a publicising and recruitment
body for the CHC - a task delegated for their consideration by one of the
multiagency groups in the previous phase of the project. Although these
particular plans were challenged in the subsequent multi-agency meeting it was
only the absence of further meetings that prevented counter challenges being
made to produce better proposals given the near total consensus that the CHC
was a virtually anonymous body. The views of NHS users were therefore
formulated, heard and challenged, which exemplifies their relatively high degree
of social empowerment.
The empowerment of NHS users in the TQI was arguably partly the result of
structural planning to manage the variety produced during the process. As well
as guidelines about the logic of dialogue there was prompt reporting, filtering at
every meeting by the participants to summarise and prioritise issues of concern,
referral of points of dissensus onward, selection by groups of the issues they
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wished to discuss, and delegation of issues to other groups for discussion. Each
of these options enabled the variety produced to be attenuated to levels amenable
to management by the groups concerned without losing important details.
Where variety increases there is no reason in principle why additional groups
could not form to deal with it6.
7.3 Participation and the role of lay people in NHS decision making
In the second series of peer group meetings - relatively early in the dialogue
process - the role of lay people and patients in NHS decision making became a
focus for debate. Critical questions were asked about 'who' should benefit from
or change the measures of success of or be involved in designing quality systems
in the NHS. So explicit consideration of the identity of decision makers and
beneficiaries was forced on the participants. The provider-managers suggested
that audit was the mechanism through which NHS patients could be involved in
decision making, implicitly favouring the employed professional, expert
approach to NHS decision making (Gregory, Romm and Walsh, 1994, p80). To a
lesser extent the mixed professionals peer group followed this line. It was being
claimed implicitly either that broader participation in NHS decision making is
undesirable or not feasible but it can be 'proxied' through audit and other
consultative tools.
In contrast the NHS users suggested that patients should be represented in
decisions in a way 'that overcomes disability' (Gregory, Romm and Walsh, 1994,
p82). The nurses peer group followed a similar line to the NHS users while the
CHC peer group explored ideas about democratic patient involvement and
representation (Gregory, Romm and Walsh, 1994, p85). The purchaser's peer
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group commented that the framework for decision making should be based upon
'consumer led' outcomes and upon broader participation (Gregory, Romm and
Walsh, 1994, p86). These groups claimed that genuine broader participation in
NHS decision making is acceptable and feasible while conversely claiming that
narrow participation in NHS decision making is unacceptable. So, very crudely,
at this stage the broad line was drawn between those supporting broadly
participative 'lay-led' decision making in the NHS and those supporting more
narrowly participative 'expert-led' decision making7.
All three subsequent multi-agency meetings prioritised the issue of participation
to greater or lesser degrees and delegated the issues to specific peer groups for
discussion at the next meeting. Of the 17 issue areas specifically itemised in the
written record (Gregory, Romm and Walsh, 1994, pp89-94) 11 directly refer to the
mechanism or conditions of participation of patients and lay people in NHS
decisions.
The purchasers were twice delegated approximately the same issue. For example
Multiagency group (M/A) A delegated the consideration of 'patient involvement:
who are they? what do they want?' (Gregory, Romm and Walsh, 1994, p90) while
M/A group C delegated 'How should users' voices become involved in terms of
planning?' (Gregory, Romm and Walsh, 1994, p93). The mixed professionals
were twice delegated less explicit but nevertheless related issues ('informed
consent' (Gregory, Romm and Walsh, 1994 p90, issue 3) and 'receptive forums'
(Gregory, Romm and Walsh, 1994, p92, issue 3). The CHC were delegated the
user involvement issue three times and 'the selection of Authorities' referring to
NHS purchaser and provider Trust boards (Gregory, Romm and Walsh, 1994,
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p90). Nurses were delegated a 'receptive forum' issue. NHS users were
delegated the issues of the role and profile of the CHC8.
Provider-managers were n o t delegated a participation issue at this phase of the
dialogue. Since delegation was done on the basis of the multi-agency group's
consensus as to a peer group's expertise or need to confront an issue it may be
that provider managers were regarded as either less able or willing or interested
to deal with participation than the other groups. It should be recalled that there
were provider-managers (from separate Trusts) at the simultaneous multi-agency
meetings and none registered an objection to the delegation of participation
issues to other peer groups. Simple caution is one possible explanation of this.
It is easier to wait and see what others say about how you should make decisions
and then criticise rather than the other way around.
The dialogue process at this stage had achieved a consensus about the need to
discuss further the issue of participation in a variety of forms that had been
filtered and selected. The challenges to the acceptability and feasibility of broader
participation in decision making were to come when the easily stated principle
was being fleshed out with proposals for action in the subsequent peer group
meetings.
The third and final phase peer groups each had an agenda to consider with a list
of issues delegated to them by the multi-agency groups. Again there was a task of
filtering and selection occurring which meant that not all issues on the agenda
were discussed. Of the 17 issues delegated to peer groups 12 were discussed in
depth9. 7 of these were participation issues. So from the second phase to the
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third phase, 7 out of 11 participation issues survived the processes of filtration
and selection. All the peer groups apart from the provider managers had at least
one participation issue on their agenda while three (half) had no other kind of
issue.
The issues that did not survive related to the broadening of purchaser/provider
relations to include middle management, staff and patient viewpoints (not
pursued by mixed professionals / nurses), the involvement of 'users' voices' in
planning and specification of services (not pursued by purchasers) and the use of
'receptive forums' in effective use of resources (not pursued by mixed
professionals). The latter issue was also delegated to the nurses peer group who
did consider it.
The peer groups had to suggest what activities were necessary to produce an
outcome in keeping with the principles (including genuinely broadened
participation) of the issue on the agenda. The nurses peer group managed only
to state that 'receptive forums' had to be 'set up' (Gregory, Romm and Walsh,
1994, p100). Similarly the mixed professionals dealing with the same issue only
mentioned 'talking through policies with stakeholders' (Gregory, Romm and
Walsh, 1994, p106). However they also dealt with informed decision making and
suggested 11 linked activities that they believed would enhance patient decisions.
The NHS users dealt with enhancing the profile and representiveness of the
CHC and produced more than 20 detailed activities that might help achieve this.
The CHC peer group dealt with enhancing the design and monitoring of health
care in the community and the selection of Authorities. Again more than 20
activities were proposed to increase 'lay-led' decision making. The purchasers
dealt with patient involvement and complaints handling in terms of the user
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definition of criteria. For example they refer to 'question-card and evaluation
form design - users and professionals?' (Gregory, Romm and Walsh, 1994, p106)
indicating a proposed document that travels with each patient to record and
report their individual requirements and evaluations of service. This was a
concrete proposal on user participation that potentially goes further than mere
consultation and is certainly more clearly 'pro' broader participation in terms of
individual and local decisions. In contrast the CHC peer group proposals for
representation on NHS Trust boards were more concerned with executive
decisions in a way not dissimilar to the Labour Party's manifesto (Labour Party,
1994) announced at that time. This was not unexpected given the strong Labour
hold on South Yorkshire and the presence of Labour Councillors on the CHC. It
would have been more surprising to find the CHC advocating a closing down
rather than opening up of Trust board meetings.
At this stage of the dialogue the participation issue had been raised, filtered and
selected for detailed discussion and was handled in two broadly differing ways.
There seemed no doubt from the NHS user and CHC peer group meetings about
the acceptability nor even feasibility of lay involvement in NHS decision
making. The question was one of h o w it should be organised. The 'lay-led'
model was in full flow. In contrast the three NHS professional groups that were
also dealing with participation issues, in terms of the written record, tended to
pursue the 'expert-led' model even where they were discussing consultation. On
the whole the NHS user and lay person was seen as someone to be consulted -
but not as a strategic decision maker. At an individual level at best the patient
had to be assessed for competence prior to information being supplied to them on
which they were to make a more 'informed decision' (Gregory, Romm and
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Walsh, 1994, p104, para 8.2.5, point 6). At an organisational level managers were
to employ 'user agreed criteria' in evaluation on the basis of which NHS services
were to be programmed and specified (Gregory, Romm and Walsh, 1994, p106).
This is very much in the vein of the Department of Health's Local Voices
initiative (Department of Health 1992b,c). My concern is that, although the
professionals were discussing user involvement, this was responded to
strategically and not with the conviction that users are discerning and potentially
competent decision makers. The evidence for my (contentious) view is
contained in the final meetings.
All of these proposals on participation had to go on to the more diverse assembly
- the final M/A meetings - where approaches to implementation were to be
considered. However details could be challenged, qualified, modified or rejected.
It could have been expected that there would be strong challenges to the 'lay-led'
activity proposals from the minority 'lay' representatives given that NHS
professionals outnumbered them two to one in the M/A meetings. What the
final multi-agency meetings had to deal with then was the possibility of
confrontation on issues of substance in the context of the end of dialogue. I have
already explained that the professionals may have been acting strategically with
respect to this point in time and process. So what did happen to the participation
issues?
It appears that consensus and coordinated actions on participation, to find ways of
implementing the peer group proposals, were not forthcoming. In M/A group
A there was no acceptance by the professionals involved that they could
contribute to implementation on participation issues either directly or even
indirectly (Gregory, Romm and Walsh, 1994, p117). What occurred was a series
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of implicit challenges to the claim to feasibility inherent in the participation
activities proposed by preceding peer groups rather than a challenge to
acceptability. However, M/A group A only dealt with proposals made by the
mixed professional, nurse and purchaser peer groups - the most 'expert-led'
dominated proposals.
In contrast M/A group B dealt with proposals made in the NHS user and U-IC
peer groups but fared no better in terms of consensus on participation issues and
in terms of coordinated action. In this meeting the challenges were more
pointed and explicitly aimed at the inherent claims of participation proposals to
feasibility and to acceptability. For example, as discussed previously, it was
claimed that the public are too apathetic to become more involved in the CHC or
to pursue complaints (Gregory, Romm and Walsh, 1994, p121).
M/A group C seems to have been more constructive, with greater consensus on
the principles and activities of participation issues but again no signs of
commitment by any professionals to implementation or how to implement. For
instance 'receptive forums' and '3-pronged discussions' were deemed to be an
urgent issue for action (Gregory, Romm and Walsh, 1994, p125) but there was no
coordinated action agreed at the time in respect of this. There is the possibility
that some independent action may have been undertaken since but there is no
mention by any respondent of anything specific in the second evaluatory
questionnaire.
So the participation issues raised and debated during the course of the dialogue
largely fizzled out in terms of coordinated action and were subject to a great
302
degree of challenge in the absence of the possibility of reconsidering or discussing
the issues further. The principle of lay-led decision making was challenged ly
those with power to redeem it's implicit claims without the genuine opportunity
to do so in a subsequent meeting. Expert-led decisions began as the status quo of
NHS decision making and remained so - through the failure of the groups to
agree ways of implementing participative proposals. These points are echoed in
some of the participant evaluations of the dialogue that probably come from lay
persons, for example:
Has the project influenced any of your attitudes or actions in
relation to health care issues? If so please elaborate.
(b) No difference in actions. I have not changed my views. I
still think the 'top' want more and they're not willing to
make changes for the benefit of society.
(d) Sadly yes - a loss of confidence in the whole thing from
the top down. I think that managers are interested in
earning a lot of money. How many managers visit the
centres and how frequently?
Gregory, Romm and Walsh (1994, p184).
Conversely, the point made by an NHS professional that the lay participants were
unable to appreciate 'practicalities' (Gregory, Romm and Walsh, 1994, p172) also
emphasises the dominance of the expert-led perspective in terms of
implementation. So dialogue occurred on the issue of participation in NHS
decision making in terms of propositions being made, challenged and qualified,
but without leading to coordinated implementation of actions.
There are two perhaps rather subtle points arising from this about the nature of
dialogue itself. Firstly the dialogue succeeded in empowering NHS users to a
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point short of coordinated implementation of their proposals. As argued
previously, in a perpetual dialogue one might expect genuinely coordinated
action to emerge from such empowerment. Secondly reflection upon the
dialogue reveals a richness of detail and a degree of debate that does not seem to
have been fully visible to all the participants (including the research team) at the
time. This second point warrants some discussion.
7.4 Meta-dialogue
It is possible to see in the TQI that there was a flow of thematic argument from
meeting to meeting that was not controlled by any particular individual or group
except possibly (but not necessarily) the facilitators. The dialogue was designed so
that the agenda of each meeting was determined at the previous meeting and
also that issues could be delegated as I explained above. Moreover it is an
essential characteristic of dialogue that issues can be raised freely. What was
perhaps not so obvious to many participants during the project is that the
individual propositions made in the TQI in quite separate meetings were often
also thematically linked across meetings - for example propositions on
participation issues - perhaps reflecting participant lifeworids. Even the
facilitators were not necessarily aware of all the themes that the participants
themselves might have identified with hindsight had they the opportunity.
Examples of other retrospectively identifiable themes include those of resources,
motivation, and patient rights. Doubtless other themes can be identified by other
observers, such as other participant representatives, and these may not
necessarily agree with each other. Suddenly it seems as if it is possible to hold
another dialogue between observers about the thematic content of an original
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dialogue. Likewise my interpretation of the dialogue content and of what
occurred is disputable (and I expect it to be challenged).
Such a dialogue might be termed a meta-dialogue (following Flood's and
Carson's 1993 definition of a metalanguage) and it deals with the flow of
argument between meetings rather than simply within them. Yet participants in
the TQI were not necessarily aware that such themes could be identified. The two
evaluation questionnaires filled in immediately after the project and then after
some months had elapsed asked for participant opinions on, amongst other
things, personal learning, desirable consequences, and improvements to the
project. The responses are given in full in the research report (Gregory, Romm
and Walsh, 1994, ppl5S-l88). These offer some insights into the richness of the
discussion as perceived by the participants and also into their awareness of the
whole process in which they took part - it is this latter issue which is most
concerning.
There are a range of answers to every question broadly varying from optimistic
responses to pessimistic responses and often contradictory between respondents.
This is to be expected given that the context for the project was deliberately
chosen to for its possible diversity of attitudes and opinions and that expression
of this was promoted as desirable. So, for example, pessimistically speaking some
participants claimed to have learned little if anything from the project while
optimistically others claimed to have learned lots. Some respondents found the
facilitation of meetings to be generally poor while on the contrary others found it
very good. Some found the meetings muddled while others felt they were a good
way of promoting dialogue, and so on.
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What is most striking about the responses, however, is the general lack of
awareness of meta-dialogue. This is visible in the pessimistic responses claiming
that there was muddled thinking and lack of a recognisable framework, in the
many responses that identify that specific issues were discussed but without an
'outcome', and in the near total absence of reported awareness of the broader
nature of some of the issues raised; the participation issue is an exemplar of this.
No participant seems to have been aware at the time, for example, that the
dialogue was processing the thematic participation issue in the way that it did
which, as demonstrated earlier, was in dialogue between groups rather than
simply within groups. So what are the implications of this?
Although the participation issue was dealt with in great detail even in the
absence of knowledge of the overall flow of argument (i.e. of the meta-dialogue)
participants simply did not have access to this information. Consequently the
impression of dis-satisfaction with the process which arises in some of the
evaluation questionnaires may be due in part to this lack of awareness. More so
perhaps than the apparent lack of rational argumentation in some individual
meetings (according to some participant evaluations) or even the general lack of
coordinated actions for implementation.
This possible lack of awareness of the meta-dialogue may be thought of as an
efficiency problem. Individual actors whether facilitating or otherwise have to
be very talented individuals if they are to be able to assimilate and synthesise all
the important thematic elements of a multi-stakeholder dialogue, as well as deal
with a large number of individual propositions, in a strange setting. Practice and
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familiarity with fellow participants should improve the ability of participants to
grasp themes and make judgments.
Firstly, participants will become more intelligible to one another as they learn the
jargon, terms and concepts used by the others. Subsequently, they will obtain
more data upon which to form judgments about sincerity of other speakers, and
judgments about information or experiences offered in support of propositions.
Dialogue efficiency should improve, then, with participant practice. One of the
evaluation questions (Gregory, Romm and Walsh, 1994, p176) asked whether the
respondent's ability to contribute improved during the course of the dialogue.
Again, this was responded to in the diverse and ambivalent way mentioned
previously, although many participants claimed to be as talkative at the end as at
the start (e.g. (Gregory, Romm and Walsh, 1994, p177). However, the CHC peer
group members were obviously familiar with each other and the respondents
thatidentified themselves as CHC members appeared to find the process easier to
'get into'.
Participants in dialogue need a view of the big picture to make sense of the
individual arguments which they conduct. In the TQI the facilitators who were
dealing with a very broad range of project details were probably not able to
provide the degree of clarification that might have enabled the majority of
participants to comprehend the meta-dialogue of personal interest and to go on
to produce meaningful commitments to coordinated action.
The significance of this is that dialogue in a TQI type project might be enhanced
byproviding a special feedback on the meta-dialogue on the identity of the issues
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raised and the type of validity claims that have been raised or redeemed between
meetings. This might raise dialogue efficiency by an order of magnitude over a
process where meta-dialogue awareness is left to individual development and
facilitator judgment. How could such a meta-dialogue be operationalised?
One approach would be to allow stakeholders (i.e. those groups who are
represented in the peer groups) to analyse the thematic output of TQI style
meetings and feedback summarised information into the subsequent meetings.
The participants can then filter, prioritise and select agenda issues for the next
meetings in the light of these summaries. This might enhance argument and
prioritisation and increase the productivity of meetings.
Another approach would turn the TQI process on its head. Instead of
representatives from various stakeholders in the community forming peer
groups in the dialogue, they would form groups in the meta dialogue. The
detailed dialogue itself would be conducted by full time official representatives
who advocate stakeholder positions which may be formulated in peer group
meetings. Alternatively officials may brief themselves on detailed issues
through other modes of research rather than imposing a burden of several
meetings on a particular group in the community which, for example, might be
short of resources. In other words the viewpoints put forward might be largely
expert rather than directly lay formulated. Stakeholder peer groups, with the
help of their chosen advocates and experts, would analyse the output of the
multi-agency meetings which would be part of a perpetual series. These groups
would then feedback their views on the themes of the dialogue to the next multi-
agency meeting. In this way the dialogue would consist of more articulate and
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more effectively prepared propositions, validity claims, and redemptions than if
groups with highly differing competencies faced one another directly.
Nevertheless the dialogue of chief interest to broad groups in the community
would be the meta dialogue in which general principles and themes are
articulated. These general viewpoints would become part of the detail of the
dialogue in the usual way. Crucially though, the articulation of these meta-
viewpoints would help to guide representatives in the filtering, prioritising
analysis and selection of propositions.
The official representatives in the multi-agency groups would be entering into
systematic communicative action in the usual way including making
arrangements for coordinated action for which they need access to and control
over resources. Like Hutchins quality circles these multi-agency groups would be
fed with the resources to make them executively independent but within the
overall framework of dialogical control. This seems to mean that the
representatives would be de facto purchaser and provider managers and what
amounts to solicitor advocates for NHS user groups.
There are objections to this approach. It implies a reduction of the diversity of
viewpoint formulation, an increase in expert domination, reduced participation
of the community with the loss of the opportunity to deal with fine details which
might be more important at times than the overall flow of argument, the loss of
the chance to directly learn about the 'practicalities' of the NHS and to have
prejudices challenged from a variety of perspectives, and the loss of the
opportunity for those who actually do the work of, or use, the NHS to check the
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genuineness of each other's positions. However, it is possible that these
objections can be overcome to some extent with practical benefits to the
community as I shall now argue.
7.5 Diversity, marginal groups and advocacy
Firstly, diversity might still be generated and dealt with even in the absence of
dialogue peer groups. The key to diversity of viewpoint formulation is that there
is a dialogue structure which even very small groups of minimally competent
and resource-poor individuals can easily join to begin contributing. To do that
probably requires an agent or researcher to go out and make contact with such
groups in a way that is socially feasible and culturally appropriate.
Such an 'outreach' idea was floated during the TQI (Gregory, Romm and Walsh,
1994, p102: the word 'outreach' is not in the summary but it is on the audio
recOrd) .This in itself is an important way of beginning to advocate for groups in
the community that are the most marginalised and least likely to be heard.
Travellers, homeless people, certain ethnic groups, children in particular
situations, learning disabled or brain injured people, prisoners, older people,
people with mental health problems, people in remote areas and so on are all
examples of such groups. These may never be able to form a peer group able to
engage in formal dialogue but they can be contacted. Their views on the existing
output of dialogue and their ideas for further dialogues can sought and stated.
They can at the very least participate by proxy through an advocate. There are
examples of existing schemes (e.g. A.S.C, 1995) but these advocates do not usually
have access to a dialogue forum in which to make their views known.
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Advocates may be appointed by a local office, perhaps the CHC, either because
someone has discretely proposed a marginal group, or as a result of a direct
approach from the marginal group. It is worth noting that if the CHC did have
this role they would have to be very high profile in contrast to their current
remarkably low profile status as observed in the TQI (Gregory, Romm and
Walsh, 1994). One way of raising profile (again as observed in the TQI) is perhaps
with prime time advertising and the appointment of 'marginal group' research
staff. Naturally this service has resource implications but the costs are the price
of democracy and management in the egalitarian interests of the whole while the
benefits are improved use of resources - an increase in efficiency and
effectiveness.
Where groups do have the resources and competencies to form distinct peer
groups they may recruit their own advocates. Even wealthy groups may be
marginalised, business people from ethnic minorities for example.
7.6 The effects on participation - finding a constituency
The handing over of dialogue to expert advocates does not necessarily entail
creating a new mode of expert domination so long as they are directly related to a
'constituency' stakeholder that legitimates their role. Where stakeholder
members are concerned about an advocate's conduct of the dialogue they can ask
for another advocate to be appointed by the CHC or recruit one independently. If
for some reason the existing advocate manages to 'stay on' it will soon become
obvious on what basis as any claims that are made may be challenged by the new
advocate. It may then become a question of an advocate demonstrating that they
d o have a constituency to represent since the genuineness of their role can be
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challenged.
7.7 Dealing with the 'small print'
The great potential benefit of an expert dialogue is that peer groups would not be
confronted with a mass of fine detailed argument and would not be forced into
defensive positions by more communicatively competent professionals. Instead
a more leisurely view of the dialogue itself can be taken concentrating on the
emergent issues. They can check that their advocate is producing the right details
in the dialogue, they can also contribute proposals, but they can also take an
overview of what is being produced in other dialogue meetings. If they don't
trust their advocate they can replace her/him. Those who like dealing with the
small print can apply to be an advocate.
The , one thing that is lost, however, is the possibility of learning directly through
having personal prejudices challenged by other stakeholder participants. This is
replaced with the indirectness of an advocacy system. Put another way there is a
loss of immediate critical appreciation at the individual level but an increase in
reflexivity between groups and society.
The corollary is that dialogue and meta dialogue each need to be considered and
perhaps structurally serviced in a dynamic balance so that participants are aware
of their overall progress but are undertaking as much critical appreciation as they
can individually.
Having dealt with issues of substance arising out of the dialogue I will now
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briefly summarise the answers to the evaluatory questions posed at the start of
the chapter.
7.8 Resume: did dialogue occur in the TQI?
Dialogue occurred within meetings but also between meetings. There was a
degree of empowerment of the NHS users that led to user defined proposals
being fielded and challenged. It was only the end of the dialogue that prevented
user defined issues being taken further forward. However once the dialogue
forum had dissolved there was no sign afterwards that longer term insider
relations had been created between any of the stakeholders, although there may
be some 'low profile' inside relations of which I am not aware.
7.8.1 To what extent were issues of acceptability raised in the dialogue and how
were they dealt with?
There were frequent expressions of concern over the acceptability of the current
arrangements of the management of the NHS especially relating to lay-
participation in strategic NHS decision making. However as well as the dialogue
on these matters within meetings it is clear that issues were dealt with at a meta-
level of dialogue of which there was little awareness.
7.8.2 In what ways was sincerity challenged or claimed?
In some ways this is a difficult category to evaluate. Sincerity tended to be dealt
with in a general polite way in the meetings themselves. Indeed the structure of
the dialogue was aimed at producing jointly owned proposals in order to diffuse
away from individuals the possibility of being identified with a specific
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viewpoint. There were challenges made to the sincerity of NHS management in
general (for example claiming that they were more bothered about money than
patients) and this seemed to lead to some territorial responses from managers
particularly in the final meetings.
7.8.3 Were any actions coordinated through dialogue?
Options for action on a wide range of issues were generated and were specified in
detail by the peer groups. However there seemed to be no agreement over these
courses of action between peer groups at the end of the project although it is quite
possible that some of the ideas may have been taken forward. There were some
occasions of independent action taken for example when an NHS user went to
see a senior nurse with some special crockery or the commitment made by a
member of the CHC to put the profile of the CHC onto the agenda of the next
meeting. It is possible that participants wanted to avoid commitments beyond
the end of the dialogue and this may have constrained the coordination of
actions.
7.9 Dialogue and the NHS quality gap
In chapter 2 I suggested that the NHS is characterised by a gap between the quality
of what is provided by the NHS and what is required by the public. This I
illustrated with an hypothetical map of the NHS 'quality gap'. The problem with
this gap is that it is unfair because there is unequal access to the process in which
the boundaries of quality are specified. I propose that the process of dialogue is an
appropriate way of reducing the unfairness and the size of this gap because it can
reveal hidden options for action on quality in the NHS by empowering
participants within a democratically framed, communicatively level, 'playing
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field'. The Trent Quality Initiative provides empirical evidence that dialogue can
occur both within and between meetings amongst widely disparate peer groups
in terms of their social, political, cultural and physical states and abilities. The
TQI can be seen therefore as a step toward creating critical quality in the NHS in
which the boundaries of quality become subject to a lay-critique and are perceived
to be more acceptable to the general public. What I will now do is discuss two
broad approaches for implementing critical quality in the NHS and suggest hat
methods might accomplish this.
7.10 Transforming the NHS: incremental versus radical methods for
implementing critical quality
Approaches toward the implementation of critical quality in the existing NHS
can be divided in into incrementalistic and radical methods. Incrementalistic
methods can be defined as those that promote gradual change and presume that
this• is the only feasible and desirable approach. My use of the term differs slightly
from the notion of incrementalism in policy analysis which is seen as 'muddling
through' organisational decision making (Lindblom, 1959). Incrementalism is
often seen in policy terms to be the 'actual' way that organisational and
governmental decisions are made and implemented (Smith and May, 1980). In
contrast rationalistic decision making is regarded in the policy literature as
having 'predominated in the study of organisation' (Smith and May, 1980) and to
be the model of not only analytically how but normatively how 'ought' decisions
be made (Etzioni, 1967)10. This model presumes that decisions require a search for
goals, the formulation of objectives, the selection of alternative strategies, and the
evaluation of outcomes (Scott, 1971). These ideas also underlie the rationality of
strategic systemic and other management interventions discussed and criticised
in chapter 5.
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My use of the term incremental takes something from both policy concepts and
adds the crucial ingredient critical through the process of dialogue. By
incremental I mean gradual change that often will amount to muddling through
day to day NHS decisions pending the resolution of issues through dialogue. In
terms of the revised insider-outsider model developed in chapter 3 incremental
change does not alter the identity of groups in a situation but it does involve the
creation of at least some insider relations amongst outsiders by necessity and
ideological outsiders. It also involves the weakening of prisoner insider relations
perhaps along the lines of Flood's disimprisoning (1993).
Radical methods of NHS transformation I define as sweeping changes produced
in a short period of time. Referring again to the insider-outsider model this
radical change alters the identity of groups in a situation and revises all the
relations in the situation. Everyone has to look to see how things have changed
and how they are affected. For example no one can take for granted that their
preexisting insider relation still pertains. Or groups previously ideologically
outside might have become thresholders or high profile insiders. A change of
government might be the harbinger of one such radical change. Privatising the
NHS by floating it on the international stock markets would be another example.
The governments creation of the internal market in the NHS is possibly another.
The creation of general management in NHS decision making may perhaps be
regarded as an attempt to be radical that was arguably less so (Klein, 1989).
In policy terms radical simply means rationalistic decisions that produce big
changes. Incrementalism is, by definition, not radical although there is no reason
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why many incremental changes over along period of time cannot also lead to
complete transformation. In this section I shall look at incremental approaches
to implementing critical quality first, and radical approaches next.
7.11 Promoting incremental change - NHS Quality Forums
The structural linking of dialogue groups with points of access to existing NHS
decision making mechanisms is one potentially easy incremental way of
beginning the 'public-sphere' transformation of the NHS. An organismic
perspective shows how this transformation might be seen as the reproduction of
'commensal' seif-organising dialogue groups throughout the body of the NJ-IS,
that reflexively mediate between it and the community, wherever the conditions
are suitable. These conditions include the availability of resources - as in self
controlling quality circles (Hutchins, 1990) - and dialogue conditions, especially
commitments, specified earlier. Looked at in terms of the insider-outsider model
it is equivalent to creating insider relations between NHS management groups
and erstwhile outsider community groups such as the CHC which would become
'NHS Quality Forums'.
In the TQI the possibility of a similar role being undertaken by suitably reformed
Community Health Councils was discussed at length although without a
consensus on practical proposals (Gregory,Romm and Walsh, 1994, ppll9-I2l). It
goes beyond the simple restoration of councillor presence on the boards of NHS
Trusts and Health Authorities although the exact arrangements of the dialogue
process and the number of groups involved would vary from place to place
according to local circumstances.
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The evolution of self-controlling NHS Quality Forums based on dialogue would
offer an efficient means of bringing together the 'lay' requirements, expectations
and beliefs of local sections of the community into contact with expertise in the
NHS. At a local level the output of the NHS can be more closely attenuated to
the customer requirements of the community with a corresponding elimination
of waste.
Where local requirements differ from national policy requirements there is
generated a point of dissensus that can be referred onward to a greater and more
diverse assembly - the wider community of outsider-by-necessity peer groups.
Additionally this could involve the advocates for marginal groups feeding back
to the NHS Quality Forums. In this way local communities may communicate
and coordinate according to the requirements of the whole for efficiency.
Another way of seeing this incrementalistic policy and structure change is as a
recolonisation of the lifeworid of the NHS (see chapter 2). This is much more far
reaching than merely managing the NHS in a new way as has been attempted
many times since its creation. Rather, it is a gradual transformation over many
years of the whole norm-time-space framework on which those individuals who
purchase, provide and use the NHS draw to define their perceptions of the
situation. This is transformation at an anthropological level where the dynamic
creation of diverse but narrow viewpoints about what the NHS should be doing
are communicatively revised. This can also be viewed from the discordant
pluralism perspective of Gregory (1992) in which there is a a process of critical
appreciation facilitated which ripples outwards through society from the
individuals directly involved in the dialogue groups.
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It has to be emphasised again that it is the way that dissensus is handled that will
chiefly determine the success or otherwise in the democratic regeneration of the
NHS. NHS Quality Forums would be confronted with potentially large amounts
of dissensus and therefore there will be requirements for consensus on how to
'muddle through' while the dissensus issues are dealt with. Often there is
unlikely ever to be an absolute consensus on a issue. For example on abortion or
euthanasia. However dialogue provides the rational process for dealing with
such dissensus which might otherwise be resolved irrationally or through power.
7.12 Incremental steps to critical quality in the NHS
Practically speaking the responsibility for creating and facilitating NHS Quality
Forums could be delegated to local CHCs or a quasi-autonomous government
organisation such as the NHS management executive. Legislation would be
needed so that participation by NHS authorities is mandatory but the terms of
reference of that involvement need not be spelled out. Over the course of many
years executives would be preferred by the Department of Health that favour and
successfully practice high quality dialogue over executive autonomy. In this way
executive commitment to democratising the NHS could be acquired and
accumulated strategically.
The role of the CHC or the QANGO would need to be promoted. Such
promotion could coincide with such campaigns like that of the World Health
Organisation's Health For All 2000. Marginal Group research staff would need to
be appointed.
The dialogue process would be convened in the first place as a perpetual calender
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of NHS Quality Forum meetings (say 12 a year) between NHS authority board
executives and the community representatives who would be recruited locally.
These could be local people who put themselves forward and may even be
elected as suggested in the TQI (Gregory, Romm and Walsh, 1994). They could be
expert advocates put forward by the local CHC or by some community group. If a
prospective participant is insufficiently communicatively competent then they
should be able to gain expert advocacy via the Cl-IC. Many existing self help
groups and community support ventures like those mentioned by Winn (1990)
might be able to link into the meta-dialogue.
The agenda would be the one already locally pertinent and in use by the
Executive of each individual NHS organisation. However the outputs from the
dialogue would be distributed to any stake holding groups or marginal group
advocates who require them. These would fulfil the community peer group
functions and feedback their views into subsequent NHS Quality Forum
meetings.
The dialogue guidelines themselves would be identical to those in the TQI.
It is quite possible that the Community quality forum meetings could make full
use of critical systems thinking with suitable training. In this way the dialogue
could become full host to the complementary but critical application of powerful
methods such as the discussion and systemic intervention tools reviewed in
chapter 5 (e.g. CSH, or SSM). This could be an explicit critical systems
intervention. TSI for example might be used in such a setting. In many ways
this kind of intervention might resemble a community operation research
project.
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Although the above structural changes might sound radical in fact the changes
would take many years to put into effect. Many of the meetings held around the
country might not seem much different to the meetings that have occurred in
the past at least until there has been a useful level of communicative competence
achieved by participants. On the other hand some Community quality forums
might 'take off'. Over decades critical quality would emerge. Alternatively a
radical 'Big Bang' approach could be taken to achieve critical quality possibly
within a single decade which I shall now outline.
7.13 Radical steps to critical quality - the 'Big Bang'
A radical approach to implementing critical quality would involve going a
crucial but momentous step further than above. This programme of reform
would create democratic structures within an organisational design noted for its
articulation of notions of balanced efficiency, effectiveness, control and
autonomy. Such redesign could be undertaken strategically along the lines
implied by Flood (1993) and involve the broad restructuring of the NHS into a
viable system; dialogue processes would commence within the NHS and between
the NHS and those it affects in all the communities in which it operates (or
should operate), and dialogues across communities including between
professions, politicians and the public. This kind of restructuring would call into
question all the preexisting insider-outsider relations of the NHS and would
deserve to be termed radical. This should only be done through an act of
government that had already won an election on this basis and it would be a
response to Giddens call for democracy to extend upwards and downwards from
institutions to individuals (Giddens, 1994).
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The existing NHS structure of an internal market populated by Health Authority
purchasers and NHS Trusts would be reformed into democratic bodies that
would determine service specifications and agreements by dialogue with each
other, with the communities they serve, and with the professions and employees
that work in them.
Although the broad NHS would be planned as a viable system the detail of its
operations - the viable system S4's (see appendix B) which are currently
identifiable as NHS Trusts - might be dealt with through a series of critical
systems interventions within dialogue processes. Dialogues could be facilitated
with a variety of discussion tools. Key issues on the agenda of NHS dialogues
would be derived from Ulrich's CSH and would deal with, amongst other things,
the meaning of Beer's efficiency measures in the local context, the degree of
autonomy against regulation in local NHS implementations and so on.
Eventually these planning issues would be regarded as the routinely considered
parameters applied to each new issue put on the agenda by a stakeholder. In
other words they would constitute taken-for granted categories for critical
appreciation.
The NHS management executive would probably be the main body delegated
with the job of implementing the reform through dialogues which would be
resourced so that meaningful coordinated actions could be taken. These
resources would not be small - dialogue groups in Hull might affect budgets of
the order of several hundred million pounds. Overall the NHS budget of £3lbn
would be directed by dialogue groups. Naturally executives would be recruited to
322
replace those unable to commit themselves to the process of dialogue.
Once more the guidelines for dialogue would be similar to those used in the TQI.
Dissensus would be dealt with by referral of an issue onward to peer groups in
the community.
At the start of such a reform the dialogue groups might be confronted with
massive areas of dissensus although the effect of this should not be
overestimated. There would be no paralysis of action as is feared by Grant (1989)
because the interest groups would be insiders engaged in dialogue. There would
still be consensus about the continuation of many existing basic NHS functions
while dissensus points are worked out. For example hospitals would continue to
deliver their services as before in the short term. However their executives
would be engaged in local dialogues on appropriate development and change.
Eventually such change would filter through within a coordinated whole.
The operation of-dialogues would be essential in coordinating and directing
change. Rather than reliance upon 'blind steering' (Habermas, 1991b) the meta-
dialogues would add a dimension of conscious and rational steering to the
determination of quality in the NHS.
7.14 The prospects for radical change in the NHS
There has been an history of radical change in the NHS. As I explained in
chapter 2 it was created at of one of the most radical moments in history - the end
of World War Two. Subsequently it has been reformed (or 'redisorganised' to use
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a Maynard phrase, see chapter 2) several times. The 1989 reforms of the NHS
were not undertaken as part of a specific manifesto commitment but as the act of
a strong government. It cannot be ruled out that radical changes will be made to
the NHS in the future such as its total commercial privatisation. On the other
hand it might be that such future radical changes are essentially egalitarian but
only if the arguments in favour are made and backed up with appropriate
practical methods.
Democracy is a keystone principle of egalitarianism - the ethical commitment to
equality (Seedhouse, 1988). Dialogue is the keystone process of egalitarian
democracy. CST can play a pivotal role both in facilitating dialogues and arming
the democracy with complementary methods for coordinated action. There is no
compelling reason to presume that critical quality in the NHS cannot be achieved
early in the 21st Century. However can critical quality be achieved in other
services and industries? In this penultimate section I shall briefly deal with
public services and industry in general.
7.15 Critical quality and public services
If dialogue can work in the NHS it can work in other public service industries
also. The NHS is the main purchaser and provider of medical and hospital based
nursing services but community care is largely the province of social services.
Since the White paper 'Caring for People' (Department of Health, 1989) market
approaches have been facilitated in the provision of home care and residential
services for virtually all client groups requiring them.
Care management is the principle method for organising community care and
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consists of assessors with budgets who can purchase a package of services from
the private sector tailored to the individual requirements of the service user e.g.
older disabled people: - at least that's the theory. In practice this only works if the
private sector is able to produce the right services at the right price, the budget is
big enough, and the assessor is expert. However there are instances of
catastrophic failure of community care, such as the murder of Jonathan Zito 1y
Christopher Clunis (Ritchie, 1994), where communicative failures led to action
coordination failures. Taking child protection as an example of a very special
community care service communicative failures have been prominent in very
many of the child abuse inquiries such as those reviewed by Reder, Duncan and
Gray (1993) and are simply not addressed by any existing market reforms.
Yet the recommendations and exhortations from these many inquiries which
often extol multi-disciplinary working seem unable to prevent new crises
occurring. In these circumstances there would be much to be gained from
introducing dialogue processes at least as an incremental step toward realising
critical quality of community care. Indeed unless such processes are introduced
into community care, and full recognition is given to systemic complexity,
Walsh, Alaszewski, Harrison and Manthorpe (1995) argue that there will
continue to be unexpected and damaging crises such as that marked by the
Cleveland Inquiry (1988).
Health and social care are one sphere of public service but there are many others.
However since 1979 the Conservative government has introduced markets and
quasi-markets into virtually all service industries that were previously publicly
owned. Water, gas, electricity, telephones, refuse collection, community care,
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hospital care and so on comprise large sectors of industry blindly governed to
some extent by market forces. However it has been argued in chapter 3 that the
theory of market forces is underpinned by a notion of only one kind of social
action. It is not surprising then to find that all of these markets are explicitly
regulated to some extent - market forces alone clearly do not produce what
economists would call efficient solutions to resource allocation, service
specification and delivery in any of these markets. Nor do they produce what
Seedhouse (1988) would call egalitarian solutions. However does regulation
correct this? Can Oflel, OfGas, OfWat or the Community Health Council make
the specification and delivery of these services sufficiently efficient to satisfy
capitalists and 'buy off' wavering socialists of Britain in the late 1990s? Or is
regulation a misleading and bogus idea?
An insider - outsider analysis is revealing: All the industries mentioned are
composed of strategically independent units. Notionally these industrial units -
British Gas, the water companies, power companies and so on - are each
competing in a market but in practice they have for the moment near total
monopoly status. This means that they are able to define quality of service in a
strategically one sided way within certain regulatory limits. These limits reflect
certain public entitlements and comprise a degree of normatively regulated
quality of service.
With respect to the majority of those to whom they do or could supply a service
each industry is an outsider. Moreover, so are the regulators who are also
outsiders with respect to the public. There is little basis for systematic
communicative action between the groupings. There is no basis for critical
326
quality leaving only a regulated market and a political economy of quality.
Consequently there will be crises which seem unexpected - but only if you have
the narrow market view of .public services.
The recent pay scandals are a moot point. These industries will undoubtedly
attract at least some competition into their arena. Therefore newly privatised
industries are never ever likely to be as profitable as in the first few years after
privatisation. Those who manage these industries will never have such an
opportunity for short term profit. Given the infamous British short termism
discussed in chapter 6 it has to be questioned whether future well being is being
sacrificed in selfish short term interests.
Only when serious competition does enter the markets for water, gas, electricity,
and telephones will a fully two-sided strategic approach to quality of services in
general develop in these industries. Nevertheless the regulators could take on a
new role as dialogue centres in which they performed their functions as insiders
with the industry and with the community rather than being outsiders-by-
necessity. In this way quality would become a communicatively mediated
variable rather than wholly a strategic variable. Competitors to the main
providers can still enter the market but on a specification determined through
dialogue in which the interests of the wider community are expressed and
coordinated.
Finally the community and industry in general would benefit from beginning
dialogue processes. Traditional interest groups such as the Confederation of
British Industry and the Trades Union Congress could well perform pivotal roles
in the facilitation of dialogue. Since dialogue is inevitably about taking a longer
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run view than that usually attributed to industry the 'short termism' that
characterises British industry would be gradually replaced by longer run views.
Greater stability of price, quality and delivery of goods and services could be
achieved within an increasingly egalitarian national structure.
All that remains now is to review the content of the thesis, assess to what extent
the goals of the thesis have been met, identify what contributions to knowledge
have been made, and set out what further research and development might
emerge from the thesis.
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Unlike juries dialogue groups are intended to be systematic in reviewing the
evidence before them according to communicative guidelines. Also unlike
juries what the dialogue group members advance as reasons for reaching
their collective agreements and disagreements may be cross-examined by
other participants in the dialogue. Juries themselves are not required to give
reasons or be challenged on their viewpoints. The size of a jury is considered
to be very important in influencing verdicts (Carson, 1994) but the process of
dialogue purports to overcome the distortions introduced by group
dynamics. If this is so then juries should perhaps be reconstituted along the
dialogue guidelines suggested here.]
2 1n a conversation that I had with a senior executive from a major NHS Trust
when trying to canvass support especially from doctors I was asked if the
Regional Health Authority was making participation compulsory. I
responded by stating that participation was voluntary. Subsequently no
doctors from the Trust participated probably because the Trust could see no
strategic value in making any medical staff available. I had a similar
experience with several Trusts.
Checking the records carefully does enable the dialogue to be evaluated post
hoc in terms of validity claims raised, redeemed and failed but not in terms
of the intrinsic value to the participants.
For example in child care there are frequent calls for empowerment e.g.
Bond and Keys (1993); Cannon (1993); Gibson (1993); Lindsey (1993).
The parliamentary model of the House of Commons is interesting because,
following an ancient protocol, the Speaker is elected from and by the
members to maintain 'order' and nominate in an equable manner who
should speak. Similarly if a dialogue group has become sufficiently robust it
will become seif-organising if, like Hutchins (1990) self controlling quality
circles, they are fed with sufficient resources.
House of Commons arguably does not support dialogue since
propositions, questions and answers are produced for strategic purposes and
not the communicative purposes of reaching understandings. The 'select
committees' perhaps contribute more to the communicative action of
parliament than the sittings in the Commons.
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1 This debate between what Hood (1992) terms broad participation ism and
narrow participation ism is a hot topic in the risk literature which has many
parallels with the quality literature..
Note that there is some double counting because some issues were delegated
to more than one group at an M/A meeting. Similarly the issue of NHS user
involvement in design and planning was duplicated in M/A groups B and C
and was delegated by both groups to the CHC peer group. The latter were
clearly regarded at the separate M/A meetings to have the interest or the
expertise on this issue.
Out of the 17 issues there was one duplicate referred to already - the design
issue which was delegated twice to the CHC by the independent M/A groups.
'°Grant (1989) comments that there is often confusion over analytical and
normative theories in politics a view supported by Smith (1980) on policy.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion
In this thesis I have brought together the theories underpinning critical systems
thinking, dialogue and quality and related these together to form a new view of
quality that I have termed critical quality. In the course of this I have highlighted
the diversity of stakeholder perceptions of quality in the NHS, defined dialogue
as a special conditional process of mediation between actors, explored the way
that social action potentials can be identified between actors in diverse situations,
considered how critical systems thinking can assist in the creation of dialogues,
analysed quality in terms of social action, and finally reviewed the Trent Quality
Initiative, a practical research project on dialogue in the NHS.
What I will do in this final chapter is to summarise to what extent my thesis has
met the original objectives that I had when setting out on my research, what
contributions to knowledge the thesis makes, what recommendations the thesis
supports and what further research on dialogue can be undertaken.
8.1	 The original objectives of research
When I embarked on this research I had been specialising as a nurse in the care of
older people. I worked as a charge nurse in a hospital ward with clients some of
whom were individuals who 'lived' at the hospital on the wards where I
worked, others for whom rehabilitation from strokes and other illnesses were
not deemed possible and who came in from rehabilitation units and waited
while a nursing home bed was found, and others who were admitted in the
expectation that they would die sometime very soon. In winter when pressure on
beds in the city began to grow we would sometimes accept younger patients with
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other medical problems including, once, a middle-aged woman who had had a
coronary less than 24 hours previously but was transferred from coronary care to
the ward on which I worked because of demand for beds.
The hospital was built as an isolation unit for people with infectious diseases so it
was remote from the city, certainly one of the highest hospitals in England and
way above the smog and smoke of industry with keen fresh air, and it was
designed to minimise the spread of respiratory diseases with very long corridors.
Yet this function was obsolete, it was crumbling and it was being used for other
purposes of which the most bizarre was probably the nursing of older people.
There was a great deal that was unsatisfactory with those wards but how could it
all be expressed in a simple, pithy way? How could the inadequacy be measured?
Quality seemed to me then, in 1991, a good way of beginning to deal with it. I was
convinced that by arguing for quality and criticising the obvious failures around
me that I was acting in the interests of my patients. I thought I needed a surefire
formula to identify those who were 'marginalised', and arrange to consult them
in some way, so that their views could be taken into account. This was my first
idea about 'pushing out the boundary' of decision making in the NHS. I soon
outgrew this arrogant idea however.
My personal research objective changed from the search for an ultimate (and
universal) scientific quality formula to the search for a way of bringing together
diverse actors because the 'problem' was more complex than I first appreciated. In
my new view the NHS quality 'problem' is not directly related to any particular
shortage / excess of any resource - human, physical or fiscal - or to the use of any
particular formula for combining these. Rather my understanding of quality in
the NHS is that it is problematic because of the dilemmas arising out of
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differences of beliefs, means and ends of those producing, using or not using the
NHS. This means that my original aim of finding an (indisputable) quality
formula could not be achieved. Instead I strived to find a way of mediating
between individuals and groups with alternative views.
This change in my research path is one of the clearest signs of my personal
development - I have changed from wanting always to find the single 'true' path
(consisting mainly of assertions that this or that should or should not happen) to
wanting to open up options for action. In terms of the NHS this means that
formulas are still useful but only to the extent that they are used critically and
fairly. Fairness I have defined communicatively - crudely social action is fair
when those it affects can challenge effectively the claims to validity inherent in it.
Social action is unfair when those affected cannot challenge it. Again crudely my
commitment to 'fairness' is partly based on a wish to care for others (a sincere
value that I cannot wholly explain away as a manifestation of selfishness) and my
perception that cooperation is strategically vital for the longer term viability of
organisation (whether local or global) because it allows other options to be
developed. Nevertheless my new perspective is only beginning to unfold. I have
not 'arrived' - I am simply in transit (and enjoying the trip).
As I mentioned above a major research objective that was part of my remit was to
think critically about how to 'push out the boundary' of NHS decision making.
This objective has been achieved to the extent that NHS users were engaged in
dialogue with purchasers and providers in the NHS. What is more the potential
of dialogue has only begun to be explored. This thesis has helped to elaborate and
link the process of dialogue (a sociologically grounded theory) empirically with
the goal of quality (a pragmatically grounded ideal) through the medium of
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critical systems thinking (linking theory and practice systemically and critically).
These contributions to knowledge can be spelled out more fully:
8.2 An increased understanding of dialogue
An increased understanding of dialogue has been achieved in two ways. On the
one hand empirical evidence has been provided of dialogue - indeed that it can
occur at all. This is sociological data of interest to those who support or dispute
Habermas's theory of communicative action. On the hand other dialogue has
been shown to be a flexible practical process that may possibly be modified at a
meta-level to achieve increased efficiency and effectiveness of mediation between
actors. This is management systems and science data of interest to those who
wish to manage organisations and to those who support or dispute practical
social interventions whether locally or globally. These conclusions can be
confirmed or challenged through the examination (in terms of the
communicative validity claims identified byHabermas) of a full data set that has
been recorded in written and aural media kept in the Centre For Systems Studies
at the University of Hull.
8.3 A new understanding of quality
Quality is usually defined in a pragmatic way and it is widely acknowledged to be
an under-theorised field. However the social action perspective of dialogue that I
have applied to quality allows quality to be understood in three broad
sociologically grounded ways - as strategic quality, normative quality and critical
quality. By defining critical quality it has become possible for critical systems
thinkers to say how cooperation through understandings can form the basis for
the provision of goods and services where previously quality has been
understood as resulting from a mixture only of dutiful and/or competitive goal
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directed actions. Critical quality links practical management interventions
through critical systems thinking with an abstract sociological theory. This
strengthens the ground for quality management as a democratic process.
8.4 The communicative development of critical systems thinking
The direct use of Habermas's theory of communicative action as a sociological
grounding for defining the process of dialogue has enriched critical systems
thinking in several ways: critical systems thinking can move on from the older
hackneyed and idealistic notions of 'ideal speech' and 'communicative
competence' to more practical notions of 'ideal seeking' and 'level playing fields'.
The consideration of communicative variables in any intervention can be seen
now as inevitable and therefore their consideration can become part of the 'front-
end' of critical systems interventions - especially those applying Total Systems
Intervention. Dialogue offers a framework within which to embed critical
systems interventions and one of the explicitly strategic goals of CST becomes the
creation and continuation of dialogue between stakeholders - this latter point
supports and develops other post-critical work in the CST movement that has
arrived at similar conclusions through differing routes: that of oblique
interventions. The modelling of social action potentials between individuals and
groups in terms of insider/outsider relations develops the ability of critical
systems thinkers to consider communicative variables explicitly.
Having outlined the contributions to various fields of knowledge I will now
consider what further research on dialogue and critical quality can be undertaken.
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8.5	 Opportunities for further research: dialogue in the NHS
Further research is required to repeat the format of the Trent Quality Initiative in
similar settings in order to verify or challenge or extend the conclusions reached
in this thesis. Other formats can also be experimented with in order to maximise
the efficiency of the dialogue process for example making use of meta dialogue..
At some stage it would be vital to begin a dialogue project in which there was
credible executive involvement but such a project might only be organised in the
NHS with the support of the Department of Health.
8.5.1 Dialogue in other public services
If dialogue can work in the NHS it should work in other public service industries
also. Since the White paper 'Caring for People' (Department of Health, 1989)
market approaches have been facilitated in the provision of home care and
residential services for virtually all client groups requiring them. Care
management is the principle method for organising community care and consists
of assessors with budgets who can purchase a package of services from the private
sector tailored to the individual requirements of the service user e.g. older
disabled people: - at least that is the theory. In practice this only works if the
private sector is able to produce the right services at the right price, the budget is
big enough, and the assessor is expert. However there are instances of
catastrophic failure of community care, such as the murder of Jonathan Zito by
Christopher Clunis (Ritchie, 1994), where communicative failures led to action
coordination failures. Taking child protection as an example of a very special
community care service communicative failures have been prominent in very
many of the child abuse inquiries such as those reviewed by Reder, Duncan and
Gray (1993) and are simply not addressed by any existing market reforms.
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Yet the recommendations and exhortations from these many inquiries which
often extol multi-disciplinary working seem unable to prevent new crises
occurring. In these circumstances there would be much to be gained from
introducing dialogue processes at least as an incremental step toward realising
critical quality of community care. Indeed unless such processes are introduced
into community care, and full recognition is given to systemic complexity,
Walsh, Alaszewski, Harrison and Manthorpe (1995) argue that there will
continue to be unexpected and damaging crises such as that marked by the
Cleveland Inquiry (1988). Consequently community care is a priority area for
research into the creation of dialogues. This will inevitably focus especially upon
the necessity of approaching some less accessible groups including homeless
people, travellers and so on.
Finally the community and industry in general would benefit from beginning
dialogue processes. Traditional interest groups such as the Confederation of
British Industry and the Trades Union Congress could well perform pivotal roles
in the facilitation of dialogue. Since dialogue is inevitably about taking a longer
run view than that usually attributed to industry the 'short termism' that
characterises British industry would be gradually replaced by longer run views.
Greater stability of price, quality and delivery of goods and services could be
achieved within an increasingly egalitarian national structure.
8.5.2 Disability and dialogue
The Trent Quality Initiative involved people with visual impairment, but with
ordinary levels of communicative competence, in meetings with NHS
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professionals. However dialogue potentially provides a way that individuals
with the barest minimum of communicative competence - the ability to deny a
validity claim - can engage others in debate. There are two broad aspects to this
relating to the role of intelligibility and to efficiency and effectiveness of dialogue
processes. Firstly a denial of a validity claim can be made by somebody with a
limited command of language (e.g a young child) or severe language impairment
(arising from injury or an innate learning disability). This is potentially
empowering because there are many individuals whose language (and other)
disabilities currently means that they are not recognised as competent decision
makers. The law, for example, even accepts an IQ level of below 50 as indicative
of mental deficiency (Carson, 1994). For practical purposes of care this has never
been accepted as the limits of an individual's ability to make choices but the
ability to deny validity claims has never been considered as a decision making
tool. Within a dialogue framework in which a denial is entitled to a response it
may be that this provides another way of disimprisoning some of the most
vulnerable members of society. Critical systems research from a post-critical
perspective would use the denial of a validity claim as the starting point for the
generation of options for action.
This research would usefully consider how language-disabled individuals can
communicate a denial and what methods can be used to generate options for
action. These options might involve finding ways of making the response to
such a denial intelligible to the individual concerned. Or, if this is impossible, as
to how a communicative advocate can be employed. How would such a person
facilitate their client's interaction with their social environment in shops or with
public services for example? To what extent can autonomy be created for such an
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individual? This could be a profoundly emancipative project. There is another
corollary however of this. An objection that might be raised to the inclusion of
the less communicatively able in dialogue is that they would slow the process of
decision making down by raising unnecessary challenges to validity claims, the
burning question therefore is: what structures for dialogue can be created to
enable efficient and effective decision making but which is also accessible to peer
groups and which balances the local and non-local? I have already suggested
possible 'organismic' (quality circle) and 'brain' like (organisational cybernetic)
solutions but what other possibilities are there? How would they be
operationalised? In this thesis I have dealt with quality but it seems to me
(recently!) that it is possible to go not only 'beyond' TQM but beyond quality itself.
8.6	 Beyond quality - risk?
Quality and risk are clearly linked. Risk defined as possibility of an undesirable
situation (Alaszewski and Manthorpe, 1991) applies to quality: there is a risk that
quality may not be achieved. There is the possibility that what was agreed about
quality may be ditched by one of the parties, or that what has been promised and
previously assured, may not actually be delivered. A high quality nursing home
for example may deny certain choices to residents in the interests of health and
safety. What are the consequences of this? While this may conform to the
requirements of health and safety it may deny the vital characteristic of human
life which is expressed in purposeful risk taking. In other words the claim to
quality may be denied. This is one way of beginning to think about risk. Unlike
quality, risk relates directly to the short and long term choices that individuals
make. As a concept it has a status in sociology and economics that quality does
not have (it has been written about by Giddens (1991) and Luhmann (1991) for
example). It is a far more dynamic variable because it deals directly with choice,
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decision and action. Yet the relation between risk and quality has not been
explored despite the inference that lower quality may mean higher risk or that
quality is sometimes evaluated in terms of risk. One question then is how is risk
related to quality in practice? For example how is accountability operationalised
for risk and quality within the same organisation? What constraints does this
impose on options for action? This is a fertile ground for development
particularly from the perspective of choice within the post-critical paradigm.
Critical systems thinking has the basic framework and tools to conceptualise the
domain of risk in welfare organisations. Surely it is only a matter of time before
the task is undertaken!
It can be seen that this thesis only scratches the surface of possibility for dialogue
yet dialogue is not a fashionable contender for political supremacy. However
thinking about the possibilities for dialogue, about the structures required to
make it operate, is a step toward realising dialogue in practice. An ideal
egalitarian society may never be achieved. Yet, since there is no known steering
mechanism that can overcome inequality, a fairer society will only come about by
arrangement - through dialogue. Thus dialogue is a vital research topic.
8.7 Summary: dialogue, quality and critical systems thinking
In chapter 2 I explained that the NHS 'quality gap' is not an easily circumscribed
issue. It is 'caused' by political, cultural and social diversity of health beliefs,
practices and interest both within and without the NHS, and internationally. It is
a conundrum of how to mediate between these differences to achieve goal
successes, that are acceptable to those whose diversity is reflected fairly in the
quality gap. Or, how to accept the principle of inequality and the futility of
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attempts to mediate such diversity.
The argument for the egalitarian management of the quality of NHS services
began in chapter 3. Firstly I elaborated the elements of dialogue derived from
Habermas's theory of communicative action (Habermas, 1991; Habermas, 1991).
This theory shows how strategic, dramaturgical and normatively regulated
varieties of social action can be evaluated and coordinated through
communicative action which occurs when individuals are attempting to reach a
mutual understanding of a common situation. Dialogue I defined as the
systematic opportunity to enter into communicative action between individuals
and groups. The NHS quality gap is therefore a problem of achieving strategic
success, that is dramaturgically genuine, normatively acceptable and
communicatively coordinated through an egalitarian and democratic process of
dialogue.
In chapter 4 I elaborated a theory of interest group relations, characterised as
insiders and outsiders, derived from Grant (1989) which I combined with the
theory of dialogue. I argued that it is possible to model the potentials for social
action between individuals and groups in a way that summarises relations in
terms of insider-outsider group status. I argued that the analysis of the NHS in
Sheffield provides one view as to the social action potentials of the groups that
between them define the local boundaries of quality.
In chapter 5 I introduced critical systems thinking (CST) and explained how this
framework can contribute to the fair renegotiation of the boundaries of quality in
the NHS. I justified the appropriateness of CST as a framework for the
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management of quality in the NHS, rather than the many other often apparently
conflicting alternative theories and methods in the organisational literature, in
terms of the critical and complementary themes in CST. I argued that in general
CST can be enhanced by embedding interventions in dialogue processes.
Another significant conclusion was that CST can increase its emancipative
potential, and may be undertaken in more widely varied situations, by the
analysis of the social action potentials of situations for example in terms of the
insider / outsider model. I argued that other recent developments in CST,
particularly the oblique use of systems methods proposed by Flood and Romm
(1995), also imply the need for dialogue processes.
In chapter 6 using the theory of communicative action I defined three modes of
quality management - strategic quality, normative quality and critical quality. I
argued that strategic quality traditionally dominates in post-war commercial
industries while normative quality is more strongly associated with health
services. Critical quality I defined as the determination of service quality through
dialogue. Various approaches to quality management were reviewed including
some of the so-called quality 'gurus' and total quality management and I argued
that these mainly support one or two sided strategic quality in industry although
Flood's TQM does, in the spirit of critical systems thinking, methodologically
integrate debate and disimprisoning into quality management and organisational
design. I argued that Flood's TQM can be enhanced through the use of a dialogue
framework. However I also argued that services are fundamentally more
difficult to specify than the production of physical goods and that this emphasises
the need for dialogue on them boundaries of quality in the NHS.
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In chapter 7 I gave an account of a critical systems intervention to create a
rigorous dialogue on the boundaries of quality in the NHS between purchasers,
providers and users in Sheffield - the Trent Quality Initiative. I evaluated the
TQI in terms of the social action framework according to it's degree of strategic
success (including the empowerment of NHS users), the way that issues of
acceptability were dealt with, in terms of the way sincerity impinged on the
dialogue, and finally as to the extent that actions were coordinated through the
dialogue. I argued that the TQI demonstrates that dialogues can be conducted
both within and between groups through alternating series of meetings and that
this empowered NHS users to a considerable degree but that there were few clear
signs of coordinated actions arising directly from the dialogue. I argued that this
was perhaps because the TQI was a limited series of meetings and that many of
the professionals involved avoided commitments towards the last meeting. I
argued that in a perpetual series of meetings that this difficulty would be
overcome. I further argued that the professionals involved in the dialogue may
have been acting more strategically than sincerely on the issues of user
involvement in deciding the quality of NHS services.
The dialogue process occurring between meetings I defined as a meta-dialogue
and argued that it is crucial to give feedback to participants on this so that they
can filter and select dialogue issues more effectively. This led to the suggestion
that peer groups formed from members of the public might participate directly in
a dialogue or, alternatively, they might participate mainly in the meta-dialogue
and use advocates to represent their viewpoints in the main dialogue.
I then argued that critical quality can be achieved in the NHS either through an
343
incrementalistic path or a radical path to change. The former I argued involves
improving efficiency and effectiveness through the creation of local NHS Quality
Forums without massive structural changes to the NHS. The latter I argued
involves a massive reform of the NHS possibly into an overtly organisational
cybernetic design but with dialogues occurring within and between all
stakeholders locally and nationally. Finally I argued that public services in
general could become critical quality services.
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Notes
Unlike juries dialogue groups are intended to be systematic in reviewing
the evidence before them according to communicative guidelines. Also
unlike juries what the dialogue group members advance as reasons for
reaching their collective agreements and disagreements may be cross-
examined by other participants in the dialogue. Juries themselves are not
required to give reasons or be challenged on their viewpoints. The size of
a jury is considered to be very important in influencing verdicts (Carson,
1994) but the process of dialogue purports to overcome the distortions
introduced by group dynamics. If this is so then juries should perhaps be
reconstituted along the dialogue guidelines suggested here.
2.	 In a conversation that I had with a senior executive from a major NHS
Trust when trying to canvass support especially from doctors I was asked if
the Regional Health Authority was making participation compulsory. I
responded by stating that participation was voluntary. Subsequently no
doctors from the Trust participated probably because the Trust could see no
strategic value in making any medical staff available. I had a similar
experience with several Trusts.
3. Checking the records carefully does enable the dialogue to be evaluated
post hoc in terms of validity claims raised, redeemed and failed but not in
terms of the intrinsic value to the participants.
4. For example in child care there are frequent calls for empowerment e.g.
Bond and Keys (1993); Ganrion (1993); Gibson (1993); Lindsey (1993).
5. The parliamentary model of the House of Commons is interesting
because, following an ancient protocol, the Speaker is elected from and by
the members to maintain 'order' and nominate in an equable manner
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who should speak. Similarly if a dialogue group has become sufficiently
robust it will become seif-organising if, like Hutchins (1990) self
controlling quality circles, they are fed with sufficient resources.
6.	 The House of Commons arguably does not support dialogue since
propositions, questions and answers are produced for strategic purposes
and not the communicative purposes of reaching understandings. The
'select committees' perhaps contribute more to the communicative action
of parliament than the sittings in the Commons.
7. This debate between what Hood (1992) terms broad participationism and
narrow participation ism is a hot topic in the risk literature which has
many parallels with the quality literature..
8. Note that there is some double counting because some issues were
delegated to more than one group at an M/A meeting. Similarly the issue
of NHS user involvement in design and planning was duplicated in M/A
groups B and C and was delegated by both groups to the CHC peer group.
The latter were clearly regarded at the separate M/A meetings to have the
interest or the expertise on this issue.
9. Out of the 17 issues there was one duplicate referred to already - the design
issue which was delegated twice to the CHC by the independent M/A
groups.
10. Grant (1989) comments that there is often confusion over analytical and
normative theories in politics a view supported by Smith (1980) on policy.
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Appendix A
A chronology of Habermas's texts cited in the thesis
Habermas, Jurgan. (1968). Erkenntnis und interesse. Suhrkamp Verlag: Frankfurt
am Main. Later published as Habermas (1972)
Habermas, J
.
 (1970). Knowledge and interest. Sociological theory and
philosophical analysis. D. Emmet and A. Maclntyre. London, Macmillan: 36-54.
Habermas, J. (1970). Towards a theory of communicative competence. Patterns of
communicative behaviour. H. P. Dreitzel. New York, Macmillen.
Habermas, J
.
 (1972). Knowledge and human interests. London, Heinnemann.
Published earlier as Habermas (1968).
Habermas, J
.
 (1973). Wahrheitstheorien. Wirlichkeit und reflexion: Walter
Schulz zum 60 Geburtstag. H. Fahrenbach. Pfullingen, Neske.
Habermas, Jurgan. (1981a). Theorie des kommunikativen Handeins, Band 1:
Handlungrationalitat und gessellshlaftliche Rationalisierung. Suhrkamp Verlag:
Frankfurt am Main. Later published as Habermas (1991a)
Habermas, Jurgan. (1981b). Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, Band 2: Zur
Kritik der functionalistishcen Vernuft. Suhrkamp Verlag: Frankfurt am Main.
Later published as Habermas (1991b)
Habermas, J
.
 (1982). A reply to my critics. Habermas: critical debates. J
.
 B.
Thompson and D. Held. London, Macmillen.
Habermas, J
.
 (1990). Moral consciousness and communicative action. Oxford,
Polity. Previously published papers.
Habermas, J
.
 (1991a). The theory of communicative action: reason and the
rationalisation of society. Cambridge, Polity Press. Previously published as
Habermas (1981a)
Habermas, J. (1991b). The theory of communicative action: the critique of
functionalist reason. Cambridge, Polity Press. Previously published as Habermas
(1981b)
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Appendix B
A resume of Total Systems Intervention and associated methodologies
Total Systems Intervention
Total Systems Intervention (TSI) is the brainchild of Flood and Jackson (1991a)
and has since been further developed by Flood (1995a,b). Flood and Romm
(1995a) give a neat synthesis of TSI. They describe it as a 'metamethdology' that
'works with the assumption that all problem solving methods are
complementary' (p379). The process of TSI involves a three phase iterative
process of creative thinking, choosing, and implementing a method or methods
to deal efficiently, effectively and fairly with problem situations.
In the original version Flood and Jackson (1991a) suggested that creative thinking
about problems could use systems metaphors (likening complex organisational
systems to more common conceptions e.g. to machines, brains, organisms and so
on (see Morgan, 1986)) 'to help managers think creatively about their enterprises'
(p50) and to identify dominant and subordinate metaphors. An enlightened
choice could then be made about which method(s) to use to deal with the
situation by bringing together a critical understanding of systems methods gained
through the system of systems methodologies (SOSM) with creative thinking
through metaphors. In the later version (Flood, 1995a,b; Flood and Romm, 1995a)
the emphasis on metaphors and the SOSM has been dropped. Instead there is an
emphasis on how choices can be made to use any method critically, either
obliquely or directly. This follows creative thinking using a broader range of tools
than metaphors and the critical understanding of methods is being developed in
terms of a critical review mode (Wilby, 1995).
Flood and Jackson (1991a) reviewed 6 methodologies in detail out of 13 they
placed within SOSM. Three of these I have referred to at various points in the
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thesis. Critical Systems Heuristics I have dealt with in chapter 7. I will describe
briefly below the viable system model (VSM) (referred to chapter 6 and 7) and soft
systems methodology (SSM) (referred to in chapter 6).
The Viable System Model
The VSM is claimed to be a general model of any persisting kind of organisation
(see Espejo and Harnden, 1989). It is closely identified with a 'brain-like' view of
organisation (Morgan, 1986; Flood and Jackson, 1991a). A viable system comprises
five subsystems that each carry out what Flood (1993) terms functions that are
related to one another in specific ways. System 1 (Si) is the implementation
subsystem. This is where the organisation actually produces the product or
service that sustains it 'in business'. System 2 (S2) is the coordination system
between all the five parts. System 3 is the control system. System 4 is the
intelligence gathering and analysis system and System 5 is the strategic policy
making and decision system. Each of these systems are related to one another
through specific channels for passing information and commands. Every system
1 contains all five subsystems so that the VSM is recursive. It can be magnified so
that particular jobs can be specified or magnification can be reduced so that the
whole organisation itself is seen as an Si within a much bigger viable system.
Perhaps the most interesting element of the VSM from the viewpoint of
dialogue is that the VSM articulates and specifies the necessity of balance between
autonomy and control. An organisation cannot be viable if it's Sis are not
sufficiently autonomous. However viability is threatened by the loss of control.
The VSM therefore problematises the balance between autonomy and control. In
the terms of this thesis that balance should be struck through dialogue. As Flood
put's it 'quality management can only happen when people have autonomy,
responsibility, can participate and are not subject to coercive forces - i.e. when
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they are free' (1993, p126). The viable system model is discussed in depth by Beer
(1979a,b and 1981) and Espejo and Harnden (1989).
Soft Systems Methodology
The SSM is a structured process of inquiry through which participants in a
problem situation can come to understand their situation better, and suggest
culturally feasible and systemically rigorous ways of improving it by modifying
existing systems. One of the key principles of the SSM is the distinction between
the real world and systems thinking. The systems thinking in SSM produces
conceptual models that are compared with the 'real world'. Through this
comparison differences become clear that can be used to suggest changes in real
world organisation. The process of SSM begins with creative thinking or finding
ou t by building a rich picture to express the problem situation - a profile of the
real world. Another element of the process is to produce ideal root definitions of
systems using the famous CATWOE mnemonic. This involves identifying
(C)ustomers (those who will benefit or suffer from the activity), (A)ctors (those
who do the activity), the (T)ransformation process (through which inputs
become outputs), the (W)eltanschauung (loosely speaking a world view or big
assumption about how/why the system works), the (0)wners (who can stop the
activity) and finally the constraints of the (E)nvironment as they are given.
Conceptual model are then produced from these root definitions which specify
the actual activities involved in the system and finally there is a debate about
how reality compares with the conceptual models and what desirable and feasible
action can be taken to improve the situation. Full details of SSM are given in
Checkland and Scholes (1990).
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Appendix C
1. Common health service quality approaches
Standard Setting
This has been one of the most widespread and key activities in NHS quality
management. There are professional standards originating in professional
organisations. For example the College of Occupational Therapists, the Chartered
Society of Physiotherapy and the Royal College of Nursing have all been active in
standard setting. Usually a working party is convened to identify and at least
provisionally specify standards that the workers are supposed to fulfil. Ellis and
Whittington (1993) note that these standard are sometimes very general. For
example the College of Occupational Therapists Standards (1989) refer to the need
to consider 'resources' when discharging a patient to the community. Broad based
non-contentious standards were the explicit goal of the working party that
produced 'caring principles' for Trent Regional Health Authority (1991). A typical
caring principle often used the phrase that the patient 'will have confidence' in
some quality of the service such as the professional conduct of staff. Standard
setting has also become the focus for what Ellis and Whittington term
'comprehensive review systems'. An example of one of these is the Dynamic
Standard Setting System (DySSSy) developed by the Royal College of Nursing
(1990). The broad process of DySSSy is for staff in a clinical area to identify some
matter for quality improvement, determine criteria for measurement using
Donabedian's structure, process and outcome, and agree a standard to measure
against. What follows is refinement and evaluation. Ellis and Whittington feel
that the widespread 'ground level' involvement of staff in using DySSSy might
help to create a quality culture. I would argue that it is likely to create a DySSSy
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culture!
Audit
Various tools have been devised to measure and evaluate records. For example
the Phaneuf Audit (Phaneuf, 1976) uses 50 statements (e.g. 'cause and effect is
understood') grouped in 7 categories of care (e.g. the observation of symptoms
and reactions) to which yes/no answers can be given. Note that reviewing
records is not the same as auditing social action. In contrast QUALPACS relies on
two observers (whose inter-rater reliability has been determined) who discretely
and confidentially observe periods of care. Feedback is given to the clinical area
on performance (Pearson, 1987).
Ellis and Whittington also list a large variety of techniques under other headings.
For example they refer to the use of general health indicators, quality of life
scales, disability measures, and pain measures under 'outcome appraisal' (1993,
p257) and quality circles and a quality improvement plan under 'local problem
solving techniques' (1993, p254). Interested readers can refer to their volume for
further information.
2. Quality function deployment
This is described by Munroe-Faure and Munroe Faure (1992). The approach
facilitates a trade off between customer requirements and design and
manufacture constraints. This is done through a 'house of quality' which
specifies on the same chart the customer requirements, engineering variables,
engineering characteristics that affect customer requirements, the interaction
between the latter, the target engineering characteristics, the importance of each
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requirement, and finally the customers perception of competitors. In this way
quality function deployment produces a picture in which judgments can be made
as to what tradeoffs can be made but always from the perspective of customer
requirements and always in comparison with competitors. This model assumes
therefore that such information is available.
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Appendix D
Measuring dialogue
it is feasible, on the basis of Habermas (1991a), to undertake a linguistic analysis
of pragmatic utterances to determine what statements were made, what validity
claims were raised, what valdity claims were challenged or denied, what validity
claims were redeemed, and which validity claims were forgotton or dropped. The
following is an abbreviated extract from the audio record of the NHS users phase
1 meeting of the Trent Qualitry Initivative (Gregory, Romm, Walsh, 1994) which
is analysed according to the guidelines given in chapter 7:
MsB
The complaints system is not benefitting visually impared
people because they cannot write.
Mr R (challenges information / experience claims of the above)
The above does not entirely apply because a lot of people doe not
help themselves even though they could.
Mr H (attempts to redeem information / experience claims made by Ms B)
'I telephoned' (at least some people try to help themselves but
without success because of the difficulties involved)
That was the end of that particular exchange. The proposition that visally
impaired people find the complaints systems difficult to use which was made by
Ms B did not become part of the written record. When propositions disappear
from the dialogue this can be observed and become subject t o the dialogue.
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